
Frameworks for responding to emergency infectious diseases

The International Health Regulations

Global outbreaks in the past: detect, report and act at borders



Quarantine: action at borders to prevent local outbreaks




Collective response to international spread: plague, cholera, yellow fever and smallpox

1374	Venice	Ship Quarantine for Plague only
1851 - 1902	Europe/Americas	10 International Sanitary Conferences
1920	Geneva	League of Nations Health Organization
1951	Geneva	International Sanitary Regulations
1969	Geneva	International Health Regulations

Points for discussion

- Have you heard of the International Health Regulations?
- If so do you know how they came into existence and how they have functioned since agreed in 1969?

International Health Regulations 1969: purpose




security against the international spread of disease with a

> interference with world traffic."


Content of International Health Regulations 1969: requirements

- Notification to WHO: cholera, plague or yellow fever – reports only accepted from countries where event is occurring
- Health Measures: describe maximum measures that a country may require to protect against cholera, plague and yellow fever (e.g. yellow fever vaccination card)
- Health Organization at borders: ports, airports and frontier posts adequately equipped to prevent vector proliferation







Application of International Health Regulations: prevention at border posts



Application of International Health Regulations: reporting/prevention




Application of International Health Regulations, 1969



Points for discussion

- Have the International Health Regulations been successful in protecting against the international spread of cholera, plague and yellow fever?
- If so, can you provide evidence?
- If not can you suggest why?

Economic impact, cholera and plague, 1991-1998



Breaches in species barrier: emerging infections in humans
















Infection	Animal linked to transmission	Year infection first reported
Ebola virus	Bats	1976
HIV-1	Primates	1981
E. coli O157:H7	Cattle	`1982
Borrelia burgdorferi	Rodents	1982
HIV-2	Primate	1986
Hendra virus	Bats	1994
BSE/vCJD	Cattle	1996
Australian lyssavirus	Bats	1996
Influenza A (H5N1)	Chickens	1997
Nipah virus	Bats	1999
SARS coronavirus	Palm civets	2003
Influenza A (H1N1)	Swine	2009
MERS coronavirus	Bat/ Dromedary	2012
Infnuenza A (H7N9)	Poultry	2013
Zika virus	Monkey	2007

Recent infectious disease outbreaks and their economic impact




WHO: vision for revision of the International Health Regulations, 1996

 A world on the alert and able to detect and respond to international infectious disease threats within 24 hours using the most up to date means of global communication and collaboration


 A change in the norms surrounding reporting of infectious disease outbreaks, making it expected and respected to report

SARS: international spread from Hong Kong, 21 February – 12 March, 2003



Source: WHO/CDC

Revision of the International Health Regulations 2003 resolution



Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

All infectious diseases with potential for international spread to be reported


Reporting of infectious diseases from other sources accepted by WHO Member States

Revised International Health Regulations to serve as a formal framework for pro-active international surveillance and response through national IHR focal points

Points for discussion

- How would you go about revising the International Health Regulations?
- Do you think it will be easy to renegotiate in the world today?

International Health Regulations 2005




From three diseases to all public health threats

From passive to pro-active using real time surveillance/evidence

From control at borders to detection and containment at source

Requirements, International Health Regulations



Strengthened national core capacity for surveillance and control

Mandatory reporting of possible public health emergency of international importance (PHEIC)

Emergency Committee to advise DG


Decision instrument International Health Regulations, PHEIC

4 diseases that shall be always be notified **polio** (wild-type polio virus), smallpox, human influenza new subtype, SARS.


Diseases that shall always lead to utilization of the algorithm: cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, VHF (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), WNF, others that are unusual or unexpected and cause:

serious public health impact risk of international spread risk of travel/trade restriction


Insufficient information: reassess as evidence becomes available



WHO event management site, national IHR focal points



Decision making and response and the revised International Health Regulations 2005



Points for discussion

- How will WHO be sure that countries report when possible PHEIC?
- What will happen if countries do not report?
 - Is it possible to force reporting?
 - Is it possible to sanction those countries that do not report?

