New Zealand Association of Philosophers 2017 Conference

Conference programme and information guide

Monday 4 December - Thursday 7 December
Hosted by the Department of Philosophy, University of Otago (Dunedin)
Kia ora koutou

Nga mihi nui, welcome to NZAP 2017. We aim to facilitate an excellent conference for all our diverse guests. We open with mihi whakatau and welcome, from Ngai Tahu mana whenua, and from Professor Tony Ballantyne the Pro-Vice-Chancellor Humanities at the University of Otago. Light lunch follows. We then move into the established NZAP rhythm of parallel 55 minute sessions that collectively express the range of philosophy as currently practised in Aotearoa New Zealand. To make presentation at NZAP 2017 more widely accessible, we also offered the option of short (25 minute) sessions. Many took up this invitation. We ask the audience in each session, whether full or short, to select a Chair to host presenter and audience alike, and to conclude the session five minutes before the start of any following session.

Most presentations are in our general stream, with named streams also on: history of philosophy, Josh Parsons, empirical philosophy, Māori and philosophy, and applied philosophy. There are panels on Diversity and Philosophy, and on Marsden matters. Particulars are in the conference schedule. Charles Pigden will present our Chair’s Address on Monday evening; our conference party is on Tuesday night; and on Wednesday evening our proceedings shift to Etrusco at the Savoy in central Dunedin for the conference dinner. We conclude with a ‘plenary’ light lunch in the foyer of the Castle Theatres that are our conference location throughout.

On behalf of Otago’s Philosophy Department and its conference organizing group, I welcome and offer you best wishes for a diverse and stimulating NZAP 2017.

Andrew Moore,
NZAP 2017 Organizer
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# Conference Schedule

