

A Case for the Abolition of the New Zealand Defence Force: Meeting Challenges to Creating a Peaceful World and Peaceful Aotearoa New Zealand without the Use of Violence.

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Abstract:

It is a commonly held belief that war is sometimes a necessary evil, and occasionally the only means to create peace. By extension, the belief that a nation-state must have armed forces for offence, protection, civil defence and crisis situations, and humanitarian projects is also commonly held. Aotearoa New Zealand is no exception to these ideas. Pacifists and other peace activists have challenged this notion for a long time. Recent experience and empirical research is now available to reinforce the pacifist stance on war. In this article we will make an argument for, and outline the empirical research on, the effectiveness of nonviolence and nonviolent alternatives to the military. Based on this evidence, we will suggest that one of the best actions we can take to create a world without war is to demilitarise and use the same resources to grow nonviolent alternatives that can contribute to the wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand and the world as a whole.

Keywords: Demilitarisation; New Zealand; Peace; Nonviolence; Military alternatives; Civilian Based Defence

Introduction

It is a commonly held belief that war is sometimes a necessary evil, and occasionally the only means to create peace. By extension, the belief that a nation-state must have armed forces for offence, defence, disaster response, and humanitarian projects is also commonly held. We wish to raise this as a matter for debate within the context of Aotearoa New Zealand. We contend that the confines of the debate around how a country can secure itself are very narrow, and that the commonplace assumption that militaries are best suited to achieve this is built on shaky foundations. We propose that evidence demonstrates there are feasible nonviolent means of securing Aotearoa New Zealand. Through this chapter we aim to both critique Aotearoa New Zealand's current approach to security and open up discussion on potentially more effective alternatives.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we begin with a brief description of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and its activities, in order to provide context to exactly what is being discussed. We show that while the NZDF undertakes a number of activities, its primary purpose is armed combat. Second, acknowledging that this is by no means the first attempt to critically engage with the previously stated assumptions, we briefly outline pacifist responses to the military and militarisation. Third, having discussed the activities of the NZDF in the first section, we demonstrate how these same functions could be fulfilled without use of a combat force. We argue that alternative means of fulfilling these functions are likely to be more cost-effective and more conducive to securing the interests of New Zealanders, as well as helping to ensure a more peaceful international climate. One does not need to be a pacifist to accept this argument. Finally, we conclude by summarising key points we believe should be considered in developing Aotearoa New Zealand's defence policy moving forward. Our position, based on what we present, is that the people of Aotearoa New Zealand could be best secured by abolishing the NZDF and replacing it with nonviolent alternatives.

Pacifism and Pacifist Responses to the Military and War

The existence of military institutions and their use in response to international or domestic threats has long been questioned. While such voices do not necessarily emanate from the halls of political power, activist and intellectual traditions exist in which the need for a military is rejected outright. Indeed, Aotearoa New Zealand's well-known anti-nuclear protests in the 1980s are one example of people opposing one particular military armament – the nuclear bomb.

Pacifism is "...the view that war, by its very nature, is wrong and that humans should work for peaceful resolution of conflict" (Cady, 2010, p17). Some pacifists reject war primarily on principle, others primarily reject war based in practice, (Cady, 2010, p69). The first position is a principled position, often based on a moral argument. The second position states that while one may hypothetically be able to justify war, war leads to negative and unpredictable outcomes in practice, and due to this, should be rejected. Both agree that due to war being a method of defeating opposition through injury, it is purely destructive (Scarry, 1985). War, it is argued, cannot build security, but instead enhances insecurity as it kills, maims, and displaces people, while destroying infrastructure. Our line of argument here is pragmatic. We assert that The NZDF is ineffective at creating security and that there are nonviolent alternatives to the NZDF. We do not fully engage with the moral arguments against war, but instead make a practical case for the abolition of the NZDF in favour of nonviolent alternatives.

If we are going to assert that the NZDF does not, and by its nature cannot, meet the security needs of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand, we must first define what security is. The NZDF and the New Zealand government see the primary role of the NZDF as promoting "a safe, secure and resilient New Zealand" (NZDF, 2016, p 8). While security is often thought of as national security, we argue that a more reasonable way to think of the security of Aotearoa New Zealand and its people is in terms of human security, as we do not believe that a nation can be secure without the individuals of which it is composed being secure. Nor do we believe that there would be much value in such a state of affairs. Booth (2007)

defines human security as *survival plus*. The 'plus' refers to people being free "from life-determining threats, and therefore [having] space to make choices" (Booth, 2007, p102). This conception of security suggests more than just defence against attack, but also access to the means of life, to healthcare, to a healthy environment and to help when needed, such as in the case of natural disasters. The NZDF states its aim as securing Aotearoa New Zealand. However, we argue that there are nonviolent alternatives that could be more efficient in achieving the human security of New Zealanders.