WHO: vision for revision of the International Health Regulations, 1996

 A world on the alert and able to detect and respond to international infectious disease threats within 24 hours using the most up to date means of global communication and collaboration

 A change in the norms surrounding reporting of infectious disease outbreaks, making it expected and respected to report

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director General, WHO 2003




China and reporting of SARS, April 2003



Points for discussion

- Do you think the revised International Health Regulations are effective?
 - Core capacity strengthening
 - Reporting/declaring Public Health Emergencies of International Importance
- Can you support your answer with evidence?


Strengthening core public health capacity under the International Health Regulations



Detections and Containment at source, International Health Regulations 2005



Country core capacity self-assessment reports, International Health Regulations 2005



Ebola outbreak, 2014-2015




Infected people from 12 countries



Deaths in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, USA, Mali, Spain and Germany



Cumulative pledges to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone




February 2017

Points for discussion

- How can core public health capacity strengthening be enforced?
- What has happened that might increase capacity development since the Ebola outbreak in West Africa?


Global Health Security Agenda, countries participating as of 1 January 2017



Points for discussion

- Has the Emergency Committee of the International Health Regulations been effective in supporting the Director General of WHO?
- Has it resulted in recommendations that have led to an effective response to emerging infections?
 - Support your answer with examples/evidence

Zika infection and microcephaly under the International Health Regulations




Zika, neurological disorders and microcephaly: is this a PHEIC?



If a Pregnant Woman Gets Zika, What's the Risk of Microcephaly for the Baby?

Decision instrument International Health Regulations, PHEIC




Emergency Committee, Zika, microcephaly and other neurological disorders, 2016

WHO Strategic Health Operations Centre SHOC)



Zika virus outbreaks, Africa




- Initially identified in Ugandan monkeys, 1947
- First human cases detected in Nigeria, 1954

Source: World Health Organization

Updated: 9 February 2016

ZIKA virus outbreaks, Southeast Asia



Pakistan, Malaysia,1977

Yap, Micronesia, 2007

• French Polynesia, 2013

Source: World Health Organization

Updated: 9 February 2016

ZIKA virus outbreaks, Latin America and Caribbean



Brazil, 2014

Rapidly spreading through the Americas


Source: World Health Organization

Updated: 9 February 2016

Observations in Brazil, 2015 – 2016, first emergency committee meeting

- Zika outbreaks confirmed:
 - Infection generally causes mild disease compared to Dengue and Chkiungunya
- Clusters of microcephaly:
 - Case definition for macrocephaly after birth is not standardized:
 some authors use 2 standard deviations below the mean for age and sex. other authors use 3 standard deviations
- Serological diagnosis a challenge:
 - PCR used in post mortem examination brain and spinal fluid: 8 infants with microcephaly positive
- Guillain-Barré syndrome occurring in areas of Zika outbreaks


Reported Microcephaly, Brazil, to February 2016



Source: Brazilian Ministry of Health and States Secreatriats of Health

Update: January, 27, 2016


Zika-infected Regions, Brazil



Source: Brazilian Ministry of Health and States Secreatriats of Health

Update: January, 27, 2016

Microcephaly in Brazil, 2010-2015



Source: ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment


Updated: December 2015

Retrospective/prospective data collection, France, 2016

- Zika virus outbreak 2014 (retrospective):
 - estimated 8,700 infections
 - 13 foetal/infant CNS malformations: 13 (3 microcephaly)
 - Guillain-Barré syndrome : 42
- Zika virus outbreaks French Caribbean (prospective):
 - Guillain-Barré: 167 reported
 - Martinique : 61
 - Guadeloupe : 63
 - St Martin: 6
 - Guyane : 37