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<td>Mihi Whakatau / Welcome Light Lunch</td>
<td>Castle 1, Castle Foyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:00 PM</td>
<td>Burdened Epistemic Virtue Richard Paul Hamilton (Notre Dame Australia)</td>
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<td>1:00 PM</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence and Free Will: A 2017 Christmas Carol Matt Boyd (Adapt Research Ltd)</td>
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<td>1:00 PM</td>
<td>Grades of Proper Function John Matthewson (Massey)</td>
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<td>2:00 PM</td>
<td>The Mystery Machine: How Narratives and Virtues Cause Action</td>
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<td>Rule-Following, Moral Realism and Non-Cognitivism Revisited Alex Miller (Otago)</td>
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<td>Cooperation, Scale and Complexity Kim Sterelny (ANU)</td>
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<td>3:30 PM</td>
<td>Stakes and Standpoints Antony Eagle (Adelaide)</td>
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<td>3:30 PM</td>
<td>Three 7’s in π: Why Alice Ambrose and Wittgenstein Fell Out</td>
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<td>3:30 PM</td>
<td>Hey Functionalists, Let’s Get Sufficiently Physical Paul Hubble</td>
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<td>4:30 PM</td>
<td>There’s No Such Thing as Conceptual Competence Injustice: A Reply to Anderson and Cruz Paul Mikhail Catapang Podosky &amp; William Tuckwell (Melbourne)</td>
<td>Castle B</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:30 PM</td>
<td>Schmonceivability and the Mirror Argument: All Escape-Routes Barred Douglas Campbell (Canterbury)</td>
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<td>4:30 PM</td>
<td>Religious signalling: getting past the handicap principle Carl Brusse (ANU)</td>
<td>Castle D</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:30 PM</td>
<td>Dinner (find your own)</td>
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<td>6:00 PM</td>
<td>Chair’s Address Reason, the Slave of the Passions: What Hume Meant, Whether He Was Right, Why It Matters Charles Pigden (Otago)</td>
<td>Castle 1</td>
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<td>8:30 PM</td>
<td>Social Gathering</td>
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<td>9:30 AM</td>
<td>Autonoetic Animals&lt;br&gt;Alex Morgan (Rice)</td>
<td>The Emergence and Nature of Analytic Philosophy&lt;br&gt;Joel Katzav (Queensland)</td>
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<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Morning Tea</td>
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<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td>When Good Norms Go Bad: Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms&lt;br&gt;John Thrasher (Monash)</td>
<td>Does consequentialism work in our universe?&lt;br&gt;Hayden Wilkinson (ANU)</td>
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<td>12:00 PM</td>
<td>What kind of where you are: Does a Pleistocene shift to discontinuous environments lend itself to “category” thinking&lt;br&gt;Ben Jafferess (Whitireia and WelTec)</td>
<td>Has the deceived businessman been deceiving philosophers?&lt;br&gt;The freebie problem and intuitions about discovered and undiscovered deceptions&lt;br&gt;Dan Weijers (Waikato)</td>
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<td>1:00 PM</td>
<td>Lunch (find your own)</td>
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<td>2:00 PM</td>
<td>Reflections on Philosophy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Intelligence Augmentation (IA)&lt;br&gt;Negar Partow (Massey)</td>
<td>What is Naturalism in Metaethics?&lt;br&gt;Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)</td>
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<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td>The Mathematician's Black Box Encoder&lt;br&gt;Bruce Long (Sydney)</td>
<td>Being and Well-Being&lt;br&gt;Andrew Moore (Otago)</td>
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<td>4:00 PM</td>
<td>Afternoon Tea</td>
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<td>4:30 PM</td>
<td>Teaching and Learning as the 'missing link in the chain' in explaining the Evolution of Human Cognition&lt;br&gt;Christopher Carroll (Massey) SHORT SESSION</td>
<td>Institutions, Dispositions, and Two Sorts of Virtue&lt;br&gt;Marinus Ferreira (Auckland)</td>
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<td>7:00 PM</td>
<td>Conference Party (7:00-9:00 PM)</td>
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<td>9:30 AM</td>
<td>Two Kinds of Passional Doubt in Faith Ventures Matteo Ravasio (Auckland)</td>
<td>&quot;We the People&quot; Holly Lawford-Smith &amp; Stephanie Collins (Melbourne &amp; Manchester)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Morning Tea</td>
<td>Castle Foyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td>Was Filmer Right? Anthony Gambrell (Otago)</td>
<td>Roles All The Way Down Tim Dare with response by Christine Swanton (Auckland)</td>
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<td>12:00 PM</td>
<td>The Concept of Evil John Bishop (Auckland)</td>
<td>The Arc of Moral Development: Roles in Early Confucian Philosophy Cheryl Cottine (Oberlin)</td>
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<td>2:00 PM</td>
<td>Reason in Hobbes's De Cive Michael LeBuffe (Otago)</td>
<td>John Dewey and the contemporary debate on knowledge as a natural kind term Jerome Agboola Odebunmi (Waikato)</td>
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<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td>Relations in the History of Philosophy: From Heraclitus and Parmenides to de Morgan, Frego and Peirce Max Cresswell (Victoria University of Milan)</td>
<td>Tenses in Action Giuliano Torrengo (Milan)</td>
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<td>7:00 PM</td>
<td>Conference Dinner (7:00-9:00 PM) Etrusco at the Savoy, Moray Place, Central Dunedin</td>
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<td>9:30 AM</td>
<td>Marsden Information Panel Chair: Justine</td>
<td>Should the new “Rutherford’s Den” display at the</td>
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<td>Kingsbury (Waikato)</td>
<td>Christchurch Arts Centre really give such prominence</td>
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<td>to a philosopher (Popper)? Allan McCulloch (AgResearch (NZ) Ltd.)</td>
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<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Fictional Properties</td>
<td>So Where Do They Go Wrong? Marx, Engels and the</td>
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<td>Fred Kroon (Auckland)</td>
<td>‘German Ideologists’ Charles Pigden (Otago)</td>
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<td>11:30 AM</td>
<td>Farewell &amp; Light Lunch</td>
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NZAP 2017 Presentation Abstracts

Abstracts are organized by surname of the presenter (first presenter in the case of co-authored presentations). Panel abstracts can be found at the end of the list.