The Track-record of Military Means of Security

The early part of the 21st century presents clear examples of the destabilising consequences of war. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, of which the NZDF was involved in the former, have not achieved their stated short-term goals of stopping terrorist violence in the region. They have, however, led to a large number of unintended, destructive and destabilising consequences. Much evidence suggests that the occupation of Iraq was a major factor in the birth of ISIS, for example, which is now inextricably intertwined with the violence in Syria.

Generally speaking, military intervention in other countries often has the potential to create insecurity for the intervener through blowback (Johnson, 2000). Yet, Western militaries, including the NZDF, have been deployed in the Middle East recently in a so-called humanitarian operation to defeat ISIS. While ISIS now appears to be on the verge of losing its territorial strongholds, the length of time and amount of lives that this has taken to achieve mean that it is hard to call the military response to ISIS a success.

Most people who defend war as a tool of security do so while accepting that it is a regrettable last resort. However, we contend that we in Aotearoa New Zealand have not given the attention required to alternatives in order to be able to make this claim. As Parkin (2016, p260) states when discussing just war theory more broadly, "Given the importance of the last resort criterion to just war reasoning, it is somewhat surprising that just war theorists have not spent more time

discussing alternatives to war." We would like to both begin this discussion and suggest, based on this initial investigation, that feasible alternatives do exist for Aotearoa New Zealand.

While one does not need to be a pacifist to accept the arguments made herein, we highlight the pacifist tradition as pacifist thinkers and activists are responsible for much of the evidence we now have to suggest that the retention of military forces by states is unnecessary and even unproductive in the pursuit of peace.

Aotearoa New Zealand and the NZDF

The NZDF is the unified force composed of Aotearoa New Zealand's Navy, Army and Air Force. There are 14,000 members of the NZDF, including uniformed, civilian, regular and reserve staff (NZDF, 2015, p10). Annually, the NZDF is allocated around \$3.5 billion by Aotearoa New Zealand's Government. This is about 1.2% of GDP, according to the World Bank. The NZDF states that its mission is "to secure New Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign interests, including in the Exclusive Economic Zone, and to be able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest" (NZDF, 2015, p10).

Utilising these resources and pursuing this objective, the NZDF undertakes a multitude of varied activities. Since the start of the 1990's, the NZDF has participated in, among other activities, disaster relief efforts internationally and domestically, multinational peacekeeping operations, support for scientific enquiry in the Antarctic and combat operations in Afghanistan. While these activities are diverse, they are not equally as important to the NZDF's existence or identity. In assessing the role of the NZDF in securing Aotearoa New Zealand, it is important to have a clear understanding of what the NZDF is and what its capabilities are.

It is clear that the NZDF is primarily a force for armed combat. Nothing makes this clearer than the words of the Chief of the NZDF, Lieutenant General T.J. Keating, in the NZDF's 2015-2018 *Statement of Intent* (NZDF, 2015, p6) document.

Our purpose is to provide the government of-the-day with credible and effective options to deliver an armed response when New Zealand's interests are at stake. So first and foremost, we are a Force prepared for combat. This is our raison d'être.

Moreover, as detailed later in the *Statement of Intent* (NZDF, 2015, p10), "...the forces are held principally to allow the Defence Force to respond to security events in which New Zealand acts alone to protect national interests." By its own words, the NZDF exists primarily to carry out unilateral armed operations.

The primacy of this purpose is also seen in the allocation of funding to the NZDF. Of the nearly 3.5 billion dollars allocated by the Government to the NZDF, 2 billion goes towards force preparedness "for joint operations to provide the Government with a range of military forces to protect and advance the security and interests of New Zealand" (NZDF, 2017). This can be broken down by branch of the NZDF as follows. Respectively, the New Zealand Army, Air Force and Navy are allocated NZ\$831 million, NZ\$766 million and NZ\$447 million in the 2017/2018 financial year.

In addition to the funding mentioned above, NZ\$709 million is to be spent on acquiring assets for the NZDF. The NZ Army website states, "An Army is always among the first to get its hands on the latest technologies. The New Zealand Army is no different. As you would expect, much of the technology at our disposal is designed to help us excel in combat situations" (NZDF, 2017). This suggests that much of the \$709 million dollars is likely spent on acquiring technologies for combat operations. In 2014, Aotearoa New Zealand's defense spending per (active) troop was US\$293,820 compared to the global average of approx US\$65,905 (Greener, 2015).

Reasons to Retain a Military for Aotearoa New Zealand's Security

In this paper we present evidence to suggest that there are alternative methods of achieving security for the people of Aotearoa New Zealand, and that these alternative methods may be less costly and more effective in doing so. We argue, therefore, that it is negligent to continue to ignore such alternatives in developing Aotearoa New Zealand's defence policy.

