Mapping Medieval and Modern chauvinism in England

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There is evidence for the long-run persistence of geographical variation in tolerance towards other ethnicities. However, existing studies of tolerance use data from countries with long-standing patterns of ethnic diversity, so it is unclear whether the inter-generational transmission is in attitudes towards specific ethnic groups or in an underlying cultural trait of which such attitudes are just one expression. This paper presents evidence for the latter, identifying geographical variation in the intensity of anti-immigrant sentiment in England that has persisted over eight centuries, spans the arrival and departure of different immigrant groups, and is correlated with authoritarianism.

Recent evidence in economics and political science indicates substantial long-run persistence in the extent to which different ethnic groups interact co-operatively or antagonistically. For example, Jha (2013) finds that modern Hindu-Muslim conflicts are less frequent in those parts of India where in the Mughal period there were greater gains from trade between Hindus and Muslims, while Voigtländer and Voth (2013) find that the regional variation in the intensity of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany is correlated with the regional variation in 14th century Germany.[1] One type of mechanism that could explain such persistence is the inter-generational transmission of social norms through instruction or imitation (Cavalli-Sforza *et al*., 1982).[2] Moreover, different types of prejudice, including anti-Semitism, are known to be correlated with authoritarianism (Kaufman, 1957), and recent work in sociology and social psychology has developed a theoretical framework to explain how authoritarian and social dominance traits combine to produce intolerance and prejudice (Thomsen *et al*., 2008; McFarland, 2010). The persistence of regional variation in the magnitude of intolerance might then be explained by the

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[1] These papers are part of a wider literature documenting evidence for the persistence of different cultural traits. For example, some of the variation in modern US state constitutions is associated with cultural heterogeneity across different groups of 18th century settlers (Fischer, 1989), and modern US homicide rates are higher in regions where the settlers had an 'honour culture' (Grosjean, 2014). There is more social capital among communities which were part of independent medieval city-states (Guiso *et al*., 2008), and less social capital among communities that were victims of the slave trade (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009); because the slave trade changed gender ratios, these communities also retain different attitudes towards polygyny (Dalton and Leung, 2011). Societies descended from communities using the plow exhibit less gender equality, because the plow gave men a comparative advantage in work outside the home (Alesina *et al*., 2013). The regional variation in modern Polish political preferences is correlated with the historical division of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2013).

[2] It is also possible that genetic transmission has a role to play. See Martin *et al*. (1986) and Alford *et al*. (2005).

inter-generational transmission of these underlying traits.[3] In this case, the level of antagonism between specific ethnic groups is not just a consequence of the history and economics of the relationship between the groups, but also of more deeply rooted social forces. Addressing perceived historical grievances ('they've taken our land / our jobs / our social benefits') will not entirely mitigate the antagonism.

One way to test the conjecture that ethnic intolerance is a function of persistent underlying traits is to examine a case in which one ethnic minority disappears and is replaced, after some interval of time, by other minority groups. If the conjecture is correct, then the regional variation in intolerance towards the first minority should be correlated with variation in intolerance towards the later minorities, and with associated traits such as authoritarianism. In this paper we argue that medieval and modern England represents such a case.[4] In the 12th and 13th centuries, England was home to a large Jewish community which had emigrated from France in the years following the Norman Conquest of 1066. However, the distribution of Jewish communities was not uniform across the country: communities were established in about 30 English towns, and Jews were largely absent elsewhere. These communities survived to the end of the 13th century, when all Jews were expelled from England: this was the first event of this kind in Europe, 200 years before the expulsions from Spain and Portugal. England was officially barred to Jews until 1656, and although there were probably a few Jewish families living secretly

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[3] For this type of inter-generational transmission mechanism to explain the long-run persistence of regional variation in tolerance towards other ethnic groups (as in the German case), it will be necessary that the rate of migration between towns is not too high, and that those who have recently arrived in a town tend to conform to the established culture and/or marry locals. Winney *et al*. (2012) report a substantial amount of geographical clustering of both genotypes and surnames among the modern British population, which suggests that such conditions do hold in the UK, and that geographical variation in cultural traits could persist over time.

[4] Throughout this paper, the term 'England' is used in its narrower geographical sense, excluding Wales and Scotland. Very little is known about the history of Jews in medieval Wales and Scotland (Skinner, 2003).

in Tudor London, there was a period of nearly 400 years during which neither the Jews nor any other minority of overseas origin were seen in England.[5] Jewish immigration in recent centuries has been limited; the modern English Jewish community represents less than 0.5% of the population and is largely concentrated in the London area. On the other hand, England is now home to other ethnic minorities, mainly of Caribbean and South Asian descent (as a result of late 20th century immigration) and of Eastern European descent (as a result of early 21st century immigration). In the most recent census, 13% of English residents reported that they were born outside the United Kingdom.

In this paper we will explore the regional variation in attitudes towards immigrants in 21st century England, and in associated cultural traits, including authoritarianism and support for far-right political parties. We will see that conditional on socio-economic conditions and on measures of social capital, tolerance towards immigrants is significantly higher in towns that were home to medieval Jews; these towns are also less authoritarian and show less support for the far right. This suggests that there is inter-generational transmission of an underlying cultural trait that transcends the relationship between the indigenous community and any one immigrant group. However, this trait is distinct from social capital.

The next section summarizes the history of the Jews in medieval England, which informs the analysis of the modern data in subsequent sections.

THE JEWS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

Jews in the English Economy

Jewish communities were absent from England before the Norman Conquest (Scheil, 2004); according to the chronicler William of Malmesbury, the first English Jewish community was

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[5] As discussed in Appendix 4, most of the French Huguenot immigration was at the end of the 17th century.

founded in London in the late 11th century. The settlement of French Jews was encouraged by the first Norman kings, and tax records indicate that by the middle of the 12th century, Jewish communities had been established in eleven different English towns (Hillaby, 2003). The Jews played two key roles in the medieval English economy (Mundill, 2010). Firstly, ecclesiastical law prevented Christians from lending money to each other at interest, and the only interest-bearing assets available were those created by contracts with Jewish financiers. Secondly, the feudal system gave the king very limited powers to raise direct taxes, and this weakened his bargaining position during frequent political conflicts with the barons. The Jews stood outside the feudal system and were vassals of the king, so he could tax them directly. Jewish tax revenue increased the king's bargaining power, so the Jewish community became associated with royal authority.

The 12th century Jews seem to have been able to choose where to settle, and their movements were not regulated by the state. The taxation of Jews was infrequent; the two most substantial levies – each known as a *donum* – occurred in 1159 and 1194. Comparison of the 1159 and 1194 records shows an increase in the number of tax-paying Jewish settlements from eleven to 21, and an increase in total tax contributions from £362 to £1,742.[6] Hillaby (2003) notes that most of these settlements were in established towns that contained a royal mint, and that many lay close to a royal castle that could provide protection from anti-Semitic attacks. Historical records lack the detail to determine whether the location of Jewries was driven mainly by economic factors or by variations in the local intensity of anti-Semitism. Either way, most English Jewries were well established when, in 1194, the state began to regulate Jewish

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[6] 12th century price data are very limited, but there is no evidence of high inflation during this period. For comparison, the earliest complete records of the taxation of the wider population are from the 'Lay Subsidy' of 1334, in which the largest contributing cities were London (£1,100) and Bristol (£220); see Dyer (2000).

movement and activities. This regulation was founded on a network of towns that were already home to a substantial Jewish community. Each town contained a chest (or *archa*) where all local contracts between Jews and Christians had to be deposited (Brand, 2003; Brown and McCartney, 2006). Each town's chest was run by two Jewish officials and two Christian officials, who reported to the local sheriff. By the mid-13th century 30 towns housed such chests; the list of these towns in Table 1 is taken from Hillaby and Hillaby (2013). Inspection of the chests formed the basis of most Jewish tax assessments, which were much more frequent in the 13th century than in the 12th. After 1194, it was difficult for Jews to conduct business at any distance from an *archa* town. Records show evidence of individual families or small groups of Jews living outside *archa* towns, and legislation passed in the mid-13th century to compel Jews to live in these towns was not always enforced. Nevertheless, the *archa* towns formed the hub of the Jewish economy and were probably home to the vast majority of 13th century Jews: in the final 'parliament' called to organise the collection of Jewish taxes in 1287, 40 out of the 42 provincial Jewish representatives came from the *archa* towns listed in Table 1 (Rokéah, 2001).

[Table 1 here]

Medieval English Anti-Semitism

The anti-Semitism of medieval England has been well documented: only a small proportion of contemporary Christian chroniclers showed any sympathy towards the Jews, and racially motivated attacks on individuals seem to have been common (Mundill, 2010). However, genocidal attacks on whole Jewish communities seem to have occurred only during two periods. Firstly, there were attacks in 1189-90 following clashes between Christians and Jews at the coronation of King Richard I (Hillaby, 2003); these attacks may also have been motivated by

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anti-Semitic propaganda that formed part of the mobilisation for the Third Crusade. It seems that some of these attacks were instigated by groups from outside the local area: accounts of the attack at the market in Lynn (near Norwich) implicate foreign merchants, and accounts of the attack at Stamford implicate crusader troops on their way to the Holy Land. Other attacks, such as the one at York, seem to have been organized by members of the petty nobility who had run up large debts to local Jews. Unlike the attacks in 14th century Germany that form part of the study of Voigtländer and Voth (2013), it is unlikely that the attacks of 1189-90 tell us much about geographical variation in the intensity of anti-Semitism among the wider population. The same is true of the other period of genocidal violence in England, during the civil war of 1263-65, when forces loyal to the barons opposing King Henry III attacked Jewries in many of the towns they captured (Stacey, 2003).

After the end of the civil war, negotiations between the king and the barons included measures to secure royal tax revenue from sources other than the Jews. In 1275, King Edward I negotiated an agreement with the barons in which Parliament consented to a royal tax on wool in exchange for an end to Jewish moneylending (Koyama, 2010). From that point onwards the Jewish community ceased to be the main source of royal tax revenue, and the king's incentive to protect them from endemic English anti-Semitism rapidly diminished. A royal decree in 1290 ordered the expulsion of all Jews from England by the end of the year, although Jews were allowed to liquidate their assets before departure. The value of these assets was recorded by the chronicler Hugh of Kendal, and the details are reproduced in Mundill (1988). Table 1 shows the value of Jewish assets in each town where an *archa* survived until 1290; these values are reported both in pounds and as a fraction of the valuation of the whole town in the 'Lay Subsidy' tax accounts of 1334. The largest fractions are in Northampton (19%), Colchester (15%), and

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York (15%). 1290 saw the departure of a community which had generated a large part of England's wealth.