John Bishop (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)
The concept of evil
Stream: History of Philosophy
How should the concept of evil properly be understood? I recently agreed to write a 10,000 word essay on ‘Evil and suffering’ for a forthcoming ‘encyclopaedia’ project, with editorial instructions to deal, not with debates about ‘the Argument from Evil’ and the viability of theodicy, but with presuppositions made in those debates about the nature of suffering and evil. I am thus in pressing need of helpful discussion on my initial ideas, including (1) that evil makes sense as a specific concept only in the context of the idea that humanity – indeed, perhaps, reality as a whole – has an overall purpose or telos; and (2) that, despite its widespread contemporary rejection, there is actually a lot to be said for the traditional doctrine (found in Augustine and Aquinas) of evil as ‘privation’ of the good. This will be a talk designed to elicit that helpful discussion. 55 minutes.

Matt Boyd (Adapt Research Ltd)
Artificial Intelligence and Free Will: A 2017 Christmas Carol
Artificial intelligence (AI) is poised to revolutionize the way we do many things, and this in turn has great potential to alter society. I outline the risk that AI will come to dominate media discourse. I discuss negative potential consequences of this, but also describe how AI threatens to erode free will. Due to bounded rationality and a suite of psychological biases, human minds are hackable. On the basis of this, I argue that a world of media discourse dominated by AI could only enhance Strawson’s argument for the impossibility of human causa sui and the non-existence of free will, ultimate moral dessert and responsibility. I conclude by posing a set of philosophical questions that need answering in this setting. The key issue will be in deciding whether this future is merely a quantitative shift from the past and present, or a qualitative one deserving of further normative consideration. 55 minutes.
Carl Brusse (Australian National University)

Religious signalling: getting past the handicap principle

Stream: Empirical Philosophy

Since the early work of Spence and Zahavi in the 1970s, the idea of costly signalling (aka 'the handicap principle') has been frequently appealed to in both biology and social science. More recently, a diverse literature has developed the idea that religious expression can be seen as a costly signal of commitment - potentially tying the evolution of religion to the evolution of cooperation in human societies in an adaptive (rather than maladaptive) and naturalistic explanation of the phenomena. However, this work suffers from a disconnect between the principle of signalling in the abstract, and the real-world phenomena it is intended to model. In this paper I argue that the explanatory pay-offs of this approach are challenged by significant complications when applying actual signalling models to the target system: i.e. when going beyond simple 'proof of concept' modelling. I outline the mathematical models available and argue that a certain degree of conceptual confusion in the literature has obscured these difficulties. Crucial to overhauling religious signalling as a naturalistic explanation will be a) to develop an approach to defining and accounting for costs and benefits which is both more nuanced and more rigorously aligned with the models used, and b) to drop the prevalent fixation with the handicap principle in favour of a more general category of differential pay-off signalling models, with specific models paired to real-world ritual practice and self-reinforcing cultural behaviours. I conclude with a partial taxonomy of such model-ritual pairing types, to illustrate how this new framework might be developed by social scientists for testing in the field. 55 minutes.

Douglas Campbell (University of Canterbury / Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha)

Schmonceivability and the Mirror Argument: All Escape-Routes Barred

The “zombie argument” is a famous argument against physicalism, due to David Chalmers. Is it sound? Recently three University of Canterbury philosophers—Jack Copeland, Zhao-Ran Deng, and myself—have argued that it isn’t, using what we called the “mirror argument”. Chalmers has responded that the mirror argument has a flaw. In this talk I show why Chalmers is wrong, and why he has no viable means of defending the zombie argument. 55 minutes.

Christopher Carroll (Massey University / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)

Teaching and Learning as the 'missing link in the chain' in explaining the Evolution of Human Cognition

Stream: Empirical Philosophy

One of the key practices associated with teaching is the use of imitation (by a learner) and
demonstration (by a teacher). The second is mental attribution to young which would allow for teaching that changes to target the specific deficiencies of a learner. Explaining how, in what order, and why these two practices were adopted within human evolutionary history (from a point where they did not exist at all) is the task of this paper. My aim here will be to argue that learning and teaching has an important role to play in explaining our ancestors’ cognitive evolution as a species. Whilst doing so, I will compare my account with that of Dunbar (2003) and Sterelny (2011) and defend my own account. 25 minutes.