We acknowledge that the NZDF does perform roles that are useful or necessary in maintaining security and humanitarian conditions both within Aotearoa New Zealand and abroad. For example, the NZDF is called upon to respond to natural disasters, for multinational peacekeeping operations and for reconstruction projects in war zones. However, we will argue that these potentially positive roles that the NZDF is sometimes involved in could be better dealt with in non-military manners. There is evidence to suggest that nonviolent methods have the potential to be effective at such tasks. It cannot be assumed that an institution primarily designed and equipped for combat has the skills required to perform these tasks simply because they have the resources (largely in the form of personnel) that make them an obvious candidate to undertake this work.

In the following, we list five primary reasons why it is often assumed that Aotearoa New Zealand needs to retain a military force. These reasons are: offensive capabilities to attack foreign governments and organisations; defensive capabilities to protect Aotearoa New Zealand from physical or cyber attack; humanitarian relief efforts, peacekeeping operations and protection of New Zealand's economic interests. We do not have fully formed plans for alternatives. We merely aim to point out the inefficiency of maintaining military capacity for these purposes.

The military to attack foreign governments/organisations

One of Aotearoa New Zealand's more recent military deployments, and the longest foreign war in the country's history (Hagar, 2011), is NZDF participation in the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. This followed the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Despite often being characterised as a humanitarian

intervention, Aotearoa New Zealand's participation was primarily political and military, as it moved in solidarity with the US (Hagar and Stephenson, 2017). It emerged that a key role of the NZ SAS was to paint targets for US bombs. Hagar and Stephenson's report, *Hit and Run*, demonstrates the nature of the NZDF's role, asserting that humanitarian aid related roles were at best minimal, ineffective, and unsustainable. It also highlights potential war crimes committed by the NZDF in retaliation attacks. All in all, the invasion of Afghanistan did not lead to democracy. Instead, it created insecurity. While this not *due to* the NZDF's role in the conflict, it makes such operations hard to justify. This is especially true in light of nonviolent alternatives explored below.

Nonviolent movements have shown us that oppressive governments can be removed without the use of violence. Experience demonstrates this to be true even in conditions of extreme repression. In fact, nonviolent movements have a much higher success rate at toppling oppressive regimes than do violent revolutions or invasions from another power.

The pragmatic nonviolence theory of Gene Sharp (1973; 2005; 2012) demonstrates how people's movements can produce force and thereby remove a regime's power. Every regime is held up by "pillars of support" including the armed forces, police, civil servants, the media, workers and civil society groups, amongst others (Helvey, 2004). If these pillars are removed by the revolutionary movement - through sustained acts of protest, non-cooperation and direct intervention - the regime will collapse because the people who are necessary for the continued operation of the oppressive regime no longer participate in it. From this point of view, power comes from the bottom up, through consent and certain behaviours. If a movement can prevent these pillars from fulfilling what the regime needs, the regime collapses. Based on past nonviolent movements, Sharp (2012) generated a list of 198 methods of action that can be and have been used to challenge governments.

There is growing evidence to support the efficacy of nonviolence even against the most ruthless of regimes. From 1900 to 2006 nonviolent movements have

been twice as successful at achieving their aims than violent movements (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011); nonviolence achieving a 53% success rate versus violent movements achieving a 26% success rates. Both are far more successful than the record of foreign invasion.

Nonviolence also leads to more democratic outcomes that are longer lasting. (Toerell, 2010; Ulfelder, 2005; Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). In fact, even failed attempts at nonviolence are more likely to achieve more democratic outcomes than a successful violent revolution (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). In addition to this after nonviolent revolution there is a much lower chance of violence occurring in the years following the revolution. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that there is likely to be a recurrence of civil war within ten years after a violent revolution but significantly less chance of war after a nonviolent revolution. Martin (2007) argues that the historical record of nonviolent resistance shows that it is more successful than conventional politics or violent resistance.

These findings raise the question of whether Aotearoa New Zealand would be better giving resources to nonviolent peoples movements; investing in training and support for these movements; and putting money into research on nonviolent means of conflict resolution; than we are contributing to coalition forces. As demonstrated above, violent intervention does not have a good track record of bringing peace to societies experiencing violent conflict. Research on non-violent movements shows the potential for alternative means of resisting oppressive regimes and implementing more peaceful conditions.

The Military for National Defence

The second, and possibly most often cited, supposed reason why Aotearoa New Zealand requires a defense force is to defend itself from foreign aggression. The very title of the NZDF suggests that this is surely a primary reason for the maintenance of the NZDF's armed capacity. Assessing whether self-defense is a good reason to maintain armed capacity in the NZDF requires engaging with two

questions: First, what is the level of threat that Aotearoa New Zealand faces? Second, what are the most appropriate ways of addressing threats we confront?