As noted above, the location of genocidal attacks is unlikely to tell us much about the geographical variation in the intensity of medieval English anti-Semitism.[7] However, the location of the *archae* could be more informative. *Archae* were created in towns that were already home to large Jewish communities, and there are two reasons why anti-Semitism in these towns might have been less intense than average. Firstly, the original pattern of settlement may have been determined mainly by the attitude of people in the towns that the first Jewish immigrants visited; in other words, the location of the *archae* captures a selection effect. Secondly, even if the pattern of settlement was driven by economic factors, there could have been a treatment effect. Modern evidence from natural experiments indicates that exposure to ethnic diversity can induce higher levels of tolerance towards other ethnic groups; see for example Clingingsmith *et al*. (2009). This effect is likely to depend on an absence of economic competition between the groups, but in medieval England the Jews' main occupation was the provision of financial services to landowners, an occupation which was barred to Christians. Therefore, the Jews were never in economic competition with the peasantry who formed the vast majority of the population. We might therefore expect that if there is long-run persistence in the level of tolerance towards other ethnic groups (or in the underlying traits of which tolerance is one expression), then we should see a higher level of tolerance in modern towns that once housed an *archa*.

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[7] The locations of these attacks are noted in Hillaby (2003) and Stacey (2003). When an indicator variable for the presence of an attack is added to the models presented below, the estimated coefficient is insignificantly different from zero.

England after the Expulsion

There seems to have been little immigration into England between the end of the 13th century and the end of the 17th. Documentary evidence indicates that following the expulsions from Spain and Portugal at the end of the 15th century, a small and secret Sephardic Jewish community established itself in London (Katz, 1994). Individual members of this community played a role in the politics of Tudor England, and the authorities were almost certainly aware that some of the Portuguese residents of London were Jewish. However, only a tiny minority of people in Tudor England would ever have met a Jew, and literature of that period which featured Jews was always set in continental Europe, as for example in plays such as *The Jew of Malta* and *The Merchant of Venice*. The persecution of Jews by continental Catholic states elicited sympathy among some English Reformation leaders, and the official ban on Jews was finally lifted by the Puritan government of Oliver Cromwell in 1656. However, the re-establishment of a Jewish congregation in London did not lead to immigration on a large scale, the original Sephardic population of Spain and Portugal having resettled in Eastern Europe. The 2010 census indicates that Jews make up around 1.75% of the population of London and around 0.25% of the population of the rest of England.

However, from the end of the 17th century onwards other ethnic minorities entered England, first of all the French Huguenots (discussed in more detail in Appendix 4), then in the 20th century groups from different parts of the former British Empire, especially the Caribbean and South Asia, and finally in the 21st century groups from the eastern countries of the European Union. The 2010 census indicates that around 13% of English residents were born outside the United Kingdom; 13% of residents are non-white; 5% are Muslim and 2% are Hindu or Sikh. Today, the Muslim minority in particular is viewed with suspicion by a large proportion of the

population: only 30% of respondents in the 2003 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) believed that British Muslims were committed to the country, and 52% thought that Muslim immigration was a threat to the country's identity (McLaren and Johnson, 2007).

MODERN MEASURES OF TOLERANCE AND THEIR CORRELATES

The next section presents an analysis of the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants, authoritarianism, and support for far-right political parties. In this section we discuss the survey data used in the analysis, which is taken from two waves of the British Election Study (BES).

Survey Data on Attitudes

Several different large-scale surveys contain responses to questions about attitudes towards immigration and about associated attributes such as authoritarianism and support for far-right political parties: these include the British Citizenship Survey (BCS), the BSA and the BES (which has been conducted during every general election since 1963). One limitation of the BSA and the BCS for our purposes is that they are based on face-to-face interviews with respondents selected in a stratified sampling design. The different waves of the BSA have been based on 200-300 sample points, and the BCS was based on around 1,500 sample points. Each sample point is a postcode cluster or ward. (The ward is the basic geographical unit in the UK Census, and also the basic geographical unit in elections: parliamentary constituencies are formed as aggregations of wards. A ward comprises around five or six thousand people; there are around 10,000 wards in the United Kingdom.) The sampling design means that the sample points are representative of broad regions, but not necessarily of smaller geographical areas. In the BSA, some English towns are not sampled at all.

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The 2005 and 2010 waves of the BES are different, including an internet-based survey of a random sample of the whole electoral roll that includes respondents from every parliamentary constituency in England, Scotland and Wales.[8] The 2005 BES comprises 7,793 respondents across 626 constituencies; the 2010 BES comprises 16,814 respondents across 630 constituencies. The size of towns varies, so some towns cover more than one constituency and others form only part of a constituency, but it is possible to match *archa* towns to constituencies in the way illustrated in Table 1. We define an *archa* constituency as one which includes part or all of an *archa* town. All of the towns in Table 1 have grown considerably over the last 700 years, so the constituencies cover a geographical area that is broader than the small settlements inhabited by medieval Jews. Nevertheless, if each town has a unique culture that is preserved as it grows, we ought to be able to identify the effect of a medieval Jewish presence on modern attitudes by comparing the constituencies containing all or part of an *archa* town with the other constituencies. However, London is excluded from Table 1 and from our sample. Modern London comprises 71 constituencies, most of which are tens of miles away from the small medieval city inhabited by the Jews, and we will not assume that there is any cultural continuity between medieval London and the modern mega-city. The next largest *archa* town is Bristol, which comprises four constituencies and is included in our sample.

Our strategy then is to model responses to questions in the 2005 and 2010 waves of the BES conditional on respondent characteristics and on the characteristics of their constituencies. One of the constituency characteristics, denoted ***archa-town***, is equal to one if the respondent lives in a constituency containing an *archa* town and equal to zero otherwise. (Replacing *archa-town* with an indicator defined on the towns in the 1194 *donum*, or on the towns with *archae* surviving to 1290, produces results very similar to the ones reported below.) The results reported

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[8] See www.essex.ac.uk/bes/ and www.bes2009-10.org.

in the main text are based on 2005 and 2010 samples which comprise respondents from all English constituencies outside London.

One potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that the location of Jewish settlements is correlated with a number of medieval geographical and economic characteristics: most settlements were in relatively large medieval towns with a royal mint, and only one (at York) lay in the north of England. The culture of towns that were established in the middle ages might differ from that of newer towns for reasons that have nothing to do with Jewish settlement. Similarly, the presence of a medieval royal mint might indicate a level of early financial development that reflects a particular type of culture, or there might be systematic variation in culture across the different regions of England. In order to deal with the concern about regional variation, all of the results discussed below are based on models that contain indicator variables for different English regions. In order to mitigate the other concerns, Appendix 3 includes further results in which the sample is restricted to either (i) constituencies containing the largest medieval towns, or (ii) constituencies containing towns that had a royal mint. The results in Appendix 3 are similar to those discussed in the main text.

The two waves of the survey include questions related to attitudes towards immigrants, authoritarianism and support for far-right political parties. The questions we use are as follows.

Questions relating to attitudes towards immigrants

There are several different questions relating to immigrants in the two waves of the BES. One of the 2010 questions which relates specifically to attitudes is:

'Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration?'

Respondents could choose up to four of the following words: 'angry', 'happy', 'disgusted', 'hopeful', 'uneasy', 'confident', 'afraid', and 'proud' (which were randomly rotated in each respondent's survey), plus 'no feelings' and 'don't know'. We define a binary variable ***immigrant-feeling-10*** which is equal to one if the respondent ticked the 'angry' or 'disgusted' box (or both), and zero otherwise. This variable is designed to identify the respondents whose feelings towards immigrants are the most antipathetic. The 2005 wave does not include this question, but at the beginning of the survey respondents were asked,

'As far as you're concerned, what is the *single most important issue* facing the country at the present time?'

There was a free-text answer box. We define a binary variable ***immigrant-issue-05*** which is equal to one if the respondent's answer included 'immigrants', 'asylum-seekers' or associated words, and zero otherwise. In the context of the 2005 general election, it is very unlikely that respondents with positive feelings towards immigrants would think immigration to be the most important issue facing the country. If there is any inter-generational transmission of attitudes towards immigrants, we should find that the proportion of respondents for whom *immigrant-feeling-10 = 1* or *immigrant-issue-05 = 1* is significantly lower in constituencies containing *archa* towns. The BES contains a number of other questions relating to immigration; in Appendix 2 we report results using these alternative measures, which are very similar to the results reported in the main text.

Questions relating to authoritarianism

If there is significantly less antipathy towards immigrants in constituencies containing *archa* towns, then it is possible that this persistence in attitudes towards immigrants is associated with

an underlying trait (such as authoritarianism) of which these attitudes are one expression. The BES's coverage of questions relating to these underlying traits is somewhat limited; however, both the 2005 and 2010 waves of the survey included a question about the respondent's view on crime and civil rights:

'Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place *your own* view?'

Our variables ***crime-2005*** and ***crime-2010*** measure the response to this question in the two waves, with a higher value on the 0-10 scale indicating that more importance is attached to crime prevention and less to civil rights.[9] Authoritarianism is known to be associated with a preference for security at the expense of civil rights (Cohrs *et al*., 2005), so if there is inter-generational transmission of an underlying trait associated with authoritarianism, then *crime-2005* and *crime-2010* should be significantly lower in constituencies containing *archa* towns.

Questions relating to support for far-right political parties

Questions about feelings towards immigrants necessarily involve some subjectivity. A somewhat more concrete set of questions in the two waves of the BES relates to the respondents' support for the two political parties on the far right: the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP). Both of these parties' manifestos include substantial restrictions on immigration (Carey and Geddes, 2010); support for UKIP is stronger among

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[9] In the actual survey, a higher value indicated that more importance was attached to civil rights and less to crime prevention, but we invert the scale so that the *crime* variable is positively correlated with antipathy towards immigrants.

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white-collar voters disaffected with the mainstream Conservative Party, while support for the BNP is stronger among blue-collar voters disaffected with the mainstream Labour Party. In the 2010 wave of the BES, respondents were asked to take part in an imaginary Alternative Vote (AV) ballot in which they ranked candidates from the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green and Respect parties, plus the UKIP and the BNP:

'Thinking about this Ballot Paper, please… rank the parties in order of preference… Please number as many or as few choices as you wish.'

We define an ordinal variable **UKIP-rank-10** which is equal to six if the UKIP is ranked first, five if it ranked second, and so on down to zero if the UKIP is ranked seventh or unranked;[10] the variable **BNP-rank-10** is constructed in an analogous way. The 2005 wave of the BES does not include an AV ballot, but it does include the following question:

'On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel about the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)?'

We use the response to this question, denoted **UKIP-feeling-05**, as an alternative measure of the strength of support for the UKIP. (No equivalent measure is available for the BNP.) If there is any inter-generational transmission of anti-immigrant or authoritarian sentiment, and if such sentiment translates into support for a far-right party, then we should find that the values of the three party support variables are significantly lower in constituencies containing *archa* towns. The two waves of the survey contain other questions about party support, which are discussed in Appendix 2; results using these alternative measures are similar to the ones reported in the main text. Appendix 2 also contains a constituency-level analysis of the actual vote for the BNP and UKIP in the 2010 election, the results of which are consistent with those in the main text.

