Campbell McLachlan, 1986
The author examines provisions in the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 applicable to conflicts issues upon dissolution of marriage through separation with specific reference to: the international diversity of matrimonial property regimes; the scope of the Act in relation to movable and foreign immovable property; the uncertainty pervading common law conflict rules and their potential applicability to property falling outside the scope of the Act; and ante-nuptial agreements. The article highlights the tension between domestic policies and foreign law in transnational matrimonial property disputes.
Craig Brown, 1976
The author examines the confusion caused by the double-limbed tort conflict rule (Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1) in regard to jurisdiction and choice of law, as well as the significance of the "proper law of the tort" exception (Boys v Chaplin  2 QB 1). While emphasising the distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law, the author points to the interaction between jurisdiction and choice of law in order to find the appropriate forum as well as the appropriate lex causae for cross-border tort disputes. The jurisdictional doctrine of forum conveniens (where leave to serve abroad is required) and the "proper law of the tort" for choice of law purposes may provide the required degree of flexibility in tort choice of law.
Anthony Gray, 2006
The author argues that the double actionability rule, which has survived in New Zealand, is no longer best suited for choice of law in tort. Instead, the lex loci delicti should be the preferred rule supplemented by a flexible exception. The author undertakes an in-depth analysis of the North American jurisprudence in this area, focusing on the value of the distinction between conduct regulation and loss distribution. He concludes that Australia and New Zealand should adopt similar choice of law rules for torts.
Maria Hook, 2017
This article explores the problems associated with an exclusive focus by courts on statutory interpretation when determining whether a statute applies to foreign facts, overlooking the application of conflict of laws principles. This focus is referred to as “statutism.” In particular, the author focuses on how statutism risks distortion of established notions of subject-matter jurisdiction in two ways. First, statutism can lead courts to overlook the choice of law process. Courts may conclude that if the relevant statute does not apply they must lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, overlooking the possibility that they can adjudicate the dispute according to foreign law. Second, statutism, by deciding the question of subject-matter jurisdiction according to statutory interpretation, prevents a proper analysis of whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction according to the external conflict of laws framework.