As regards the first question, we are lucky to be able to say that the direct level of threat confronted by Aotearoa New Zealand is very low. As *Defence Assessment 2014* (NZDF, 2014, p25) states:

New Zealand does not presently face a direct threat of physical invasion and occupation of New Zealand territory. The likelihood of such a threat to the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and territory over which we have a sovereign claim, emerging before 2040 is judged to be very low, and would be preceded by significant change to the international security environment. New Zealand could therefore expect to have a reasonable amount of time to re-orientate its defence priorities should this be necessary.

The *Assessment* (NZDF, 2014, p26) goes on to note that while Aotearoa New Zealand is not at risk from attack by conventional armed forces, there are a number of other “evolving threats” to the country. Cyber attack and terrorist activities are two issues that receive attention. It seems reasonable to ask whether these issues could be effectively dealt with by military means.

In the first instance, cyber attack is said to be problematic due to the pervasive role of technology in modern society, and the ability of such attacks to be carried out irrespective of Aotearoa New Zealand’s geographic isolation. Almost by definition, however, such attacks cannot be prevented by conventional armaments. Nullifying such attacks requires technological solutions such as those sought by businesses in protecting customer information. The threat of cyber attack is posed more as a threat to NZDF operations, rather than to Aotearoa New Zealand’s citizens. The *Assessment* states “The diffusion of offensive cyber capabilities means that all future Defence Force operations will need to be cognisant of this threat and take appropriate protective and defensive measures.” (NZDF, 2014, p26).

With regard to terrorism, the specific threat to Aotearoa New Zealand stems from the “...small number of New Zealand citizens that are engaged in terrorism-related activities in conflict zones, such as Syria and Iraq.” In particular, “The threat to New Zealand relates largely to how such individuals behave should they return to New Zealand.” (NZDF, 2014, p26).

The association of any New Zealander with terrorist organisations is concerning, indeed. However, a military response to the specific issues of terrorism that Aotearoa New Zealand faces, such as “returning fighters”, would seem inappropriate. As citizens of Aotearoa New Zealand, surely such individuals would be the subject of investigation by the New Zealand Police and be processed by Aotearoa New Zealand’s justice system, rather than the subject of military attention.

Terrorist violence internationally is concerning. However, there are bodies of literature that demonstrate 1) the perceived threat of terrorism vastly outweighs the likelihood of being a victim of such violence 2) that military response to this phenomenon is ineffective and often produces outcomes opposed to those intended, such as increased insecurity. For example, Robert Pappé’s (2006) study indicating that suicide bombings are related to US occupation of foreign territories. Militaries are not able to “resolve” extremism or terrorism, and military methods of eliminating terrorists or extremists, such as drones strikes, are known to incite further terrorist acts.

Additional challenges are mentioned in the *Assessment*, include challenges to managing maritime threats, increasingly common natural disasters and demographic shifts in Aotearoa New Zealand making NZDF recruitment more difficult. Some of these are discussed below.

Despite the fact that Aotearoa New Zealand does not face any threat of occupation or invasion, we do not advocate for a state of unpreparedness. Rather, we argue that given the lack of such a threat a more reasonable policy of self-defence would employ civilian-based tactics of defence. Such an approach to

defence, we argue, is practical, financially responsible and arguably more effective. Given the size of the NZDF, it is questionable as to whether it would be able to repel any committed aggressor that possessed the military means of reaching and attempting to occupy Aotearoa New Zealand.

Sharp (1990; 1985) writes that civilian-based defence is not only desirable, but also feasible, if it is based on training and research. It would be based on non-cooperation with the invading forces. The aim of civilian-based defence is both to deny attackers their objectives and to make impossible the consolidation of their rule. Non-cooperation and defiance may be combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty and reliability of the attackers' troops and functionaries. In other words, the pillars of support model outlined above holds for invading forces, which still need the support of the population to, e.g. extract resources from an occupied territory.

Despite rarely being talked about, there is a theoretical and empirical literature on civilian national defence models (Bartkowski, 2015; Boserup and Mack, 1974; Salmon, 1988; Sharp, 1990; 1985) that both discusses plans for implementing such strategies and reports on historical cases of its use. Examples of where it has been used include Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to protect against Soviet attacks in 1991, and in Czechoslovakia in the 1960's. Moreover, civilian-based defence may be uniquely suited to national defence requirements as the nature of warfare changes. As noted above, the NZDF (2014) recognises a growth in armed conflicts that exhibit involvement by external forces in support of domestic militia. Ukraine is specifically cited (NZDF, 2014, p7).