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[10] In an AV ballot, the consequences for a party of leaving it unranked are the same as ranking it last.

Correlates of the Survey Responses

Correlates in the existing literature

There is already a large body of evidence on the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants, based on surveys such as the European Social Survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel and the BSA. Most studies find that attitudes towards immigrants are more positive among wealthier and better educated respondents, and more negative among the unemployed (Becchetti *et al*., 2010; DiGiusto and Jolly, 2009; Dustman and Preston, 2001; Fertig and Schmidt, 2011; Gang *et al*., 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Miguet, 2008; Miguet and Müller, 2007; Ortega and Polavieja, 2012; Pettigrew *et al*., 2007; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010). These effects might have an economic interpretation, because most immigrants tend to work in low-skilled jobs in competition with indigenous workers who are relatively poor and poorly educated, and a face greater risk of unemployment. Alternatively, the effects might have a sociological interpretation, because a higher income and better education lead to greater familiarity with other ethnic groups and less of a sense of threat.[11] Since immigrants tend to be younger, on average, than the indigenous population, and tend to be more urbanized, familiarity could explain why many of these papers also report a significantly more positive attitude towards immigrants among the young and in towns.

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[11] Some researchers use variation in respondent skill level relative to the national average (as in O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006) or self-reported views on economic competition (as in Malchow-Møller *et al*., 2008) to estimate the size of the economic channel. Other papers use variation in characteristics such as the perceived size of the immigrant group (as in Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010) or the frequency of contact with immigrants (as in Schneider, 2008) to estimate the size of the familiarity and threat channels. It seems that both types of channel are important in explaining the variation in attitudes. However, the BES does not contain enough data to perform this kind of exercise with our sample.

A few studies also explore the effect of generalized trust, as captured by, for example, responses to the World Values Survey question, 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' Miguet and Miller (2007) and Rustenbach (2010) both find that attitudes to immigrants are more positive among respondents with a higher level of generalized trust. This finding is consistent with sociological explanations emphasizing the importance of a sense of threat in attitudes towards immigrants, and suggests a link between these attitudes and indigenous social capital.

Some studies test for the significance of gender and marital status. While most of these studies find that women's attitudes are significantly more positive than men's, Ortega and Polavieja (2012) and Malchow-Møller *et al*. (2009) find that men's attitudes are significantly more positive. The estimated effects of marital status are similarly mixed, and it is unclear which sociological or economic theory explains them. Other studies (for example, Dustman and Preston, 2001; Facchini *et al*., 2013; Rajman and Semyonov, 2004) find that religious affiliations of different kinds have some effect on attitudes. However, the affiliation variables vary from one study to another, and there is no systematic cross-country result pertaining to the association between religious affiliation and anti-immigrant sentiment.

In studies that explore the effect of regional characteristics on attitudes towards immigrants, the one consistent finding is that attitudes are more negative in areas with a higher immigrant population density.[12] It has been noted that estimates of this effect may be biased downwards, if immigrants tend to settle in areas where they are more welcome, and Dustman

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[12] This effect needs to be interpreted along with the finding that anti-immigrant sentiment is less intense in urban areas (where most immigrants live). One interpretation is that the familiarity of seeing one or two immigrants around town reduces a sense of threat, but seeing larger numbers of immigrants has the opposite effect.

and Preston (2001) find that the estimated immigrant population density effect is larger when an Instrumental Variables estimator is used, with county-level population density as an instrument for ward-level population density.

There is also a small literature on the determinants of individual attitudes towards the BNP and UKIP. Borisyuk *et al*. (2007), Bowyer (2008), Cutts *et al*. (2011), Ford and Goodwin (2010) and Whitaker and Lynch (2011) all explore the correlates of support for the BNP in local and European Parliament elections during the first decade of the 21st century. These studies use either opinion poll data along with self-reported individual characteristics, or ward election results along with ward characteristics. Among the consistent findings across the studies is that BNP support is significantly negatively correlated with skills and education, and significantly positively correlated with unemployment and economic deprivation, which suggests that support is driven by characteristics similar to those generating anti-immigrant sentiment. (In opinion polls, there is a strong positive correlation between BNP support, anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition to the European Union, but no significant correlation with anti-Semitic sentiment.) Several of the studies also find that BNP support is higher among the middle-aged than among the young or elderly, and higher in the north of England than in the South. Whitaker and Lynch also explore the correlates of support for the UKIP, finding similar correlations with attitudes towards immigrants and the European Union but a different geographical pattern, with more support in the south of England.

Correlates in this study

The 2005 and 2010 waves of the BES include questions that allow us to construct variables to measure the characteristics which previous studies have found to explain some of the variation in anti-immigrant sentiment and in support for far-right parties. In the next section, we will model

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the relationship between attitudes and *archa-town* conditional on these characteristics. The characteristics are as follows; summary statistics for these variables appear in Appendix 1. Note that the sample is restricted to respondents who do not identify as members of an ethnic minority. Variables which are expected to increase anti-immigrant sentiment, authoritarianism or support for far-right parties are indicated by a plus sign (+). Variables which are expected to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment, authoritarianism or support for far-right parties are indicated by a minus sign (–). Signs are not attached to variables for which there have been conflicting results in previous studies.

● *income:* income per capita in the respondent's household, in thousands of pounds. (–)

● *if-kids:* an indicator variable for whether the household has any children (under the age of 18). This variable does not appear in other studies, but schools are one of the main places where household members could encounter immigrants. If these encounters are mainly positive then households with children will express less anti-immigrant sentiment; however, it is also possible that the encounters are mainly negative and associated with more anti-immigrant sentiment.

● *if-beneficiary:* an indicator variable for whether the respondent's (or, if the respondent has a partner, the couple's) main source of income is a state payment other than a student loan or pension. (+)

● *if-graduate:* an indicator variable for whether the respondent has a university degree or equivalent qualification. (–)

● *if-low-quals:* an indicator variable for whether the respondent's highest academic qualification is lower than a General Certificate of Secondary Education grade C or equivalent. GCSE examinations are normally taken at age 16, two years before the Advanced Level qualification that equates to graduation from a North American high school. (+)

● *if-widowed*, *if-separated*, *if-divorced*, *if-single:* if all of these marital status indicator variables are equal to zero than the respondent is married.

● *if-female:* an indicator variable for whether the respondent is female.

● *if-religious:* an indicator variable for whether the respondent identifies as a member of an organized religious group.

● *age:* the respondent's age in years, along with age^2. If anti-immigrant sentiment, authoritarianism and support for the far right are highest among the middle-aged, then the coefficient on *age* should be positive and the coefficient on age^2 negative.

● *trust-1:* the respondent's answer to the question, 'On balance, would you say that most people can't be trusted or that most people can be trusted?' Respondents are asked to choose a point on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the highest level of trust. (–)

● *trust-2:* the respondent's answer to the question, 'Do you think that most people you come into contact with would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?' Respondents are asked to choose a point on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the highest level of trust. This variable is available only in the 2010 wave of the BES. (–)

● *happiness:* the respondent's answer to the question, 'Generally speaking, how happy are you?' Respondents are asked to choose a point on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the highest level of happiness. This variable, which is available only in the 2010 wave of the BES, does not appear in other studies, but higher levels of happiness may reflect less of a sense of threat. (–)

In addition, we will use two constituency-level variables constructed from data in the 2001 census (used with the 2005 wave of the BES) and the 2011 census (used with the 2010 wave of the BES).

● *density:* the number of residents per hectare in a constituency. (–)

● *minority*: the fraction of residents in a constituency identifying with a racial group other than 'white'. Other minority variables, such as the proportion of residents identifying with a minority religion, or the number of residents born overseas, are highly correlated with *minority*. (+)

MODELING MEASURES OF TOLERANCE AND THEIR CORRELATES

Figures 1-7 illustrate the differences in the distribution of attitudes between *archa* constituencies and non-*archa* constituencies. These figures are constructed using the data in the 2005 and 2010 waves of the BES for all white respondents in English constituencies outside London. Figure 1 shows that in 2010, over 50% of respondents in the 423 non-*archa* constituencies were 'angry' or 'disgusted' about immigration, compared with 40% in the 37 *archa* constituencies. Figures 2-3 show that in 2010, respondents in non-*archa* constituencies were more likely than respondents in *archa* constituencies to rank the BNP and UKIP first, second or third, and less likely to rank these parties sixth or seventh. Figure 4 shows that in 2010, respondents in non-*archa* constituencies were more likely than respondents in *archa* constituencies to think that crime prevention was much more important than civil rights (points 8-10 on the scale). This suggests that on average there was less tolerance towards immigrants in non-*archa* constituencies, more support for the far right, and more authoritarianism. Figures 5-7 show similar patterns in the data from the 2005 wave of the BES.

In order to see whether these differences are statistically significant and robust to conditioning on other characteristics, we need to fit a model for each of the seven attitudinal variables. The variables *immigrant-feeling-10* and *immigrant-issue-05* are binary, so it is appropriate to use a Probit model; the variables *BNP-rank-10* and *UKIP-rank-10* are ordinal, so it is appropriate to use an Ordered Probit model; the variables *UKIP-feeling-05*, *crime-10* and *crime-05* are distributed on a 0-10 scale, so it is appropriate to use a Tobit model. All models

include all of the survey variables discussed above, plus indicator variables identifying the respondent's region. (The regions correspond to the standard UK census geography: North-East, North-West, Yorkshire-Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East, South-East, and South-West. *Archa* towns are more common in some regions than in others, but including the indicator variables means that the *archa-town* coefficient captures the average difference between *archa* towns and non-*archa* towns within a region.) We have samples of individuals within constituencies, so it is appropriate to allow for constituency-level random effects, and Tables 2-3 report the estimated coefficients in Random-Effects Probit, Ordered Probit and Tobit models, as appropriate.[13] Table 2 reports results pertaining to the 2010 wave of the BES, while Table 3 reports results pertaining to the 2005 wave. The tables also include t-ratios and Probit marginal effects. (In the case of the Ordered Probit models, the marginal effect is for the probability of transition from the lowest category to a higher one.) The sample sizes (*N*) are reported at the bottom of each table; these vary slightly within each wave of the BES, because some respondents did not answer all of the survey questions.[14]

[Figures 1-7 and Tables 2-3 here]

Tables 2-3 show some similarities in the results for the different attitudinal variables. University graduates are significantly less likely (and those with the lowest levels of educational achievement significantly more likely) to express anti-immigrant sentiment, or to support for a

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[13] The estimates were produced in Stata 12 using the *xtprobit*, *reoprob* and *xttobit* commands. The coefficients on the regional indicator variables are not reported, but are available on request.

[14] On average, there are 21 respondents per constituency in the *immigrant-feeling-10* model, 17 respondents per constituency in the other Table 2 models, 10 respondents per constituency in the *UKIP-feeling-05* model, and 12 respondents per constituency in the other Table 3 models. *Archa* constituencies account for just over 8% of the total observations in both the 2010 and 2005 samples.