Britta Clark (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Picking What Persists: Sociocultural Natural Capital and Intergenerational Justice
Stream: Applied Philosophy
Attempts to determine the value and intergenerational importance of environmental goods have a difficult time accounting for the non-basic services that ecosystems provide. Discussions of ‘Critical Natural Capital’ deem some ecological goods ‘non-substitutable’: acting justly towards the future requires their preservation. These characterizations, however, often miss a crucial distinction between the type of non-substitutability exhibited by basic CNC and sociocultural CNC: the former is only technologically and practically non-substitutable while the latter is constructed as such by specific groups regarding token natural spaces. In this paper, I will address whether sociocultural natural capital is a required component in the basket of goods we leave for future generations. While the constructed nature of the value of these goods makes their implication in a theory of intergenerational justice subject to a number of objections, I argue—employing the Rawlsian tools of the Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position—that they are indeed a required component of a just bequest. 55 minutes.

Stephanie Collins (University of Manchester)
Obligation and Blameworthiness in Non-agent Groups
What's the moral status of groups that are not agents? This paper will argue that groups that are not agents cannot have obligations, but that they can be blameworthy. This unlikely pair of conclusions arises because of the different functions that obligations and blameworthiness play in our moral and political practices. Obligations function as inputs into the reasoning of the entity that bears the obligation. Groups that are not agents cannot reason, so they cannot have obligations. By contrast, blameworthiness functions as a reflection of the esteem or disesteem with which others (should) hold the blameworthy entity. Non-group agent groups are -- sometimes -- appropriate objects of esteem or disesteem. I give conditions under which non-agent groups are irreducibly blameworthy. 55 minutes.
Cheryl Cottine (Oberlin College)
The Arc of Moral Development: Roles in Early Confucian Philosophy
A prominent feature of several early Confucian texts is their attention to role-relations and the impact these roles have on both individual and communal moral development. Rather than beginning ethical reflection and assessment with the fully rational adult, the early Confucians devote considerable attention to the long process culminating in the morally mature human being. Central to their vision is the many role-relations that humans embody over a lifetime; role-relations ranging from the involuntary family relations, to the more voluntary role-relations comprising broader social interactions. In this paper, I argue that contemporary moral theory has much to learn from how some early Confucian texts depict moral development. Understanding how these texts relate role-relations, virtues, ritual, and duty, helps to develop a more robust account of the type of work required to reach moral maturity. This is an account that is not only intuitively appealing, but also one that is corroborated by recent studies in psychology and theories of childhood development. 55 minutes.

Max Cresswell (Victoria University of Wellington / Te Whare Wānanga o te Īpoko)
Relations in the History of Philosophy: From Heraclitus and Parmenides to de Morgan, Frege and Peirce
Stream: History of Philosophy
A relation can be understood as a set or property of ordered pairs. Because Simmias is taller than Socrates the relation 'taller than' holds of the pair (Simmias,Socrates). Yet it seems that this fact was not explicitly appreciated until the late 19th century in the work of Augustus De Morgan, Gottlob Frege and C.S. Peirce. In this talk I discuss how the views of selected thinkers from Heraclitus and Parmenides onwards (in particular, Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley) were inhibited by their lack of recognition of the true nature of relations. I then explain what it was in the work of the 19th century thinkers which allowed us to give a correct analysis. 55 minutes.

Adam Dalgleish (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)
Refugee Obligations, Developmental Obligations, and The Fuzzy Line In-between
Stream: Applied Philosophy
Duties toward refugees have traditionally been rooted in the logic that refugees require a state ‘refuge’ in order to secure their human rights. As a result, much emphasis has been put on duties of immigration in refugee circles, but less attention has been paid to how these obligations should interact with our broader commitment to the human rights of closely related groups, such as the global poor. In this paper, I take a multi-level global justice frame and apply it to the debate over
who should be granted refugee status and probe what exactly we should think of as refugee obligations. In doing so, I aim to show that a clearer picture of our obligations to refugees can be fleshed out with the inclusion of these groups, rather than their exclusion. 55 minutes.