Much has been made of the Russian Government's use of "hybrid warfare" in Ukraine, whereby physical force is employed in conjunction with propaganda, plausible deniability and inciting nonviolent civilian protests in the adversary's territory (Bartkowski, 2015, p8). Bartkowski argues that civilian-based defence is an effective means of responding to such an attack and notes that states in the region, such as Lithuania, have begun to incorporate this into their defence policies.

Summarising one of the relative strengths of civilian-based defence, when compared to armed resistance to occupation, Bartkowski (2015, p22) writes,

In contrast, however, to violent popular resistance that is usually carried out by a limited number of physically fit men operating in a clandestine guerrilla network, nonviolent resistance can mobilize and engage the whole society. Everyone can participate in open acts of noncooperation, disobedience and refusal to accept adversary's authority. Nonviolent actions mobilize many more millions of people than armed resistance ever could, bringing a real, hard, power to the resistance.

Notably, CBD is not seen as untenable by all political parties in New Zealand. The Green Party of New Zealand (2017) in fact has CBD as one of their policies.

Civilians could be prepared to block roads with vehicles, turn off power or stop public services. Teachers could refuse to use propaganda in schools and police could refuse to arrest people. Large strikes could prevent the invaders from getting the resources they need to continue their occupation and from exploiting the countries resources. This would involve training the population of Aotearoa New Zealand. Civilian training in nonviolent resistance could be incorporated into the education system and workplaces.

CBD is not only a means of hindering an aggressor once they have arrived, but also possibly a deterrent. As alluded to by Bartkowski, countries with small military forces (such as Aotearoa New Zealand) may appear more exploitable than countries whose entire population is trained to resist aggressors. It is important to remember that occupation is not achieved by capturing a parliament building, but requires systematic control of the population and key infrastructure. CBD is a defence policy that recognises this reality.

It is likely that before switching to CBD, centralized industries would need to be decentralised. Dispersing production facilities, and power and food supplies would make it extremely hard for an invading force to control economic infrastructure, coerce the population and ensure that their forces got the resources they need to sustain occupation. This decentralisation would likely have the positive affect of making Aotearoa New Zealand more resilient to natural disaster.

The Military for Civil Defence

The NZDF is often deployed in civil defence emergencies, such as after a flood or earthquake. Two recent examples include the 2011 Christchurch and 2016 Kaikoura Earthquakes. What is more, the NZDF recognises that this form of work is likely to be required of it more and more into the future. Noting Aotearoa New Zealand's vulnerability to natural disaster, due to its placement between Australian and the Pacific, *Assessment 2014* states that such events are likely to increase due to climate change (NZDF, 2014, p28). It is stated, "The Defence Force can therefore expect a steadily increasing requirement for domestic disaster response and recovery" (NZDF, 2014, p28).

We argue that civil defence responses could be more effective if an institution existed, and was trained and equipped, specifically for this purpose, rather than amassing much of the material resources and organised labour required into an institution which exists primarily for combat. As is also the case with dealing with maritime challenges (discussed below), the NZDF seems to fulfil this role due to there being no other government agency that has the ability to do so by itself. A fundamental problem is, however, that, precisely due to its main function not being disaster relief "the New Zealand Defence Force cannot guarantee that certain resources will always be available [for disaster relief], because they may be involved in another Government-directed mission" (Mateparae, 2015, p40).

After the Christchurch Earthquake, Aotearoa New Zealand accepted expert earthquake recovery teams from Japan and Taiwan to assist with the aftermath. Aotearoa New Zealand could establish a similar capacity, ready to be deployed

nationally or internationally. If the NZDF was dissolved, many currently employed by the NZDF could retain employment, if they so wished, in disaster response, as there are certainly some non-military skills and expertise that are transferable here. An example of a non-military, and voluntarily run, organisation equipped and trained specifically for saving lives is the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) in the UK. Such organisations respond to emergency situations with resources and skills specifically designed for this purpose, rather than technology and training suited to combat operations.

The Military as a Peacekeeping Force

The NZDF has a history of being involved in United Nation peacekeeping operations reaching back to the 1950s, when such operations started to occur. Participation in such missions continues through until the current day. In 2011 Aotearoa New Zealand had 458 NZDF personnel participating in 19 UN-led or UN-endorsed operations (Capie, 2015). In 2017, there are 219 personnel across 14 operations in 10 countries (Yong, 2017). Aotearoa New Zealand's ability to continue to participate in such international efforts is another commonly cited reason for why this country should maintain a military force.

The Government of Aotearoa New Zealand often uses the phrase "peace support operations" to describe UN peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2015). However, it is important to recognise that the term "peace support operations" is also used in a way that includes peace enforcement operations (UN sanctioned missions that are granted power to use military force to end hostilities, rather than solely in self-defence) and "other military deployments based on alliance and other ties" (Capie, 2015).