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far-right party, or to think that crime prevention is more important than civil rights. Support for far-right parties is significantly negatively associated with income. These income and education effects are consistent with the results of previous studies, and with the economic and sociological interpretations discussed above. For some attitudinal variables there is a significantly negative population density effect, which is also consistent with previous studies. Respondents identifying with an organized religious group are significantly more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment, or to support for a far-right party, or to emphasize the importance of crime prevention. Respondents who are single are significantly less likely to express anti-immigrant feeling or to emphasize the importance of crime prevention; however, this does not correspond to a significant difference in their level of support for far-right parties. The coefficients on *age* and *age*^{2} have the expected signs, but are not always statistically significant. Neither the presence of children in the household, nor beneficiary status, nor the size of the ethnic minority population is ever statistically significant. The insignificance of the *minority* variable might be a consequence of endogeneity bias, and another set of results available on request includes estimates using the minority population density at the county level as an instrument for *minority*, as in Dustman and Preston (2001). Using the instrument leads to a moderate increase the size and significance level of the *minority* coefficients, but does not change any of the other results.

Conditional on these effects, there is a large and statistically significant difference between attitudes in *archa* constituencies and attitudes in non-*archa* constituencies. The first marginal effect for *archa-town* in Table 2 implies that on average, the difference between the probability of a respondent in a non-*archa* constituency expressing anti-immigrant sentiment in 2010 and the probability of a respondent in an *archa* constituency expressing such sentiment is nearly eight percentage points. (In other words, controlling for other determinants of sentiment

makes little difference to the effect already apparent in Figure 1.) The next two marginal effects for *archa-town* imply that the difference in the probability of ranking the BNP better than seventh is also nearly eight percentage points, and the difference in the probability of ranking the UKIP better than seventh is only slightly smaller. Finally, respondents in *archa* constituencies choose a significantly lower point on the *crime-10* scale, indicating that they attach more importance to civil rights. The *archa-town* coefficients in Table 3 indicate effects in the 2005 data that are very similar. The results consistently point to a significant difference between those English towns with a Jewish heritage and those without: in the 21st century, towns which welcomed medieval Jews show less anti-immigrant sentiment, less support for far-right parties and less authoritarian attitudes regarding the value of crime prevention relative to civil rights.

Another striking feature of Tables 2-3 is the significance of the *trust* variables in all of the models, and the significance of *happiness* in almost all of them. Table 2 shows that an increase in *trust-1* by one unit on the ten-point scale reduces the probability of anti-immigrant sentiment by three percentage points, the probability of ranking the BNP better than seventh by two percentage points, and the probability of ranking the UKIP better than seventh by one percentage point. The effects of increases in *trust-2* are about half as large, and the effects of increases in *happiness* are about a quarter as large. *Trust-1* also has a significantly negative effect on *crime-10*, although *trust-2* and *happiness* do not. Moreover, there are negative and significant coefficients on *trust-1* in all three models of the 2005 responses in Table 3. Happy and trusting people are more positive about immigration and less likely to support a far-right party; trusting people also have less authoritarian attitudes regarding the value of civil rights relative to crime prevention. These results suggest that the models in Tables 2-3 capture a large part of the variation in social capital (or at least that part of social capital relating to trust), so the significant

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differences between *archa* constituencies and non-*archa* constituencies are unlikely to be explained by the inter-generational transmission of social capital. Nevertheless, the significance of *archa-town* effects in all of the models in Tables 2-3, including the models of *crime-10* and *crime-05*, suggests that there is inter-generational transmission of an underlying trait of which antipathy towards immigrants is one expression.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

On average, the attitude of respondents towards 21st century immigrants is significantly more positive when the respondents live in a constituency that was home to a medieval Jewish immigrant community. On average, these respondents also express less authoritarian views about crime and civil rights, and show less support for far-right political parties. These results are consistent with previous studies of the persistence of attitudes towards other ethnic groups, for example Jha (2013) and Voigtländer and Voth (2013). However, the results also suggest that there is inter-generational transmission of an underlying cultural trait of which attitudes towards a specific ethnic minority are just one expression.

It should be stressed that our results apply only to the *average* inhabitant: there is considerable variation in attitudes within towns as well as between towns. For example, in the Random Effects Tobit model of the *crime-10* variable in Table 2, the estimated standard deviation of the within-constituency error is 3.3; the corresponding standard deviation for *crime-05* in Table 3 is 3.7, and both estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Recalling that the *crime* variables are measured on a 0-10 scale, this implies a considerable amount of unexplained within-constituency variation. What might explain these patterns in the data?

Cavalli-Sforza *et al*. (1982) emphasize the distinction between theoretical models of inter-generational cultural transmission that embody a 'many-to-one' mechanism (for example class or caste norms), models that embody a 'one-to-many' mechanism (for example teaching), and models that embody a 'one-to-one' mechanism (for example parenting). Both many-to-one and one-to-one mechanisms generate high persistence, but whereas many-to-one mechanisms are associated with low within-population variation in cultural characteristics, one-to-one mechanisms are associated with high within-population variation. This suggests that a one-to-one mechanism is more likely to explain our results. Attitudes vary across families within a town, either because of variation in the initial response to a town-specific treatment such as the arrival of a foreign immigrant community, or because of indigenous migration between towns over subsequent centuries. With assortative mating and a within-family one-to-one cultural transmission mechanism, there could be persistent within-town variation in culture as well as persistent variation in average cultural characteristics across towns. In order to test this explanation directly, one would need a hierarchical data-set comprising individuals within families within towns.

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
Fig. 1. Frequencies of feelings expressed about immigration in the

BES 2010 (*immigrant-feeling-10*): □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 2. Frequencies of rankings of the BNP in the hypothetical AVR ballot in the

BES 2010 (*BNP-rank-10*): □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 3. Frequencies of rankings of the UKIP in the hypothetical AVR ballot in the
BES 2010 (*UKIP-rank-10*): ☐ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 4. Frequencies of the importance of crime prevention versus civil rights in the
BES 2010 (*crime-10*): ☐ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 5. Frequencies of whether immigration is raised as the most important issue in the BES 2005 (*immigrant-issue-05*): □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 6. Frequencies of 'feelings barometer' values for the UKIP in the BES 2005 (*UKIP-feeling-05*): □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

Fig. 7. Frequencies of the importance of crime prevention versus civil rights in the BES 2005 (*crime-05*): □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

TABLE 1

MEDIEVAL TOWNS WITH JEWISH COMMUNITIES

	towns in the 1194 *donum*	towns with an *archa*	Jewish assets in 1290 (£)	Jewish assets ÷ town assets	*modern parliamentary constituencies*
Bedford	●	●	$14^1/_3$	7.3%	Bedford
Berkhamstead		●			Hertfordshire SW
Bristol	●	●			Bristol E, NW, S, W
Cambridge	●	●	$16^2/_3$	3.6%	Cambridge
Canterbury	●	●	$85^2/_3$	14.3%	Canterbury
Chichester	●				Chichester
Colchester	●	●	$38^2/_3$	14.8%	Colchester
Coventry	●				Coventry NE, NW, S
Devizes / Marlborough		●			Devizes
Exeter	●	●			Exeter
Gloucester	●	●			Gloucester
Hereford	●	●	$26^2/_3$	4.4%	Hereford (2005), Hereford & Herefordshire S (2010)
Huntingdon		●			Huntingdon
Ipswich		●	$7^1/_3$	1.1%	Ipswich
Leicester		●			Leicester E, S, W
Lincoln	●	●			Lincoln
Northampton	●	●	$50^2/_3$	18.8%	Northampton N, S
Norwich	●	●	47	5.0%	Norwich N, S
Nottingham	●	●	$13^1/_3$	3.6%	Nottingham E, N, S
Oxford	●	●	100	10.9%	Oxford E, Oxford W & Abingdon
Stamford		●	$13^1/_3$	3.7%	Grantham & Stamford
Sudbury		●	5	*n / a*	Suffolk S
Wallingford	●	●			Wantage
Warwick	●	●			Warwick & Leamington
Wilton		●			Salisbury
Winchester	●	●	44	8.5%	Winchester
Worcester	●	●			Worcester
York	●	●	$243^2/_3$	15.0%	York (2005), York Central (2010), York Outer (2010)

TABLE 2

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDY

	immigrant-feeling-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-rank-10 R.E. Ordered Probit			UKIP-rank-10 R.E. Ordered Probit			crime-10 R.E. Tobit	
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.216	-4.13	-0.077	-0.277	-4.37	-0.079	-0.171	-3.39	-0.064	-0.352	-2.30
income ÷ 100	-0.174	-1.26	-0.062	-0.628	-3.80	-0.020	-0.574	-4.46	-0.206	-0.277	-0.68
if-kids	-0.001	-0.04	-0.001	-0.054	-1.30	-0.017	-0.053	-1.57	-0.019	0.083	0.76
if-beneficiary	0.004	0.08	0.002	0.094	1.62	0.030	-0.004	-0.07	-0.001	-0.075	-0.45
if-graduate	-0.487	-14.40	-0.172	-0.364	-8.88	-0.108	-0.311	-9.77	-0.116	-1.057	-10.49
if-low-quals	0.123	3.77	0.043	0.125	3.65	0.040	0.097	3.36	0.035	0.224	2.33
if-widowed	-0.056	-0.73	-0.020	0.079	0.93	0.025	0.098	1.42	0.034	0.035	0.15
if-separated	-0.036	-0.36	-0.013	0.087	0.80	0.028	-0.016	-0.17	-0.006	-0.253	-0.85
if-divorced	-0.129	-2.59	-0.046	-0.019	-0.34	-0.006	-0.030	-0.67	-0.011	-0.059	-0.40
if-single	-0.109	-2.53	-0.039	-0.092	-1.82	-0.028	0.012	0.30	0.005	-0.381	-2.97
if-female	-0.037	-1.35	-0.013	-0.238	-7.65	-0.074	-0.134	-5.32	-0.049	0.333	4.07
if-religious	0.166	5.97	0.059	0.060	1.95	0.019	0.158	6.29	0.057	0.476	5.82
age	0.013	2.03	0.005	0.009	1.15	0.003	0.015	2.47	0.005	0.058	2.98
age^2 ÷ 100	-0.004	-0.64	-0.001	-0.009	-1.18	-0.003	-0.006	-1.06	-0.002	-0.037	-1.84
trust-1	-0.085	-9.96	-0.030	-0.063	-6.87	-0.020	-0.036	-4.67	-0.013	-0.180	-7.05
trust-2	-0.037	-4.41	-0.013	-0.033	-3.69	-0.010	-0.021	-2.81	-0.008	-0.021	-0.83
happiness	-0.031	-4.57	-0.011	-0.015	-2.00	-0.005	-0.010	-1.66	-0.004	0.031	1.55
density ÷ 100	-0.259	-2.13	-0.092	-0.168	-1.21	-0.052	-0.301	-2.59	-0.107	-0.496	-1.40
minority	0.297	1.57	0.105	0.142	0.69	0.044	0.104	0.58	0.035	0.165	0.30
random effect	p = 0.38			p > 0.99			p = 0.14			p = 0.75	
N	9683			7810			7830			7863	

m.e. = marginal effect; in the ordered probit models, this relates to the probability of transition from the lowest value to a higher one.