Tim Dare, with a response by Christine Swanton (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)

Roles All The Way Down
When Western analytic ethics has accommodated roles at all, it has tended to portray them as derivative: as depending upon more fundamental moral theories which are the real source of role-obligation. I think roles are themselves the source of moral obligation. I rely on accounts of the emergence of social norms from patterns of behaviour (See e.g. HLA Hart 1997: 55–57). On these accounts, patterns of convergent behaviour in a group generate social norms when there is a general and regular pattern of behavior within the group, together with a widely shared attitude that this pattern is a common standard of conduct to which all members of the group are required to conform. I propose a similar analysis of role-norms. They are in effect social norms generated by the widespread acceptance of the practices which constitute roles, the widespread acceptance that deviation from those practices by those identifying or identified as role-occupants warrant surprise, criticism, pressure confirmity, and the widespread acceptance by role occupants that they are subject to these conditions. When people have the internal point of view toward a role, that role provides them with reasons for action: seeing the role as providing reasons is what it is to understand the role and see oneself as a role occupant. Their existence just consists of the facts of their acceptance and use. This account implies that role-norms are reducible not to more fundamental moral facts or accounts of what an ideal version of a practice would look like, but to what practices do in fact look like. Those practices, on this account are the social facts that generate the norms that govern all (or almost all) of our dealings with one another. 55 minutes.

Antony Eagle (University of Adelaide)

Stakes and Standpoints
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology is the thesis that, sometimes, whether someone knows depends on their practical situation. Consider two agents, A and B, who are epistemic peers with respect to their intellectual situation, but who differ in their practical situation. A and B may, according to pragmatic encroachment, differ with respect to whether they know ?. Examples of practical differences which have been argued to have epistemic import include the stakes of the situation (knowledge is harder to acquire when the stakes are higher), and also the subordinated position of the subject (some knowledge is easier to acquire from a subordinated position). What
has not been previously noted is that these two sources of pragmatic encroachment are in tension with one another, since for subordinated groups the stakes are generally higher. In this paper, I will explore these varieties of pragmatic encroachment and see if we can come to some resolution of this apparent tension. 55 minutes.

Lisa Ellis (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Three Currencies of the Human Value of Biodiversity Loss
Biodiversity loss presents at least as serious a challenge as climate change. Given the role played by democratically accountable information provision in securing the 2015 Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, one looks for analogous sources for biodiversity policy. However, the estimation of the human impacts of biodiversity is much more difficult, both empirically and ethically. Commentators have argued that reducing intrinsic natural value to monetary equivalents is both immoral and impractical. I argue that estimation practices need to correspond with the level of decision being made, so that while reducing intrinsic natural value to a money equivalent is a mistake at the level of justice, it can promote the implementation of more just policy at the level of implementation. Distinguishing among three levels of decision making could yield the kind of information about biodiversity loss that would help us prevent it. 55 minutes.

Marinus Ferreira (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)
Institutions, Dispositions, and Two Sorts of Virtue
We can draw an analogy between the way that personal virtue on the one hand and institutions on the other are meant to pattern behaviour, and use that analogy to highlight a difference between two kinds of virtues. The first kind are the virtues that concern everyday situations. Just as the rules are meant to produce a stable and worthwhile institution, these virtues are meant to produce a well-functioning human life. I call these ‘on-track virtues’. But there is also a second class of virtues which aren’t analogous to rules, and that is for handling cases where the usual run of life breaks down. Whereas it is a fool’s errand to try and set in place institutional rules for every eventuality, individual lives aren’t similarly circumscribed, and the question of how to respond to such breakdowns is a pressing issue. Accordingly, there is a domain of ‘off-track virtues’. 55 minutes.

Anthony Gambrell (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Was Filmer Right?
Stream: History of Philosophy
Sir Robert Filmer, Locke’s primary opponent in Two Treatises, presented a notion of unlimited
individual freedom, which, I maintain, Locke failed to address. To justify political power by an
original compact, Locke cunningly avoided the challenge presented by Filmerian freedom to
contract theory. If in an original compact, agents are absolutely and naturally free, then (1)
exclusion of any individual, in effect violating his liberty, is unjust; and (2) anyone is at liberty
whenever to withdraw his consent. This was Filmer’s challenge. Locke, however, never refutes
Filmerian freedom. Rather, flatly denying it, Locke invents another form of freedom, incorporating
natural and human morality. Yet if we but take Filmer’s challenge, problems Filmer presented for
contract theory persist. I consider, then, Locke’s evasive manoeuvre. — Was Filmer right?— If
wrong, his error was not unraveled by Locke’s neglect of Filmerian freedom. But, I conclude,
Locke’s original compact is unfounded, given Filmerian freedom. 55 minutes.