So, an important point of clarification is what exactly Aotearoa New Zealand's peace support operations have involved. These missions have included a wide variety of activities from unarmed observation and monitoring of a ceasefire between armed groups (such as India and Pakistan) through to the type of work that was conducted in Afghanistan (discussed above), in which the New Zealand

Special Air Service (NZSAS), Aotearoa New Zealand's special forces group, were deployed.

It is no surprise that Aotearoa New Zealand's operations have evolved alongside ever-changing notions of what constitutes peacekeeping, and related changes in the composition of international forces. Earlier UN missions typically had a more restricted mandate, and this is reflected in Aotearoa's New Zealand's work during the 1950s (?) monitoring pre-established ceasefires between other nations. Following the Cold War, these missions changed "from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and forces separations after inter-state wars, to a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars" (UN, 2000, p2, cited in Capie, 2015). Peacekeeping and, beginning in the 1990s, peacebuilding operations became far more extensive and complex during this time; a time that saw Aotearoa New Zealand make some of its largest contributions to international forces in places like Bougainville and Timor-Leste. Following 2001, a transition began whereby the proportion of NZDF personnel on UN deployments decreased relative to the proportion of personnel on non-UN deployments, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq (from 2015) (Greener, 2015).

In evaluating whether Aotearoa New Zealand should maintain a military, in order to continue to participate in these types of operations, a number of questions need to be asked. 1) How large a portion of the NZDF's work do these operations constitute? 2) What is the track record of success of these operations? 3) Can the stated aims of these operations be achieved through alternative, nonviolent methods? The first two questions are only considered briefly before moving onto the third question, which receives deeper consideration.

Firstly, while UN peacekeeping operations are a commonly cited use of our military, evidence suggests that in recent years it has not been a corner stone of what the NZDF has done. In 2011 Aotearoa New Zealand contributed \$22.2 million dollars to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2015). In the

same year the NZDF received approx. NZ\$2.77 billion from Aotearoa New Zealand's budget. Clearly, the former constitutes only a very minor portion of the latter. Furthermore, while Aotearoa New Zealand has made large contributions of forces in places like Timor-Leste, from 2002 the number of troops deployed on UN missions decreased dramatically, never exceeding 50 for the next ten years. Over this same period, non-UN deployments increased, peaking at just over 500 in 2010 (Greener, 2015). While UN missions are not the only form of international peacekeeping, with some being led by regional organisations, the size of the contribution to such operations casts doubt on the seemingly widely held assumption that traditional peacekeeping operations are a large part of what the NZDF do. The Government itself has admitted to reluctance to participate in UN peacekeeping operations due to the risk to personnel involved (Young, 2017).

Secondly, while recognising that there were positive achievements of operations such as those conducted in Timor-Leste, there needs to be an objective assessment of the track-record of UN peacekeeping/building operations, as well as those peace support operations of which Aotearoa New Zealand has been a part of, in order to not only understand what has been achieved by past missions, but also whether Aotearoa New Zealand should continue to make similar contributions to future missions. Some of the failures of peace support operations such as that in Afghanistan have been discussed above. So, we mostly focus on more traditional international peacekeeping/building here.

The historical record of UN peacekeeping/building is chequered at best. The UN has recognised its own shortcomings and numerous scholars have critiqued these operations on a number of fronts. Among other things, these operations have been said to be at times successful at stopping immediate violence but ineffective at repairing/healing societies and thus preventing future violence, insensitive to specific factors important to the context in which the operation is taking place, and, relatedly, overly concerned with implementing state/economic and military structures that may only lay the ground for further conflict. This is not to say that these failures stem from the work of Aotearoa New Zealand's

peacekeepers or any individual peacekeepers, for that matter. Rather, the point is that if these operations have such varied and often negative results, contribution to such operations surely cannot serve as a strong argument for maintaining the NZDF. This is especially true when we consider alternative means of intervening in situations of conflict and unrest. These alternatives are discussed below.

As well as evidence that suggests that nonviolent resistance is effective, there is also evidence for nonviolent peacekeeping. Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is led by trained civilians who use nonviolence and unarmed approaches to protect other civilians from violence and the threat of violence, as well as to support local efforts to build peace (Furnari, Oldenhuis and Julian, 2015). This has been done around the globe for decades with either no or close to no deaths of peacekeepers. UCPs have operated in many conflict zones such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sudan, Indonesia and Georgia, among others (Julian and Schweitzer, 2015). These examples have shown that you can successfully protect civilians in conflict zones nonviolently (Wallace, 2016). It developed at the same time that peacekeeping in the traditional sense became increasingly militarised, and is falsely presented as “humanitarian” (Schweitzer, 2010, p7-16).