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TABLE 3

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 BRITISH ELECTION STUDY

| | *immigrant-issue-05* | | | | *UKIP-feeling-05* | | | *crime-05* | |
| | *R.E. Probit* | | | | *R.E. Tobit* | | | *R.E. Tobit* | |
	coeff.	*t ratio*	*m.e.*		*coeff.*	*t ratio*		*coeff.*	*t ratio*
archa-town	-0.218	-2.72	-0.066		-0.703	-2.51		-0.413	-1.84
income ÷ 100	-0.253	-0.91	-0.076		-3.463	-3.85		-0.360	-0.48
if-kids	0.013	0.24	0.004		-0.001	-0.01		-0.104	-0.69
if-beneficiary	-0.095	-1.35	-0.029		0.393	1.62		-0.292	-1.41
if-graduate	-0.412	-7.01	-0.124		-1.381	-7.56		-1.232	-8.11
if-low-quals	0.179	3.99	0.054		0.392	2.53		0.429	3.20
if-widowed	-0.091	-0.76	-0.027		-0.395	-0.97		-0.421	-1.21
if-separated	-0.161	-1.13	-0.047		-0.893	-1.85		-0.640	-1.58
if-divorced	-0.058	-0.76	-0.018		-0.417	-1.57		-0.525	-2.42
if-single	-0.137	-2.17	-0.041		0.073	0.35		-0.681	-3.95
if-female	0.039	0.95	0.012		-0.046	-0.33		0.182	1.56
if-religious	0.048	1.15	0.014		0.485	3.51		0.743	6.28
age	0.014	1.36	0.004		0.010	0.31		0.048	1.68
age^2 ÷ 100	-0.017	-1.59	-0.005		-0.019	-0.55		-0.030	-0.98
trust-1	-0.047	-5.32	-0.014		-0.147	-4.87		-0.227	-8.67
density ÷ 100	0.017	0.10	0.005		-0.756	-1.19		0.073	0.14
minority	0.250	0.74	0.075		-1.692	-1.32		-0.426	-0.42
random effect	$p = 0.50$				$p = 0.05$			$p < 0.01$	
N	4948				4199			4833	

m.e. = marginal effect.

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates in Tables 2-3

Table A1 includes means and standard deviations of the non-binary variables appearing in the models using the BES survey data in Tables 2-3. The left-hand side of Table A1 relates to the 2010 wave of the BES and the right-hand side to the 2005 wave. For each binary variable, the table notes the proportion of observations equal to one.

Appendix 2: Results Using Alternative Measures of Attitudes

2.1 Alternative survey measures

The BES includes a number of questions relating to attitudes towards immigrants and far-right parties, other than those used for the results appearing in Tables 2-3. Tables A2-A3 report results which correspond to those in Tables 2-3, but which are based on the following alternative measure of attitudes.

● ***immigrant-issue-10****:* this variable is constructed in the same way as *immigrant-issue-05* in Table 3, but using data from the 2010 wave of the BES instead of data from the 2005 wave.

● ***immigrant-rank-10****:* this variable is based on a question in the 2010 wave of the BES which asked respondents to rank a number of different political issues according to their importance. The alternatives were: 'the economy generally', 'the environment', 'health care', 'unemployment', 'immigration', 'the war in Afghanistan', 'terrorism', and 'paying off government debt'. Respondents were asked to choose the first, second, and third most important issue. The ordinal variable *immigrant-rank-10* is equal to four if immigration was ranked first, three if it was ranked second, two if it was ranked third, and four if it was unranked.

● ***immigrant-rank-05****:* this variable is constructed in the same way as *immigrant-rank-10*, but using data from the 2005 wave of the BES instead of data from the 2010 wave.

● ***BNP-support-10****:* this variable is based on a question in the 2010 wave of the BES which asked respondents, 'Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?' The binary variable *BNP-support-10* is equal to one if the respondent indicated that they saw themselves as a BNP supporter, and zero otherwise.

● ***BNP-feeling-10****:* this variable is constructed in the same way as *UKIP-feeling-05* in Table III, but using data from the 2010 wave of the BES instead of data from the 2005 wave, and using responses to the question about the BNP rather than the one about the UKIP.

● ***UKIP-support-10****:* this binary variable is constructed in the same way as *BNP-support-10*, but indicates the respondent's identification with the UKIP.

● ***UKIP-feeling-10****:* this variable is constructed in the same way as *UKIP-feeling-05* in Table III, but using data from the 2010 wave of the BES instead of data from the 2005 wave.

A Probit model is used for the binary variables *immigrant-issue-10*, *BNP-support-10* and *UKIP-support-10*, an Ordered Probit model for the ordinal variables *immigrant-rank-10* and *immigrant-rank-05*, and a Tobit model for the censored variables *BNP-feeling-10* and *UKIP-feeling-10*. Each model allows for constituency-level random effects.

The results in Tables A2-A3 are broadly consistent with those in Tables 2-3. In most cases, antipathy towards immigrants and support for far-right parties are significantly negatively correlated with income, education and trust, and significantly positively correlated with a self-identified religious affiliation. Moreover, in all but one of the models there is a negative and significant coefficient on *archa-town*. The one exception is the *BNP-support-10* model, in which the *archa-town* coefficient is negative but insignificantly different from zero. One possible

explanation for this exception is that unlike the other variables capturing the level of support for the BNP, *BNP-support-10* is a binary variable that does not admit different degrees of affinity with the party. Given the negative publicity about the BNP in the mainstream media, many respondents may have been reluctant to express their unequivocal support for the party (hence *BNP-support-10* = 0) and yet happy to rank the party fifth or sixth in the hypothetical AV ballot (hence *BNP-rank-10* > 0), or happy to give it a score of one or two (hence *BNP-feeling-10* > 0). Therefore, there is variation in *BNP-rank-10* and *BNP-feeling-10* which is correlated with *archa-town* but which is not captured by *BNP-support-10*.

2.2 Constituency-level election results

We can check the robustness of our results on support for far-right parties by comparing them with results using constituency-level data on actual election outcomes. We focus on the 2010 general election for the Westminster Parliament: European Parliament elections produce results only at the regional level (not at the constituency level), and general elections before 2010 were contested by the BNP and UKIP in a relatively small number of constituencies. For each constituency we have data on the share of votes cast for each party, including the BNP and UKIP. Figure A1 shows the average shares of the vote for these parties in the *archa* constituencies and the non-*archa* constituencies. In *archa* constituencies the average share was about 3% for both parties, and in non-*archa* constituencies the average share was about 4%. In order to see whether these differences are statistically significant and robust to conditioning on other constituency characteristics, we need to fit models of the voting shares. The models include the following constituency-level characteristics from the 2011 census (in addition to *archa-town*, *density* and *minority*). These characteristics are intended to correspond to the personal characteristics discussed in the main text.

A3

● *unemployment-rate:* the proportion of economically active residents who are unemployed. This corresponds to the survey variable *if-beneficiary*.

● *graduate-share:* the proportion of adult residents who have a university degree of equivalent. This corresponds to the survey variable *if-graduate*.

● *low-quals-share:* the proportion of adult residents whose highest academic qualification is lower than a GCSE grade C. This corresponds to the survey variable *if-low-quals*.

● *widowed-share, separated-share, divorced-share, single-share:* these are the proportion of adult residents in each marital category, corresponding to the survey variables *if-widowed*, *if-separated*, *if-divorced* and *if-single*.

● *female-share:* the proportion of residents who are female. This corresponds to the survey variable *if-female*.

● *religious-share:* the proportion of residents who identify with an organized religion. This corresponds to the survey variable *if-religious*.

● *under-30-share, 30-64-share, over-64-share:* the proportion of residents aged between 18 and 30, between 30 and 64, and over 64. The reference category is the proportion of residents under 18. These variables correspond to *age* and *if-kids*.

The census does not include any data corresponding to the survey variables *trust-1*, *trust-2* or *happiness*, nor does it include any data on household income.[15] However, it is possible to construct variables that proxy for income at the constituency level using the ACORN classification system (CACI, 2014). Each postcode area in England is assigned to one of five wealth classifications; these classifications are based on the characteristics of housing in the area.

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[15] Adding constituency-average values of these variables from the BES to the model of election outcomes does not produce any statistically significant coefficients.

It is then possible to construct constituency-level aggregate measures of the proportion of individuals living in each of the five types of area. We take the highest wealth level as the reference category, and use the following four ACORN variables:

● *acorn-2-share, acorn-3-share, acorn-4-share, acorn-5-share*: here, *acorn-n-share* indicates the proportion of people in the constituency residing in an ACORN level-*n* area, where level 5 indicates the most impoverished type of neighborhood.[16]

One additional constituency-level variable is used in the model:

● *majority-2005*: the size of the majority of the winning candidate in the 2005 general election, in thousands of votes. Supporters of a far-right party might be less inclined to vote for that party if there is a closer contest between the main contenders on the centre-right and centre-left (the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrat Party and the Labour Party). In a close contest, a vote for the BNP or UKIP might be perceived to increase the probability of the voter's next-preferred part losing the election. (In reality the effect of a single vote on the probability is miniscule, but voters might nevertheless make electoral choices as if their decision were instrumental, as is the case in 'tactical voting'.) Therefore, there might be more votes for the BNP and UKIP in constituencies with a large majority in 2005, where the outcome of the 2010 election is almost certain.

The dependent variables are constructed using constituency-level data on the votes for the BNP, the UKIP, the Conservative Party (which won the general election), and the Labour Party (which came second). Following Fielding (2000), we apply a logarithmic transformation and measure the voting shares as **log(*BNP vote ÷ Conservative vote*)**, **log(*BNP vote ÷ Labour vote*)**,

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[16] These variables are taken from Pippa Norris's *British General Election Constituency Results 5.0* (www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm).

log(*UKIP vote* ÷ *Conservative vote*), and **log(*UKIP vote* ÷ *Labour vote*)**. These four variables

capture the level of support for the two far-right parties relative to support for the two main

parties.[17]

Table A4 shows the estimated coefficients in each of the four equations. For the UKIP

voting shares these are Ordinary Least Squares estimates. OLS is not used for the BNP

equations, because the BNP fielded candidates in only 271 out of the 460 provincial English

constituencies, so OLS estimates could suffer from sample selection bias. Instead, the BNP

equations are fitted using the sample selection model of Heckman (1979), which includes a

Probit equation for the probability that the BNP will contest a constituency. This selection

equation, which also appears in Table A4, needs to include an instrument that is excluded from

the voting share equation: that is, a variable which affects the probability of the BNP contesting a

constituency but not its expected performance there. We use the following instrument.

