Otago Philosophy - Charles Pigden

After graduating from Kings College, Cambridge in 1979, Charles Pigden spent five years studying at La Trobe in Australia before first coming to Otago as a postdoctoral fellow in 1986. After a brief stint teaching at Massey, he returned to Otago as a lecturer in 1988. Charles has published on a wide range of subjects from the analytic/synthetic distinction through conspiracy theories to the existence (or otherwise) of abstract objects. He is (as they say) a 'Russell scholar'. He has edited Russell on Ethics (1999) (which won the Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for 2000), contributed the chapter on ethics to the Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell and written the entry on Russell’s Moral Philosophy for the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Though he dabbles his fingers in many philosophical pies, his chief interest is in meta-ethics. He is a defender of the error-theory with special interests in Moore, Hume and the Is/Ought Question.

Teaching

PHIL 227 Moral Philosophy

PHIL 327 Moral Philosophy

PHIL 406 Why be Moral?
PHIL 458 ST: Themes from Hume

Supervision Interests

Research

Hume's famous No-Ought-From-Is passage is one of the most talked-about single paragraphs in the entire history of philosophy and continues to be the focus for metaethical debate right down to the present day. Some think it expresses a profound truth; some think it is true but not profound; and some think that it cannot be profound because it is not true. Like Thomas Reid, I am a member of the true-but-not-profound party, though, in my view, its non-profundity is itself profound, in the sense that it is a quite important point that nothing of any meta-ethical consequence follows from (my version of) No-Ought-From-Is. (When appropriately modified, No-Ought-From-Is is simply an instance of the conservativeness of logic, the thesis that in a valid deductive argument, you cannot get out what you have not put in; hence it provides no support whatsoever for non-cognitivism or even non-naturalism.)

My opponents include Arthur Prior, who argued in a famous paper that No-Ought-From-Is is not profound because not true, and Gerhard Schurz, who disputes my presupposition that there is no special logic of the moral concepts, but defends a different and potentially more profound version of No-Ought-From-Is. The collection Hume on Is and Ought addresses these issues, advancing the debate between Schurz and myself, and includes two completely new proofs of No-Ought-From-Is, one by Greg Restall and Gillian Russell and the other by Ed Mares. Research on these issues (including a debate between Annette Baier and myself about the meaning of 'deduction' in eighteenth Century English) led to further work on early modern logical theory, specifically the lecture notes of Colin Drummond, who was Hume's logic professor at Edinburgh.

Hume's 'Motivation Argument' is, if anything, even more discussed than No-Ought-From-Is. I contend that although an argument for non-cognitivism can be extracted from Hume's text, this is not the argument that Hume intended. What he was actually arguing for was the thesis that moral truths are not arrived at by reasoning but are the products of a moral sense. However both the argument that can be extracted from his text and the argument he intended are abject failures. If I am right about this, and right about No-Ought-From-Is, this rather leaves non-cognitivism in the lurch. What is perhaps more surprising is that Hume’s Slavery of Reason thesis (‘reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions’), which is usually employed together with some kind of internalism to support non-cognitivism, affords an independent argument for the error theory, a very different conclusion. However, these are contentious matters and are discussed at length by myself and others in Hume on Motivation and Virtue.

My work on Russell is dedicated to the proposition that Russell was an important ethical thinker, a major influence on Moore and a pioneer of both emotivism and the error-theory.

My long-term project is to write a defense of the error-theory (The Reluctant Nihilist) and a companion volume (Living the Noble Lie) arguing that morality is a necessary illusion. To that end I hope to explore the theme of amoralism in literature, touching on Dostoevsky, Laclos' Les Liaisons Dangereuses and the figure of Falstaff in Shakespeare's Henry IV plays. (forthcoming: 2013) in Ollo Loakola ed.

Selected Publications

Pigden. Charles (2013) ‘Subversive Explanations’ in Dawes and Maclaurin eds.A New Science of Religion, London, Routledge, , pp. 147-161.

Pigden, Charles (2012) ‘Spread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: a Problem for David Lewis’ (with Rebecca Entwisle) in James Maclaurin ed Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne, Dordrecht, Springer , 155-176

Pigden, Charles R. (2012): ‘Identifying Goodness’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90:1, 93-109

Pigden, Charles (2012) ‘Une superstition moderne: la Faussete en soi des theories de la conspiration’ [partial translation of Pigden (2007) ‘Complots of Mischief’)] Agone: Histoire, Poltique et Sociologie, 47

Pigden, Charles (2012) ‘A Sensible Knave? Hume, Jane Austen and Mr Elliot’ Journal of Intellectual History, 22.3, 465-480.

Pigden, Charles ‘Hume on Is and Ought’, Philosophy Now, Issue 83: March/April 2011

Pigden Charles R (2010) ‘The Argument from Relativity: the Nietzsche/Leiter Version’ (2292 words) an invited comment on Brian Leiter’s paper ‘Moral Skepticism And Moral Disagreement: Developing An Argument From Nietzsche’ for the online publication On the Human: a Project of the National Humanities Centre,

Pigden, Charles R (2010) ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-38, ‘Letter from a Gentleman in Dunedin to a Lady in the Countryside’ , pp. 76-91, “Comments on ‘Hume’s Master Argument’”, pp. 128-142, ‘Snare’s Puzzle/Hume’s Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is’, pp. 169-191, ‘Reply to Lo’, p. 195, ‘On the Triviality of Hume’s Law: a Reply to Gerhard Schurz’, pp 217-238, ‘Substance, Content, Taxonomy and Consequence: A Comment on Stephen Maitzen’, pp 313-319, in Pigden, ed. Hume on Is and Ought

Pigden, Charles R. (2009) ‘Introduction’ , pp. 1-29, ‘If not Non-Cognitivism then What?’ pp. 80-104, in Pigden,ed. (2009) Hume on Motivation and Virtue.