According to Julian and Schweitzer (2015) groups such as *Nonviolent Peaceforce* and *Peace Brigades International* do things such as:

...including (but not limited to) accompaniment, presence, rumor control, community security meetings, securing safe passage, and monitoring. In every place where civilian peacekeeping is used around the world, it is always context specific; it is adapted and developed by the people who work on the ground.

They create safe(r) spaces for various parties involved to come together and:

...allow the [local] parties themselves to determine the means and the terms of transforming/resolving the conflict.

To build peace post-conflict, the rebuilding of relationships, trust, and capacity is vital. Being able to protect civilians without the use of violence, force, or the military demonstrates that peace is possible and helps break the cycle of violence within communities. It has consistent means and ends, and does not produce the mechanism for violence to happen again by inserting more arms into the scenario. Empirical support from a study by Beckman and Solberg (2013) found that communities felt significantly safer and more secure when UCP was present. Research also suggests that UCP reduces death and deters violence as they stop armed groups from acting (Julian and Schweitzer, 2015). Nonviolent peaceforce's own research suggests that it is especially effective at protecting vulnerable women in conflict zones. A comparative analysis by Julian and Furnari (2014) shows that these projects have a local-level impact within two years, but that it takes longer to become more established and have a larger, more strategic, impact. Nonviolent techniques have also been used for riot prevention (Weber, 1996).

Much more research is needed in this under-explored area – but what has already been explored and what has been learned by UCP groups over decades of practice shows that there is real potential for external intervention in conflicts that does not use military force.

The Military for Fisheries

Another often-cited role of the NZDF is the protection/monitoring of Aotearoa New Zealand's maritime area and the economic resources that it contains. A number of diverse activities are incorporated within this general role of the NZDF, including "maritime resource protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, constabulary tasks such as preventing transnational crime, including people smuggling, responding to maritime pollution incidents and providing support to the Department of Conservation's efforts to protect endangered species on our offshore islands." Here, again, we

need to ask what level of threat Aotearoa New Zealand faces in confronting these challenges and ask whether a military response is likely to be appropriate.

Clearly, many of the above tasks, such as pollution management and conservation work, do not require any armed capacity to implement. This claim is rather uncontroversial. As far as we can tell, people do not actively advocate a military response to these specific issues. Rather, the NZDF seems to conduct these operations in the absence of any other government body having the resources to do so. The NZDF itself states in its *Defence Assessment* (2014, p26), “The Defence Force is the only agency that maintains disciplined forces available at short notice with large-scale, integrated fleets of vehicles, ships, and aircraft.”

While things such as assisting with conservation are stated roles of the NZDF, there appears to be an unwillingness to perform these tasks in some areas of concern for Aotearoa New Zealand. A NZDF vessel has not been utilised to monitor or deter illegal whaling in the waters south of Aotearoa New Zealand; a matter of both conservation and fisheries protection. The Green Party of Aotearoa has stated that it would send a Navy vessel to monitor Japanese whaling in the southern ocean in 2018, demonstrating that it is feasible to use the resources possessed by the NZDF for these purposes (Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, 2017). Further more, the conservation work of groups like Sea Sheperd have demonstrated that a military element is not required to be effective in conducting such work. The need for their existance also shows this.

Isolating solely the resource protection aspect of illegal fishing, particularly within Aotearoa New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone, the NZDF (2014, p27) states in its *Defence Assessment* that, “...illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing within our Exclusive Economic Zone is not thought to be a major problem presently...” The *Assessment* continues that due to predicted future scarcity in other regions Aotearoa New Zealand’s waters may become an attractive site for illegal fishing. This begs the question of whether Aotearoa New Zealand would be better off diverting some of the money currently spent on the NZDF to

initiatives to stabilise regional fisheries in an effort to prevent the scarcity predicted to lead to future illegal fishing.

Regarding short-term preventative measures, again, non-governmental groups like Sea Shepherd have shown an ability to protect marine life in a non-military manner. Moreover, the instances of illegal fishing that have been dealt with by the NZDF appear to suggest the type of illegal fishing that Aotearoa New Zealand is likely to see is disconnected instances of commercial fishers attempting to fish illegally, rather than a systematic campaign supported by another sovereign state in which the exclusive right of Aotearoa New Zealand to an area is challenged, as has happened before in cases such as the “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the UK.¹ Such illegal economic activity could surely be dealt with by an effective coast guard.