● *electorate-size:* the total number of registered voters in the constituency, in thousands. Note

that overall BNP support was too low for any of its candidates to have any chance of winning

their constituency election: its largest share of the vote in any constituency was 15%. Therefore,

it would be a rational strategy for the party to focus its efforts on constituencies with the largest

number of voters, in order to maximise its share of the national vote and raise its media profile.

Although the British Electoral Commission continually adjusts constituency boundaries in order

to minimize differences in their size, the unpredictability of migration between constituencies

leads to some variation in size: the largest constituency has about twice as many registered voters

as the smallest. There is no reason to suppose that political preferences are correlated with

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[17] The results are very similar if the dependent variable is just the percentage share of the BNP (or UKIP) vote,
but simple theoretical models of voter choice do not generate an equation that is linear in the percentage share
and the determinants of voter preferences.

variations in size (which are driven mainly by demographic forecast errors), so size should be a valid instrument.

The effects in Table A4 relate to the *relative* performance of parties, and the estimated effect of constituency characteristics does vary according to whether performance is measured relative to the Conservative Party or relative to the Labour Party. We see that in more economically deprived areas (as defined by the *acorn* variables), the BNP vote is significantly larger relative to the Conservative vote, and the UKIP vote is significantly smaller relative to the Labour vote. The BNP vote is also larger relative to the Conservative vote in areas of low educational attainment. These effects are consistent with the BNP's traditional blue-collar associations and the UKIP's traditional white-collar associations. Both the BNP and UKIP fare poorly relative to the Labour Party (but not relative to the Conservative Party) in areas with more voters in the 30-64 age range. In constituencies with a large majority in 2005, there are more votes for both the BNP and UKIP relative to both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party; this suggests that 'tactical' considerations do sway potential BNP and UKIP voters.

Conditional on these constituency characteristics, the BNP vote relative to both the Conservative vote and the Labour vote is significantly larger in non-*archa* constituencies than in *archa* constituencies. The coefficients in Table A4 imply that on average, the ratio of the BNP vote to the Conservative vote is 26% higher in non-*archa* constituencies, and the ratio of the BNP vote to the Labour vote is 21% higher. These results are consistent with those in Tables 2-3, again indicating that towns with a Jewish heritage have less sympathy for the far right. Conditional on constituency characteristics, the UKIP vote is also larger on average in non-*archa* constituencies, but this effect is not quite significant at the 5% level.

Appendix 3: Results when the BES Sample Is Restricted to Medieval Towns

One potential concern about the results in Tables 2-3 and A2-A3 is that all of the *archa* towns are necessarily older than the average English town, since *archa* towns must have come into existence by 1290 at the latest. The *archa-town* coefficients might then capture the effect on modern attitudes of town age rather than a Jewish history. In order to deal with this possibility, we fit models like those in Tables 2-3 and A2-A3 to BES samples that are restricted to respondents living in constituencies that contain a substantial medieval town. The definition of what counts as 'substantial' is somewhat arbitrary: in the results shown in Tables A5-A8, the constituencies included are those containing a town that was home to at least 500 men in 1377, the first year for which reliable population records exist. These results do not change much unless the population cut-off point is raised to a level that restricts the sample to a few hundred observations. The list of towns and population sizes is taken from Dyer (2000).[18] Note that the cut-off point of 500 excludes the smallest *archa* towns: Bedford, Devizes, Marlborough and Warwick.

The models are estimated by the same methods as in Tables 2-3 and A2-A3, but in three cases (*crime-10*, *immigrant-rank-10* and *immigrant-rank-05*) the estimated variance of the constituency-level random effect is so close to zero that the Random-Effects model fails to converge. In these cases the results are produced using standard Tobit and Probit models without random effects, but allowing for the clustering of errors.

The results in Tables A5-A8 are broadly similar to those in Tables 2-3 and A2-A3. However, the samples in Tables A5-A8 are much smaller, so the significance levels associated

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[18] The list is based on Poll Tax records for 1377. These records exclude the cities of Chester and Durham, which were exempt from central government taxation, but the constituencies containing Chester and Durham are included in our sample. These two cities were almost certainly inhabited by at least 500 men.

with individual coefficients are generally lower. The *archa-town* coefficient is now significant at the 5% level in only ten out of the 14 models. In the models for *immigrant-issue-05*, *crime-05*, *immigrant-issue-10* and *BNP-support-10*, the coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, taken together, the results in Tables A5-A8 suggest that the association between modern attitudes and a Jewish heritage is not explained by the age of towns with a Jewish heritage.

A further concern is that Jewish settlements were heavily concentrated in towns that had a royal mint: 21 out of the 26 towns in Table 1 also appear in the list of 46 towns with a large mint published in Dyer (2000). It is possible that these mints reflected a relatively high level of financial development, and that this development was associated with a distinctive culture: financial centers are often relatively cosmopolitan. Therefore, the *archa-town* coefficient might be explained by a financial development effect rather than anything related to Jewish settlement. For this reason, Table A8 includes results using a sample restricted to those 56 constituencies corresponding to a town that had a large medieval mint. This restriction makes the sample very much smaller, so it is applied only to the BES 2010 data, and Table A9 corresponds to Table 2 in the main text. All of the *archa-town* coefficients in Table A9 are negative, but with this small sample only two out of four of them (those in the *immigration-feeling-10* and *UKIP-rank-10* models) are significant at the 5% level. The fact that some significant effects are preserved in such a small sample suggests that the association between modern attitudes and a Jewish heritage is not explained by the early financial development of towns with a Jewish heritage.

Appendix 4: Jews and Huguenots

While it would be informative to trace the evolution of regional variation in attitudes towards immigrants between the end of the 13th century and the end of the 20th century, data for the

intervening centuries are quite limited. Nevertheless, one period of immigration for which some data do exist is the end of the 17th century, when there was a large influx of French Protestant (or Huguenot) refugees. Small numbers of Huguenots had been arriving in England since the wars of religion in the middle of the 16th century, but for most of the 17th century the Edict of Nantes gave legal protection to Huguenots in France. When King Louis XIV revoked the Edict in 1685, many Huguenots sought refuge in Protestant-majority countries, including England. Estimates of the number of Huguenots entering England at the end of the 17th century vary between 20,000 and 120,000 (Gwynn, 1983), in other words between 0.5% and 2.5% of the total population of five million. In percentage terms, this is probably the largest single immigration event in English history.

Almost all Huguenot families were artisans; although there was some sympathy for them during a time of increasing anti-Catholic sentiment, they were in competition with indigenous skilled manual labour, and might not have been equally welcome in all parts of England. Gwynn (1983) lists all of the provincial English locations that were home to at least 100 Huguenots between 1681 and 1705. This list, which comprises a number of small towns and villages as well as cities, is reproduced in Table A10, along with the corresponding modern parliamentary constituencies. Huguenot settlements were heavily concentrated in the south and east of England, with only two located outside the modern East, South East and South West regions.

Is there a correlation between the pattern of medieval Jewish settlement and the pattern of Huguenot settlement in the 17th century? Table A11 provides some evidence on this question, tabulating 2010 parliamentary constituencies according to whether they were home to medieval Jews, or 17th century Huguenots, or both. Given the geographical concentration of Huguenot settlement, the sample is restricted to constituencies in the East, South East and South West

regions. The table shows that 12 out of 22 *archa* constituencies (or 55%) were also home to Huguenots, but only 16 out of 176 non-*archa* constituencies (or 9%) were home to Huguenots. Using a Fisher exact test of association, this difference is significant at the 1% level; the difference remains significant even if large cities such as Bristol are excluded from the sample. In the absence of any regional 17th century socio-economic data on which to condition these figures, we cannot be sure of the reasons for the association between Jewish and Huguenot settlement. Nevertheless, towns with a Jewish heritage are much more likely also to have a Huguenot heritage, which is consistent with a pattern of tolerance towards immigrants that has persisted through the centuries.

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
Fig. A1. Average constituency voting shares (in percentage points) in the 2010 general election: □ non-*Archa* constituencies and ■ *Archa* constituencies

TABLE A1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	BES 2010 (9863 observations)				BES 2005 (4948 observations)			
	mean	*s.d.*	*min.*	*max.*	*mean*	*s.d.*	*min.*	*max.*
income ÷ 100	15.50	11.00	0.42	105.00	12.49	8.97	0.42	75.00
age	49.79	14.19	17	105	46.56	14.40	18	87
$age^2 \div 100$	26.80	14.00	2.89	110.25	23.75	13.67	3.24	75.69
trust-1	5.58	2.24	0	10	5.63	2.28	0	10
trust-2	5.82	2.30	0	10				
happiness	6.48	2.21	0	10				
density ÷ 100	0.08	0.10	0.01	0.73	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.65
minority	14.02	14.85	0.26	80.02	13.93	14.13	0.26	130.98

	proportion = 1	*proportion = 1*
if-kids	0.26	0.32
if-beneficiary	0.07	0.10
if-graduate	0.30	0.24
if-low-quals	0.34	0.38
if-widowed	0.03	0.03
if-separated	0.02	0.02
if-divorced	0.08	0.08
if-single	0.14	0.17
if-female	0.49	0.50
if-religious	0.46	0.45

TABLE A2

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 AND 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDIES (PART 1)

	immigrant-rank-10 R.E. Ordered Probit			immigrant-issue-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-support-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-feeling-10 R.E. Tobit	
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.175	-3.62	-0.069	-0.147	-2.20	-0.033	-0.023	-0.18	-0.001	-0.884	-3.65
income ÷ 100	-0.534	-4.22	-0.212	-0.796	-4.30	-0.178	-1.077	-2.64	-0.049	-2.788	-4.47
if-kids	-0.047	-1.46	-0.019	-0.063	-1.41	-0.014	0.047	0.57	0.002	0.176	1.12
if-beneficiary	0.026	0.55	0.011	0.049	0.80	0.011	0.078	0.74	0.004	0.042	0.18
if-graduate	-0.385	-12.35	-0.151	-0.270	-6.06	-0.060	-0.312	-3.19	-0.014	-1.967	-12.82
if-low-quals	0.128	4.59	0.051	0.167	4.57	0.037	0.130	1.89	0.006	0.430	3.16
if-widowed	-0.035	-0.53	-0.014	-0.036	-0.40	-0.008	0.028	0.15	0.001	0.197	0.59
if-separated	0.148	1.72	0.059	0.150	1.34	0.036	0.218	1.12	0.012	0.373	0.88
if-divorced	-0.044	-1.02	-0.018	0.005	0.09	0.001	-0.010	-0.09	0.000	-0.371	-1.71
if-single	-0.045	-1.14	-0.018	-0.047	-0.84	-0.010	-0.035	-0.33	-0.002	-0.582	-3.01
if-female	0.003	0.12	0.001	0.008	0.23	0.002	-0.264	-3.99	-0.012	-0.590	-4.91
if-religious	0.105	4.30	0.042	0.097	2.95	0.022	-0.075	-1.15	-0.003	0.352	2.94
age	0.025	4.24	0.010	0.036	4.45	0.008	-0.004	-0.27	0.000	0.014	0.49
age² ÷ 100	-0.014	-2.42	-0.006	-0.029	-3.51	-0.006	0.006	0.40	0.000	-0.016	-0.54
trust-1	-0.062	-8.45	-0.025	-0.055	-5.66	-0.012	-0.067	-3.68	-0.003	-0.264	-7.30
trust-2	-0.021	-2.83	-0.008	-0.015	-1.53	-0.003	-0.035	-1.97	-0.002	-0.176	-4.94
happiness	-0.020	-3.42	-0.008	-0.006	-0.73	-0.001	-0.016	-1.15	-0.001	-0.117	-4.08
density ÷ 100	-0.023	-0.21	-0.010	-0.052	-0.35	-0.012	-0.062	-0.21	-0.003	-1.595	-2.87
minority	0.487	2.92	0.195	0.437	2.00	0.098	0.473	1.21	0.022	2.392	2.88
random effect	p = 0.49			p = 0.37			p = 0.50			p = 0.02	
N	9683			9683			9683			9380	

m.e. = marginal effect; in the ordered probit model, this relates to the probability of transition from the lowest value to a higher one.