Stephanie Gibbons (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)
Is Plato a virtue ethicist?
I argue that Plato is a virtue ethicist. In doing so it is important that we not confuse the genus of
virtue ethics with particular species of virtue ethics. It is also necessary to distinguish between
Plato’s moral theory and his metaphysics (however uncomfortable Plato would be with such a
distinction). 25 minutes.

Charles Gibson (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Are Individual Piracy Harms Instances of Wrongful Harming?
Stream: Applied Philosophy
Digital piracy is the practice of experiencing media without the consent of the intellectual property
owner. Despite the widespread nature of this practice, it is unclear if individual acts of piracy cause
any wrongful harm. IP owners have claimed that this practice wrongfully harms them. This is a
surprisingly strong claim since Feinberg’s canonical analysis of wrongful harm requires both that
the act is responsible for a serious and avoidable setback to the owner’s interests and that the act
violates the owner’s rights. However, it is still unclear if piracy leaves the IP industry worse off or
that the current regime of strong intellectual property rights is morally justified. This paper will
apply Feinberg’s wrongful harm analysis to acts of piracy by considering the extent of harms which
piracy causes and whether acts of piracy violate the IP owner’s rights. 55 minutes.
Eliza Goddard (University of New South Wales)
Prosthetics and Disability: Promoting alternative ways of functioning
Stream: Applied Philosophy

Prosthetics design is informed by a medical model for addressing disability, which aims to restore functioning by replicating a mode of functioning typical to the species, e.g. mobility as walking/communication as hearing. Approaches in bioethics and justice question the role of species typical functioning as both a way of understanding of disability and in evaluations of justice and compensation. Many people with physical impairments have developed alternative modes of functioning which achieve the same (functional) outcome, but do not replicate the species typical mode of functioning e.g. communication as signing/mobility involving echolocation. In this paper, I draw on work, by Jackie Leech Scully, Anni B Satz and Martha Nussbaum, to challenge understandings of prosthetics as compensation for lost species typical functioning (by replicating normal modes of functioning) and to argue that prosthetics should facilitate alternative modes of functioning in addition to mimicking species typical modes. 55 minutes.

Richard Paul Hamilton (University of Notre Dame Australia)
Burdened Epistemic Virtue

Lisa Tessman (2005) has famously offered an account of the “burdened virtues”. Tessman suggested that, all things being equal, the development of virtue should conduce to a good life. However, in conditions of inequality, oppression and systemic injustice, virtue may actual harm its possessors or else in order to survive and resist such conditions, people may be called upon to develop paradigmatically non-virtuous and even vicious character traits. In this paper I will apply Tessman's anaysis to the epistemic virtues. We are currently going through a period of epistemic crisis in which the epistemic authorities which we should ordinarily trust have been shown repeatedly to be unreliable. As such certain epistemic virtues can become burdensome in precisely the way that Tessman has suggested for the moral virtues. 55 minutes.

Theresa Helke (National University of Singapore and Yale-NUS College)
The Barbershop Paradox

This paper analyses Lewis Carroll’s alleged counterexample to modus tollens. It focuses on the responses four theories of the indicative conditional would offer to the trilemma Carroll’s argument presents. The theses of the trilemma are: #1 the argument is invalid; #2 the argument is an instance of modus tollens; and #3 modus tollens is valid. The four theories on whose responses the paper focuses are: (i) the material theory; (ii) the possible-worlds theory; (iii) the suppositional theory; and (iv) the hybrid theory – inspired by Grice, Stalnaker/Lewis, Adams/Edgington and Jackson.
respectively. The paper shows the paradox is alive and well. The material and possible-worlds theories can’t reject theses while still explaining the plausibility of all three. Moreover, while the suppositional and hybrid theories can, they face their own problems: the suppositional theory implies conditionals are non-propositional; and the hybrid theory makes a seemingly ad hoc distinction between probability and assertibility. 55 minutes.