Source: Government of France

Dengue risk worldwide, 2016



WHO Emergency Committee of the IHR

- First task to decide whether there was a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)
 - Discern which of the two independent events was the PHEIC: Zika or microcephaly and other neurological disorders
- Second task to make recommendations for the PHEIC
 - Coordinated and standardised surveillance of microcephaly
 - Collaborative research to confirm/disprove the linkage with Zika virus
- Additional precautionary recommendations made for Zika to continue while PHEIC recommendations implemented
 - Strengthen vector control
 - Determine potential for vaccine production


WHO activities since PHEIC declaration

- Development of over 15 consensus guidelines on prevention and patient management
- Regular review of research in Brazil and elsewhere and conclusion of epidemiological linkage Zika and microcephaly/other neurological disorders
- Meetings with approximately 30 vaccine developers
- Development of diagnostic algorithms and diagnostic test needs with diagnostic manufacturers
- Regular convenining of Emergency Committee

Zika vaccine development




Reported dengue, Brazil 2014 - 2016



Semana Epidemiológica de Início de Sintomas


Source: Sinan online

Reported Zika, Brazil, 2016, presented to 3rd Emergency Committee meeting



VECTOR CONTROL ACTIVITIES, BRAZIL, 2016

households vector control activities



Obs: Percentual considerado sobre o total de imóveis









Post-Olympic Zika analysis, Brazil, 2016

- 350,000 to 500,000 foreign tourists
- 6 cities: Population 35 million
- 10.900 athletes from 206 countries
- 0.03% of foreigners required some health care service
- No athletes or other tourists with diagnosis of Zika, dengue or Chikungunya

Zika virus outbreaks, 2013 - 2016



Middle East Respiratory Syndrome under the International Health Regulations



SARS-like respiratory syndrome, Saudi Arabia, 2012

Coronavirus: is this the next pandemic?

Last September a doctor in a Saudi hospital was fired for reporting a new, deadly strain of the coronavirus. Now, with half of all confirmed cases ending in death, the World Health Organisation has issued a global alert and scientists are preparing for the worst

· Coronavirus victim's widow tells of grief



The Guardian, Friday 15 March 2013 20.06 GMT

Jump to comments (186)



Professor Ali Mohamed Zaki, who diagnosed the first patient with a strain of the coronavirus in Saudi Arabia, stands in his office in Cairo. Photograph: David Degner/Getty Images



SARS-like respiratory syndrome, London, September 2012



Patient with SARS-like respiratory syndrome, St Thomas', London

49 year-old previously well Qatari male Exposures

Travel to Mecca with family and friends	31 Jul - 18 Aug
Possible mild respiratory illnesses in family during	18 Aug - 3 Sep
Visit to own farm in Qatar (camel, sheep)	18 Aug - 3 Sep

Course of illness

Severe respiratory illness requiring hospitalisation	9 Sep
Intubation and ventilation required	11 Sep

Microbiology

Common causes of viral and bacterial pneumonia not detected

Novel coronavirus **detected** nasal swab 13 Ser


Confirmed novel coronavirus 2012 (later named MERS coronavirus)

Clinical Course

Remained on ECMO 12 months - deceased




Cluster of nCoV cases, UK, December 2012 – February 2013



Source: Eurosurveillance, Volume 18, Issue 11, 14 March 2013

MERS coronavirus: international spread, 2012 - 2015




MERS Co-V after almost three years.

very collaboration; valid case


e of non-sustained transmission


Nosocomial spread in hospitals, households, workplace....