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TABLE A3

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 AND 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDIES (PART 2)

	UKIP-support-10 R.E. Probit			UKIP-feeling-10 R.E. Tobit		immigrant-rank-05 R.E. Ordered Probit		
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.
archa-town	-0.227	-2.05	-0.019	-0.488	-3.21	-0.209	-3.25	-0.080
income ÷ 100	-1.495	-4.98	-0.125	-1.704	-4.24	-0.004	-1.72	-0.001
if-kids	-0.226	-3.19	-0.019	-0.029	-0.27	-0.034	-0.8	-0.014
if-beneficiary	-0.147	-1.54	-0.012	-0.245	-1.51	-0.112	-1.93	-0.045
if-graduate	-0.237	-3.44	-0.020	-1.071	-10.81	-0.363	-8.44	-0.141
if-low-quals	0.026	0.48	0.002	0.336	3.61	0.139	3.65	0.054
if-widowed	-0.002	-0.01	0.000	-0.025	-0.11	-0.136	-1.39	-0.056
if-separated	0.307	2.02	0.032	0.091	0.32	-0.067	-0.59	-0.026
if-divorced	-0.054	-0.61	-0.004	-0.146	-1.01	-0.138	-2.26	-0.053
if-single	0.057	0.69	0.005	-0.261	-2.02	-0.125	-2.58	-0.049
if-female	-0.287	-5.64	-0.024	-0.167	-2.08	0.001	0.04	0.002
if-religious	-0.116	-2.33	-0.010	0.511	6.41	0.137	4.08	0.054
age	0.032	2.54	0.003	0.015	0.78	0.007	0.85	0.003
age² ÷ 100	-0.020	-1.67	-0.002	-0.003	-0.15	-0.006	-0.65	-0.002
trust-1	-0.038	-2.57	-0.003	-0.115	-4.69	-0.077	-10.41	-0.030
trust-2	0.007	0.49	0.001	-0.037	-1.52			
happiness	-0.017	-1.44	-0.001	-0.061	-3.13			
density ÷ 100	-0.293	-1.25	-0.025	-1.184	-3.30	0.178	0.62	0.072
minority	-0.237	-0.67	-0.020	0.359	0.66	-0.002	-1.13	-0.001
random effect	p = 0.27			p = 0.04		p = 0.07		
N	9683			8531		4949		

m.e. = marginal effect; in ordered the probit model, this relates to the probability of transition to the highest value from a lower one.

TABLE A4

DETERMINANTS OF 2010 CONSTITUENCY-LEVEL ELECTION OUTCOMES

	log of BNP vote ÷ Conservative vote Heckman		log of BNP vote ÷ Labour vote Heckman		BNP election participation Probit		log of UKIP vote ÷ Conservative vote OLS		log of UKIP vote ÷ Labour vote OLS	
	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.258	-3.03	-0.210	-2.00	0.014	0.05	-0.125	-1.91	-0.100	-1.10
acorn-2-share	0.269	0.48	0.965	1.39	0.485	0.27	-0.621	-1.33	-0.239	-0.45
acorn-3-share	1.419	3.96	-0.257	-0.59	0.428	0.35	0.092	0.30	-1.351	-3.45
acorn-4-share	1.797	5.06	-0.157	-0.36	1.427	1.12	0.017	0.06	-1.835	-4.78
acorn-5-share	2.016	4.58	-0.191	-0.36	-0.577	-0.37	0.147	0.36	-1.461	-2.87
unemployment-rate	-4.374	-1.20	-10.979	-2.53	-27.513	-2.34	7.571	2.86	0.713	0.19
graduate-share	2.202	1.65	0.160	0.10	-3.924	-1.01	0.588	0.64	-0.494	-0.46
low-quals-share	6.853	4.23	1.037	0.53	9.814	1.66	3.678	2.68	-1.907	-1.15
widowed-share	-0.980	-0.10	13.313	1.15	8.960	0.28	-13.730	-1.70	-10.365	-1.00
separated-share	15.596	1.57	20.478	1.70	-24.281	-0.67	1.108	0.12	8.604	0.67
divorced-share	-10.043	-2.49	-4.295	-0.87	11.884	0.86	1.878	0.56	10.318	2.35
single-share	-0.576	-0.26	0.110	0.04	9.536	1.36	-1.418	-0.88	-4.330	-2.05
female-share	-6.536	-1.29	-13.588	-2.21	21.692	1.28	-0.186	-0.05	-3.207	-0.61
religious-share	-0.322	-0.42	-0.563	-0.61	2.343	0.88	0.662	0.97	-0.042	-0.05
under-30-share	2.799	0.80	-10.154	-2.40	-12.072	-1.00	5.920	2.09	-3.289	-0.95
30-64-share	1.235	0.38	-13.054	-3.36	-11.174	-0.97	4.417	1.62	-9.911	-3.06
over-64-share	-0.277	-0.12	-2.982	-1.06	-11.637	-1.62	4.203	2.54	2.659	1.10
density ÷ 100	-0.334	-1.22	-0.299	-0.90	-0.064	-0.07	0.421	1.69	0.366	1.19
minority	-0.482	-0.89	-0.459	-0.68	-1.279	-0.72	-0.718	-1.60	-0.671	-1.18
majority-2005	0.014	5.94	0.010	3.63	-0.002	-0.19	0.013	6.72	0.012	4.93
electorate-size					0.027	2.00				
N	271		271		460		429		428	

TABLE A5

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDY (MEDIEVAL TOWNS ONLY)

	immigrant-feeling-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-rank-10 R.E. Ordered Probit			UKIP-rank-10 R.E. Ordered Probit			crime-10 Tobit	
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.256	-3.52	-0.091	-0.239	-2.91	-0.067	-0.213	-3.29	-0.080	-0.411	-2.44
income ÷ 100	-0.382	-1.26	-0.135	-0.004	-1.06	-0.001	-0.735	-2.63	-0.273	-0.201	-0.23
if-kids	0.045	0.60	0.016	0.080	0.92	0.026	-0.071	-1.02	-0.027	0.041	0.20
if-beneficiary	0.042	0.36	0.015	0.084	0.69	0.025	-0.038	-0.36	-0.014	0.320	0.94
if-graduate	-0.545	-7.80	-0.193	-0.355	-4.10	-0.099	-0.368	-5.62	-0.139	-1.053	-5.27
if-low-quals	0.073	1.07	0.026	0.213	2.90	0.065	0.071	1.16	0.026	0.077	0.37
if-widowed	-0.458	-2.72	-0.163	0.304	1.74	0.097	0.084	0.57	0.031	-0.025	-0.05
if-separated	-0.155	-0.82	-0.055	0.187	0.90	0.058	-0.100	-0.55	-0.038	-0.137	-0.24
if-divorced	-0.069	-0.69	-0.025	-0.048	-0.43	-0.015	-0.076	-0.84	-0.028	-0.170	-0.61
if-single	-0.097	-1.10	-0.034	-0.004	-0.04	0.003	-0.014	-0.18	-0.005	-0.181	-0.91
if-female	-0.082	-1.42	-0.029	-0.239	-3.59	-0.069	-0.173	-3.28	-0.064	0.209	1.33
if-religious	0.039	0.67	0.014	0.035	0.53	0.010	0.142	2.71	0.052	0.450	2.72
age	0.013	1.02	0.005	0.012	0.77	0.004	0.028	2.34	0.010	0.108	2.71
age^2 ÷ 100	-0.001	-0.08	0.000	-0.007	-0.49	-0.003	-0.019	-1.54	-0.007	-0.087	-2.07
trust-1	-0.090	-5.13	-0.032	-0.064	-3.32	-0.019	-0.019	-1.18	-0.007	-0.175	-3.08
trust-2	-0.027	-1.58	-0.010	-0.033	-1.74	-0.010	-0.038	-2.43	-0.014	-0.075	-1.33
happiness	-0.012	-0.85	-0.004	-0.016	-0.99	-0.004	-0.002	-0.15	-0.001	0.063	1.79
density ÷ 100	0.367	1.49	0.130	0.001	0.00	-0.000	-0.097	-0.48	-0.038	-0.114	-0.21
minority	-0.623	-1.34	-0.221	0.026	0.05	0.011	0.079	0.19	-0.026	-1.491	-1.44
random effect	p = 0.29			p > 0.99			p = 0.79			n/a	
N	2294			1853			1858			1864	

m.e. = marginal effect; in the ordered probit models, this relates to the probability of transition from the lowest value to a higher one.

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TABLE A6

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 BRITISH ELECTION STUDY (MEDIEVAL TOWNS ONLY)

| | immigrant-issue-05 | | | | UKIP-feeling-05 | | | crime-05 | |
| | R.E. Probit | | | | R.E. Tobit | | | R.E. Tobit | |
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.		coeff.	t ratio		coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.165	-1.49	-0.047		-0.947	-2.44		-0.436	-1.39
income ÷ 100	-0.314	-0.52	-0.089		-3.207	-1.66		-0.111	-0.07
if-kids	-0.054	-0.47	-0.015		0.134	0.35		-0.044	-0.14
if-beneficiary	-0.117	-0.73	-0.033		-0.035	-0.07		-0.138	-0.31
if-graduate	-0.276	-2.27	-0.079		-2.207	-5.57		-1.005	-3.29
if-low-quals	0.224	2.28	0.064		0.711	2.11		0.531	1.90
if-widowed	0.062	0.22	0.019		-0.488	-0.51		-0.150	-0.19
if-separated	-0.351	-1.10	-0.095		0.566	0.57		0.862	1.02
if-divorced	-0.132	-0.76	-0.038		-0.138	-0.23		-0.005	-0.01
if-single	-0.422	-3.18	-0.110		0.671	1.60		-0.826	-2.48
if-female	0.065	0.74	0.018		-0.162	-0.55		-0.132	-0.56
if-religious	0.016	0.18	0.005		0.331	1.11		1.003	4.13
age	0.027	1.26	0.008		0.133	1.87		0.040	0.69
age^2 ÷ 100	-0.034	-1.50	-0.010		-0.170	-2.26		-0.018	-0.30
trust-1	-0.065	-3.55	-0.018		-0.147	-2.34		-0.239	-4.58
density ÷ 100	0.206	0.54	0.058		-0.734	-0.54		2.723	2.49
minority	-0.473	-0.54	-0.134		-2.964	-0.96		-7.236	-2.98
random effect	$p > 0.99$				$p = 0.14$			$p = 0.12$	
N	1138				982			1108	

m.e. = marginal effect.