Pigden, C.R. (2008) ‘A Niggle at Nagel’ in Sandis, Constantine ed., New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan. I contend that Nagel’s famous argument in The Possibility of Altruism that causally biffy desires are not required to explain action is intellectually worthless, and thus that many philosophies of action - and some systems of ethics - are based upon a crude blunder.

Pigden, C.R. (2007) 'Russell's Moral Philosophy', [link to Stanford] Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy (includes three annexes)

Pigden, Charles.R. (2007) ‘Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem’, special Mackie issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10:5, pp. 441-456. Reprinted in Joyce and Kirchin eds (2010) A World Without Values, [link to amazon] Dordrecht, Springer.

Pigden, C.R. ‘Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4:2, pp. 219-232

Pigden, C.R. (2007) 'Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E. Moore', in Susanna Nuccatelli and Gary Seay eds, Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, [link to amazon] Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 244-269.

Pigden, C.R. (2007) 'Hume, Motivation and "the Moral Problem"' in New Essays on David Hume, [link to amazon] edited by Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2007, pp. 199-221.

Pigden, C.R. (2006) 'Popper Revisited or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?' ch. 3 of Coady, David ed. Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate, [link to amazon] London: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 17-47. Slightly revised reprint of Pigden, C.R., 'Popper Revisited or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?' The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 25, no. 1. pp. 3-34. (1995).

Pigden, C.R. (2006) 'Complots of Mischief' ch. 12 of Coady, David ed. Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate, [link to amazon], London, Ashgate, pp. 147-173.

Pigden, C.R. and Cheyne, C. (2006) 'Negative Truths from Positive Facts', special David Armstrong edition of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 84:2, pp. 249-65.

Pigden, C.R. (2004) Review of G.E.Moore's Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson, [current link] International Philosophical Quarterly, pp. 543-547.

Pigden, C.R. (August 2003) 'Owed to Uncle Joe' [current link] (a Review of Martin Amis's Koba the Dread ) in The New Zealand Political Review, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 43-45.

Pigden, C.R. (2003) 'Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist?' in Griffin, N. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Russell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 475-506.

Pigden, C.R. (2001) Review of Schurz, Gerhard, The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic, [current link] Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.

Pigden, Charles (1997) Review of The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell by Philip Ironside, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 75, no. 2. pp 257-259

Pigden, C.R. and Cheyne, C. (1996) 'Pythagorean Powers or A Challenge to Platonism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74, pp. 639-645.

Pigden, C.R. (1991) 'Naturalism' in P. Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 421-431.

Pigden, C.R. (1990) 'Geach on "Good"' Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 40, No. 159, pp. 129-154.

Pigden, C.R. (1988) 'Anscombe on "Ought"', Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 20-41.

* This is an electronic version of an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly. Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of The Philosophical Quarterly, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal's website or at the Blackwell website.

Scritti Politici

Pigden, Charles, 'One Fix Doesn't Fix all - but it Helps', Otago Daily Times, 2/2/07, p.17.

Pigden, Charles, 'Mass Extinctions But the Hills Will Still Look Nice' Otago Daily Times, 11/12/06.

Pigden, Charles ,'Falsehood and Folly of Conspiracy', Otago Daily Times, 24/7/06, p.15.

Pigden, Charles, 'Better an Honest Bigot than a Pedlar of Falsehoods', Otago Daily Times, 12/7/04, p.14

Pigden, Charles, 'Open Letter to Mr Anderton' Otago Daily Times, 5/4/02

Pigden, Charles, 'Gedda Life!' in The New Zealand Political Review, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 24-34. (September/October)

Pigden, Charles, 'Right Back at the Backgrounder' [Taxation Policy] October 1999

Coffee Spoons

'I have known the mornings evening afternoons
I have measured out my life with coffee spoons ...'

Well, not coffee-spoons exactly, but it seems to me that I have measured out an excessively large portion of my life with political work of one kind or another plus rantings on the russell-l list (a list devoted to 'matters arising' from the life and work of Bertrand Russell). In an effort to retrieve something of value from what I am sometimes inclined to think of as wasted years, I am posting a selection of of my writings from the 1990s till about 2007 which may perhaps be of interest to passing browsers.

1) Submission on the Green Paper: A Future Tertiary Education Policy for New Zealand. This submission criticizes a mercifully unimplemented scheme for tertiary educational reform that was floated by the National Government in the 1990s. I post it because it may be useful to people in search of intellectual ammunition against similar schemes in the UK and elsewhere. I particularly recommend pages 9-11, in which I criticize the view that 'consumer' (i.e student) choice should be the chief 'driver' for the provision of academic 'services'.

2) Democracy, Plutocracy and America: Debates with Oliver Kamm. This document contains my contributions to an extended debate with Oliver Kamm (now a well-known columnist for the Times) about the nature of the American political scene. I maintain three theses: 1) that America is a corrupt democracy, that is, a democracy that conspicuously falls short of the democratic ideal, 2) that it is a de facto plutocracy, and 3) that there are strong fascistic tendencies within America's political culture. The debate dates back to 1997, but subsequent events have not disconfirmed my views. The quotations from Oliver Kamm's emails are included with his kind permission.

5) Russell in the Thirties. Arguments with Ray Monk who suggested that Russell was politically inactive during ht thirties and that this was a fact which required an explanation. I argued on the contrary that there was no such fact and hence that no need for an explanation. There are some unkind comments about the politics of Ludwig Wittgenstein.