Heather Dyke

BA(Hons)(1991) PhD (1996)(Leeds)

Email: heather.dyke@otago.ac.nz

Background

Heather studied philosophy at the University of Leeds, both for her BA (Hons) and PhD, which she was awarded in 1996. The topic of her PhD thesis was the metaphysics of time and tense. In February 1998 she arrived in New Zealand to take up her first academic post as Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Otago in Dunedin. In 2009 she became Associate Professor in philosophy.

Teaching

PHIL 103 Ethical Issues

PHIL 105 Critical Thinking

PHIL 229 Philosophy of Religion

PHIL 329 Philosophy of Religion

PHIL 409 Advanced Metaphysics

Supervision Interests

• Philosophy of Time
• Metaphysics and Ontology
• Philosophy of Language

Research

The focus of much of my research to date has been the philosophy of time. I am an advocate of the new B-theory of time, according to which there is no distinction between past, present and future, and time does not flow, even though our temporal language seems to suggest otherwise. I am also interested in other issues of contemporary concern in metaphysics, for example, modality, causation, and identity.

I have published a book about the relationship between language and reality called Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (New York: Routledge, 2007). My interest in this issue grew out of my interest in the philosophy of time, where much of the debate appeared to be centred around the ontological significance of different kinds of temporal language. I argue that metaphysics should (and on the whole does) take itself to be concerned with investigating the nature of reality, and I suggest that the ontological significance of language has been grossly exaggerated in the pursuit of that aim. One of the most widely used methodologies in metaphysics involves taking ordinary language about the world as our starting point and asking what that, or some modified version of it, can tell us about the way the world is. I call this methodology into question, arguing that it is a fallacy to argue from features of language to conclusions about the nature of reality, one that is widely committed. I call it the representational fallacy. I take as my starting point the debate over the status of tense in the philosophy of time, and argue that the recent development of the new B-theory within that debate offers a new strategy for approaching metaphysics more generally. I apply this new strategy to debates in the metaphysics of causation, modality, material constitution and vagueness.

My most recent publication is a collection of essays entitled From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics (New York: Routledge, 2008). Contributors to the volume are:

JC Beall, Mark Colyvan, Michael Devitt, John Heil, Frank Jackson, Fred Kroon, D. H. Mellor, Luca Moretti, Alan Musgrave, Robert Nola, J. J. C. Smart, Paul Snowdon, Daniel Stoljar.

Publications include

Books

Heather Dyke, (ed.) From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics. New York: Routledge (2008).

Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. New York: Routledge (2007).

(Chapter 2 reprinted in L.N. Oaklander (ed.) The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2008)

Heather Dyke (ed.) Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2003).

Book Chapters

Heather Dyke, 'What moral realism can learn from the philosophy of time'. In Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Heather Dyke ed. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2003): 11-25

Heather Dyke, 'McTaggart and the Truth About Time'. In Time, Reality and Experience. Craig Callender ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (2002) 137-152

Heather Dyke, 'Real Times and Possible Worlds'. In Questions of Time and Tense. Robin Le Poidevin ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1998) 93-117

Refereed Journal Articles

Heather Dyke, 'Words, Pictures and Ontology: A Commentary on John Heil's From an Ontological Point of View', SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 6: 31-41

Heather Dyke, 'Tenseless/Non-Modal Truthmakers for Tensed/Modal Truths', Logique et Analyse 199: 269-87 (2007)

Heather Dyke, 'The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Time Travel'. Think 9: 43-52 (2005)

Heather Dyke, 'Temporal Language and Temporal Reality'. The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 380-391 (2003)

Heather Dyke, 'Tensed meaning: a tenseless account'. Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 65-81 (2003)

Heather Dyke and James Maclaurin, ''Thank goodness that's over': the evolutionary story'. Ratio XV: 276-292 (2002) Reprinted in L.N. Oaklander (ed.) The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2008

Heather Dyke, 'Tokens, dates and tenseless truth conditions'. Synthèse 131(3): 329-351 (2002) Reprinted in L.N. Oaklander (ed.) The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2008

Heather Dyke, 'The pervasive paradox of tense'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62: 103-124 (2001)

Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke and Diane Proudfoot, 'Temporal parts and their individuation', Analysis 61(4): 289-292 (2001)

Encyclopedia Entries

Heather Dyke, 'The Metaphysics of Time' Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online www.rep.routledge.com (2005) Updated 2009

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