Finally, regarding the possibility of confronting people-smugglers bringing people to Aotearoa New Zealand by boat, in similar ways to those that have occurred in Australia, there is little clarity over whether this is even possible, given the country’s extreme isolation.²

Accepting that this might happen at some point, lessons from neighbouring Australia suggest that a military response is both ineffective and inappropriate. Beginning in 2013, Australia initiated Operation Sovereign Borders, putting its military in charge of operations regarding asylum seekers (BBC, 2017). A recent study conducted at the University of New South Wales has argued that the boat turn-back tactics, employed as a part of this operation, are illegal (Moreno-Lax, 2017, cited in Doherty, 2017). Journalistic reporting has exposed the indecent treatment of people that these turn-backs have led to (Doherty, 2017). The aforementioned report also concludes that such policies are not a viable solution to people-smuggling in the long-term.

¹ As examples see (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 2015) and (Trevett and Davison, 2016).

² For examples of this debate see (Radio New Zealand, 2015) and (Collins, 2015).

By their very nature, people who find themselves in a situation whereby they will endure a treacherous journey across the sea in the hope of attaining a life for themselves somewhere else are not able to pose a military threat to Aotearoa New Zealand. It is true that we need a maritime capacity to respond to incidents of this nature. However, there is nothing to suggest that military vessels would be required in doing so.

Other Spending Alternatives to Create Peace and Keep Us Secure

In addition to all that has been written, it is important to remember that the over ten million dollar a day expenditure that the New Zealand government spends on the NZDF largely goes towards the technology of killing and is counter-balanced by the underfunding of institutions that do lead to the safety and security of citizens. A few examples are our increasingly underfunded healthcare systems, reduced or cut funding for services for survivors of sexual abuse, little action on domestic violence which New Zealand has the worst outcomes for in the OCED, and increasing inequality and poverty which these funds could help alleviate, and insufficient action to combat climate change. Tending to these problems would be a concrete way of increasing peoples safety and security. We will end the paper by discussing more appropriate ways of spending this money to increase the security of the people of New Zealand.

The in-production HMNZS Aotearoa, a 24,000 tonne ship which will be NZDF's biggest ever, is costing \$498 million. Talking on a Global scale now, one Tomahawk cruise missile costs about \$2 million, enough to pay the annual salary of 28 NHS nurses in the UK. The US at the end of last year had already fired about 50 of these missiles at Isis targets in Syria. War takes a lot of resources away from welfare. Global military expenditure is massive. Last year's global military spending averages out to more than US\$4.86 billion *every day*. To put this spending into perspective - It has been calculated that it would take less than 7% of global military expenditure to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty globally. Ignoring the suggestions we have made so far, simply by spending the NZDF budget on helping others would greatly increase our role in increasing global security.

Conclusions

In summary, if Aotearoa New Zealand demilitarised, the NZDF budget could be redistributed to: (1) Create civil defence forces that can be deployed locally and globally to respond to things like natural disasters and rebuilding in a more effective manner; (2) Build a nonviolent peace keeping force; (3) Create a nonviolent defence strategy; (4) Contribute resources to nonviolent resistance movements; (5) put more resources, both locally and globally, into areas that are currently underfunded but in reality are the first line for security in peoples lives. In addition, more money could go to research on nonviolent alternatives to the military.

Of course, a transition from the NZDF to nonviolence would involve some risks and unknowns. It would certainly require far more planning and research than has been, or could be, included in this paper. To reaffirm, we do not see this as a full blueprint, but the start of a conversation which changes the so-called “common sense” logic that a military is required by Aotearoa New Zealand, and to point out that nonviolent alternatives are possible and even visible, even if many of them are at an embryotic stage of their development. It is also worth pointing out that countries without militaries do exist, demonstrating the possibility of a state’s existence without one. Most are smaller states than New Zealand, such as Andorra, Samoa and Iceland. However Haiti, with a population of over 10 million people, and Costa Rica and Panama, which have a similar population to New Zealand, also do not have militaries. Costa Rica in fact responded to a brutal civil war by removing their military (ref needed).

Informed by evidence, we have argued that, a transition from maintaining a military to nonviolent alternatives would still allow Aotearoa New Zealand to defend itself, challenge violent and oppressive groups internationally and participate in initiatives to develop a peaceful international order. What is more, nonviolent alternatives may be able to achieve this better and at less cost than current military means. Much more research is required here. However, we believe that the evidence as it stands demands serious engagement and an in-depth public discussion on these issues. As Robert Holmes (1989, p274) states

“nonviolence is no guarantee against bloodshed. No system has such a guarantee. But the use of violence not only allows situations to develop in which bloodshed is inevitable; it entails the shedding of blood”.

More immediately than implementing some of these suggestions, which, admittedly, would take time to develop, we can stop our involvement in militarised operations and use the same resources to, for example, increase and fulfil our currently pitiable refugee quota, fund a well-run health system, prevent domestic abuse or end child poverty. This is a step we could take tomorrow, and would allow us to start to construct a peaceful Aotearoa New Zealand and world.

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Conflicts of Interests

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