Yellow Fever outbreak, Angola, 2015 - 2016



Yellow Fever outbreak, Angola, spread to DRC 2015 - 2016







Points for discussion

- Was this Yellow Fever outbreak declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern?
 - Defend your answer

Influenza under the International Health Regulations




WHO global influenza surveillance network




25 July 2008

- National Influenza Centres
- **H5 Reference Laboratories**
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Studies on the Ecology of Influenza in Animals
- WHO Collaborating Centre for the Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of Influenza
- WHO Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza

Antigenic shift and drift of seasonal influenza virus: vaccine composition




WHO global influenza surveillance network



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Confirmed Human and Poultry, H5N1 Infections since 2003



Data source: World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and national governments/WHO/EPR/FAO The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever World Health on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, Map Production: Public Health Mapping and GIS on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or or area aumorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. Communicable Diseases (CDS) World Health Organization © WHO 2006. All rights reserved

Tools to control an influenza pandemic



Oseltamivir and Zanamivir




Pandemic vaccine

Minister of Health, Indonesia and H5N1 virus sharing: link sharing to more equitable benefits



It's time for the world to change



Jakarta meeting on sharing in the benefits of virus sharing, March 2007

Types of benefits anticipated, developing countries:

- Strengthened laboratory capacities to qualify for WHO Collaborating Centre designation
- More transparent virus handling within WHO
- Sustained access to H5N1 and pandemic influenza vaccines
- Linkage of virus sharing and vaccine production to sustained benefits


Points for discussion

- Is the minister of health justified in her demands?
- How would you address the situation under the International Health Regulations?

International Health Regulations 2005 and H5N1

Article 2:

Prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease commensurate with public health risks



Sharing of avian influenza viruses under the International Health Regulations

Annex 2: helps determine if an event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), and requires reporting of any human infection with a new influenza sub-type


Article 6; requires joint risk assessment to examine if the threat posed by the reported event constitutes a PHEIC

to conduct risk assessment for influenza, epidemiological information and virus strains are required

WHO resolution on influenza virus sharing (WHA 60.28): May 2007

- Intergovernmental meeting on virus sharing, November 2007
- Open-ended working group meeting on virus sharing, April 2008
- Intergovernmental meeting on virus sharing December 2008, May 2009, April 2010 and April 2011
- Non-binding Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework developed

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, 2011



Objective: to improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response and strengthen the protection against the pandemic influenza with a fair, transparent, equitable, efficient, and effective system for:

- a) the sharing of H5N1 and other influenza viruses with human pandemic potential; and
- b) access to vaccines and sharing of other benefits.

GSH agreement, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness

Article 5. Obligations of the Company

- 5.1 The Company agrees to comply with the commitments below ('the Commitments'), in accordance with the terms set out hereunder and in the Term Sheets Annexed to this Agreement and forming an integral part thereof, including with respect to timetables established thereunder.
- 5.1.1 The Company, as a manufacturer of vaccines and antivirals, commits to the following subject to and in accordance with the respective Term Sheet with regard to each influenza pandemic during the term of this Agreement:
 - 1. Donate 7.5 %(seven point five per cent) of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO (see Annex 1).
 - 2. Reserve 2.5 % (two point five per cent) of real time pandemic vaccine production at affordable prices to WHO (see Annex 2).
 - 3. Donate 2 (two) million treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic to WHO (see Annex 3).
 - 4. Reserve 8 (eight) million treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic at affordable prices (see Annex 4).
- 5.2 The Company shall ensure that the Materials are handled in accordance with applicable WHO guidelines and national bio-safety standards.
- 5.3 If applicable, the Company shall appropriately acknowledge in presentations and publications

Don

Breaches in species barrier: emerging infections in humans















Infection	Animal linked to transmission	Year infection first reported
Ebola virus	Bats	1976
HIV-1	Primates	1981
E. coli O157:H7	Cattle	`1982
Borrelia burgdorferi	Rodents	1982
HIV-2	Primate	1986
Hendra virus	Bats	1994
BSE/vCJD	Cattle	1996
Australian lyssavirus	Bats	1996
Influenza A (H5N1)	Chickens	1997
Nipah virus	Bats	1999
SARS coronavirus	Palm civets	2003
Influenza A (H1N1)	Swine	2009
MERS coronavirus	Bat/ Dromedary	2012
Infnuenza A (H7N9)	Poultry	2013
Zika virus	Monkey	2007