TABLE A7

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 AND 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDIES (MEDIEVAL TOWNS, PART 1)

	immigrant-rank-10 Ordered Probit			immigrant-issue-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-support-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-feeling-10 R.E. Tobit	
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.194	-3.31	-0.076	-0.142	-1.62	-0.030	-0.105	-0.60	-0.005	-0.690	-2.21
income ÷ 100	-0.516	-1.96	-0.204	-0.829	-2.04	-0.172	-1.760	-1.83	-0.079	-3.212	-2.36
if-kids	-0.022	-0.33	-0.009	-0.022	-0.24	-0.005	0.139	0.80	0.006	0.416	1.26
if-beneficiary	0.091	0.93	0.036	0.144	1.14	0.030	-0.490	-1.70	-0.022	-0.386	-0.78
if-graduate	-0.464	-6.43	-0.180	-0.167	-1.77	-0.035	-0.196	-0.93	-0.009	-2.137	-6.64
if-low-quals	0.105	2.06	0.042	0.303	3.84	0.063	0.356	2.31	0.016	0.493	1.71
if-widowed	-0.098	-0.68	-0.039	0.090	0.45	0.019	-5.594	0.00	-0.022	0.874	1.19
if-separated	-0.013	-0.08	-0.005	0.089	0.41	0.019	0.371	1.02	0.023	0.254	0.31
if-divorced	-0.027	-0.31	-0.011	0.120	1.04	0.026	0.180	0.83	0.010	-0.751	-1.66
if-single	-0.021	-0.23	-0.008	0.034	0.30	0.007	-0.171	-0.73	-0.007	-0.662	-1.66
if-female	-0.038	-0.71	-0.015	-0.028	-0.40	-0.006	-0.249	-1.77	-0.011	-0.860	-3.39
if-religious	0.022	0.44	0.009	-0.032	-0.46	-0.007	-0.190	-1.34	-0.009	0.368	1.46
age	0.041	3.19	0.016	0.063	3.55	0.013	-0.033	-1.16	-0.001	0.053	0.92
age^2 ÷ 100	-0.028	-2.13	-0.011	-0.052	-2.99	-0.011	0.038	1.32	0.002	-0.055	-0.94
trust-1	-0.071	-4.82	-0.028	-0.098	-4.68	-0.020	-0.160	-4.21	-0.007	-0.343	-4.52
trust-2	-0.020	-1.29	-0.008	0.016	0.79	0.003	0.061	1.65	0.003	-0.065	-0.88
happiness	-0.014	-1.11	-0.005	0.000	0.02	0.000	-0.030	-1.00	-0.001	-0.129	-2.10
density ÷ 100	0.151	0.91	0.060	0.273	0.95	0.057	0.650	1.15	0.029	-0.799	-0.76
minority	0.266	0.74	0.105	0.337	0.63	0.070	-0.074	-0.07	-0.003	0.567	0.29
random effect	n/a			p = 0.49			p = 0.50			p = 0.64	
N	2294			2294			2294			2234	

m.e. = marginal effect; in the ordered probit model, this relates to the probability of transition from the lowest value to a higher one.

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TABLE A8

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS IN THE 2005 AND 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDIES (MEDIEVAL TOWNS, PART 2)

	UKIP-support-10 R.E. Probit			UKIP-feeling-10 R.E. Tobit		immigrant-rank-05 Ordered Probit		
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.
archa-town	-0.345	-2.12	-0.025	-0.404	-1.96	-0.266	-3.04	-0.104
income ÷ 100	-1.505	-2.19	-0.111	-1.286	-1.44	-0.953	-2.39	-0.375
if-kids	-0.169	-1.10	-0.012	0.128	0.56	-0.036	-0.40	-0.014
if-beneficiary	0.095	0.49	0.007	-0.583	-1.71	-0.266	-2.09	-0.102
if-graduate	-0.196	-1.34	-0.014	-1.235	-5.87	-0.400	-4.74	-0.154
if-low-quals	-0.031	-0.26	-0.002	0.447	2.24	0.169	2.11	0.067
if-widowed	-0.583	-1.27	-0.028	-0.286	-0.56	-0.425	-2.15	-0.158
if-separated	0.230	0.72	0.021	-0.118	-0.21	-0.229	-1.10	-0.088
if-divorced	-0.192	-0.92	-0.013	-0.216	-0.73	-0.040	-0.29	-0.016
if-single	0.037	0.21	0.003	-0.079	-0.30	-0.210	-2.37	-0.081
if-female	-0.363	-3.21	-0.027	-0.411	-2.41	-0.023	-0.33	-0.009
if-religious	-0.107	-0.98	-0.008	0.561	3.31	0.074	0.92	0.029
age	0.008	0.30	0.001	0.001	0.01	0.019	1.37	0.008
age² ÷ 100	0.005	0.22	0.000	0.018	0.46	-0.020	-1.29	-0.008
trust-1	-0.072	-2.26	-0.005	-0.098	-1.88	-0.073	-4.81	-0.029
trust-2	0.047	1.51	0.003	-0.014	-0.28			
happiness	-0.006	-0.23	0.000	-0.053	-1.25			
density ÷ 100	0.093	0.18	0.007	-0.160	-0.23	0.352	1.18	0.139
minority	-1.698	-1.46	-0.125	-0.831	-0.64	-0.582	-0.96	-0.229
random effect	p = 0.05			p > 0.99		n/a		
N	2294			2049		1138		

m.e. = marginal effect; in ordered the probit model, this relates to the probability of transition to the highest value from a lower one.

TABLE A9

DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE 2010 BRITISH ELECTION STUDY (MEDIEVAL TOWNS WITH LARGE MINTS ONLY)

	immigrant-feeling-10 R.E. Probit			BNP-rank-10 Ordered Probit			UKIP-rank-10 Ordered Probit			crime-10 Tobit	
	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio	m.e.	coeff.	t ratio
archa-town	-0.220	-2.27	-0.075	-0.149	-1.54	-0.039	-0.191	-2.47	-0.067	-0.080	-0.32
income ÷ 100	0.004	0.93	0.001	0.006	1.22	0.001	0.002	0.43	0.001	0.003	0.29
if-kids	0.034	0.33	0.012	0.052	0.51	0.013	0.015	0.19	0.005	0.262	0.94
if-beneficiary	0.185	1.16	0.064	0.335	2.23	0.087	0.069	0.48	0.024	0.481	1.16
if-graduate	-0.530	-5.54	-0.182	-0.445	-3.83	-0.116	-0.425	-4.07	-0.148	-0.843	-3.37
if-low-quals	0.188	2.00	0.064	0.133	1.48	0.035	-0.075	-0.90	-0.026	0.506	2.03
if-widowed	-0.843	-3.24	-0.280	0.270	1.16	0.070	-0.189	-0.92	-0.066	-0.465	-0.69
if-separated	-0.338	-1.17	-0.117	0.326	1.05	0.085	0.034	0.12	0.012	0.710	0.91
if-divorced	-0.338	-2.41	-0.117	-0.153	-0.90	-0.040	-0.171	-1.29	-0.059	-0.322	-0.89
if-single	-0.313	-2.55	-0.108	-0.413	-2.79	-0.108	-0.044	-0.38	-0.015	-0.113	-0.35
if-female	-0.054	-0.68	-0.018	-0.268	-2.87	-0.070	-0.123	-1.64	-0.043	0.550	2.65
if-religious	0.243	3.01	0.083	-0.090	-0.89	-0.023	0.177	1.97	0.062	0.526	2.47
age	-0.005	-0.29	-0.002	0.043	1.80	0.011	0.015	0.83	0.005	0.102	2.16
age² ÷ 100	0.019	1.00	0.006	-0.035	-1.47	-0.009	-0.003	-0.14	-0.001	-0.076	-1.56
trust-1	-0.101	-4.18	-0.035	-0.063	-2.49	-0.016	-0.053	-2.52	-0.018	-0.100	-1.58
trust-2	-0.039	-1.62	-0.013	-0.049	-2.08	-0.013	-0.040	-1.90	-0.014	-0.092	-1.47
happiness	-0.031	-1.59	-0.011	-0.001	-0.05	0.000	0.004	0.17	0.001	0.104	2.03
density ÷ 100	0.005	1.19	0.002	-0.002	-0.59	-0.001	-0.008	-2.45	-0.003	-0.003	-0.25
minority	-0.721	-1.05	-0.247	0.165	0.29	0.043	1.136	1.81	0.396	-0.857	-0.47
random effect	p > 0.99			n/a			n/a			p > 0.99	
N	1243			985			983			990	

m.e. = marginal effect; in the ordered probit models, this relates to the probability of transition from the lowest value to a higher one.

TABLE A10

Towns and Villages with Huguenot Communities between 1681 and 1705

town	modern parliamentary constituencies
Barnstaple	Devon N
Bideford	Devon W & Torridge
Bristol	Bristol E, NW, S, W
Canterbury	Canterbury
Colchester	Colchester
Coventry*	Coventry NE, NW, S
Dartmouth	Totnes
Dover	Dover
Exeter	Exeter
Falmouth	Falmouth & Camborne (2005), Truro & Falmouth (2010)
Hollingbourne	Faversham & Mid Kent
Huntingdon	Huntingdon
Ipswich	Ipswich
Maldon	Maldon
Norwich	Norwich N, S
Plymouth / Stonehouse	Plymouth Sutton (2005), Plymouth Devonport (2005), Plymouth Sutton & Devonport (2010), Plymouth Moor View (2010)
Rye	Hastings & Rye
Sandtoft*	Gainsborough
Soham	Cambridgeshire SE
Southampton	Southampton Itchen, Southampton Test
Taunton	Taunton (2005), Taunton Deane (2010)
Thorney	Peterborough
Thorpe-le-Soken	Harwich (2005), Harwich & Essex N (2010)
Salisbury	Salisbury

* Indicates a location outside the East, South East and South West regions.

TABLE A11

HUGUENOT AND *ARCHA* CONSTITUENCIES IN THE EAST, SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH WEST REGIONS

	Non-Archa	*Archa*	*Total*
Non-Huguenot	160	10	170
Huguenot	16	12	28
Total	176	22	198