Shaun Hopkins (Victoria University Wellington / Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko)

Logics of Meaning Containment

In his (2006), Ross Brady characterises entailment as meaning containment such that A entails B iff the meaning of A contains the meaning of B. This is formalised in an algebraic-style semantics similar to those described by Dunn in Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. Postulates are determined by developing a theory of contents in which contents are sets of sentences closed under a type of inference we may call “analytic establishment”. This inference is not fully specified, however, and of the two ways to specify the status of “premises” neither determine the postulates Brady argues for. The solution requires better accounts of the entities contents are intended to represent. I use King’s (2014) account of propositions to understand Brady-style semantics, and I will discuss whether Brady’s postulates can be therewith determined, or whether new logics, one which I have developed, the soundness and completeness of which I have proved, are needed. 55 minutes.

Paul Hubble (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)

Hey Functionalists, Let’s Get Sufficiently Physical

Stream: Empirical Philosophy

A long-standing debate in the philosophy of science and mind has failed to appreciate the context-dependence of functionally-defined things. Functionalists have largely taken multiple realizability to entail the irreducibility of mental states as functionally defined, thus securing psychology as a science. Reductionists have argued that heterogeneity of realizers of functional kinds casts doubt both on their status as objects of science and on the explanatory power of realization as invoked by functionalism. Both positions have been shortsighted about sufficiency: a role-occupying individual is locally necessary but not sufficient to instantiate a function; the physical basis of roles is part of the sufficiency base for functioning. The sufficiency principle I offer maps a middle position, urging that reduction, in some form, is not blocked by multiple realizability, and yet the special sciences are methodologically ineliminable in the division of explanatory labour. 55 minutes.
Ben Jeffares (Whitireia and WelTec / Te Whare Wānanga o te Awakairangi)
What kind of where you are: Does a Pleistocene shift to discontinuous environments lend itself to “category” thinking?
Stream: Empirical Philosophy
Adult spatial reasoning is a mix of a number of cognitive systems. We appear to use two that are self related: dead reckoning and response learning, and two that utilise the external environment: cue learning and place learning. While there is broad consensus that we utilise all these systems, the way they mesh together is up for debate. Moreover, there are biases in our spatial reasoning system; if our spatial reasoning systems mismatch, we tend to favour one set of spatial reasoning systems over another. This paper looks to explore these different systems, and the potential biases, in an evolutionary context. In particular it looks to a Pleistocene ecological setting for Hominin evolution: A setting that is patchy, with a disparate set of environments within a hominin’s day range. The question is then; might these biases in spatial reasoning be inevitable consequences of a patchy environmental setting? 55 minutes.

Joel Katzav (University of Queensland)
The emergence and nature of analytic philosophy
There is evidence that the emergence of biases in the editorial policies of the journals Mind (1925-1960) and the Philosophical Review (1948-1960) played a role in explaining the emergence of analytic philosophy. I document how, during the period 1950-1962, biases emerged in the editorial policies of a number of other influential philosophy journals, including, among others, the Journal of Philosophy and the Philosophical Quarterly. I go on to consider what the overall pattern of biases in philosophy journal editorial practices might teach us about the emergence and nature of analytic philosophy. 55 minutes.

Fred Kroon (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)
Fictional Properties
A number of writers have recently pointed out that there is not only a problem about fictional objects; there is also a problem about fictional properties (think of woozles, sneetches, wockets, unicorns, … ), a problem that is all the more serious since it threatens some of the most widely accepted theories about fictional objects. In this paper we review the problem, canvass some solutions, and make some suggestions. 55 minutes.
Holly Lawford-Smith (University of Melbourne) and Stephanie Collins (University of Manchester)

“We the People”
When a liberal democratic state wagers a war, signs a treaty, or bans travellers, does its enfranchised citizenry do those things? One way into this is to ask whether a liberal democratic state is identical to its citizenry, where the citizenry is understood as a structure that is instantiated by all (and only) those who are eligible to register to vote (within not-disproportionate cost to themselves) and who enjoy other basic civil/political liberties within that state's territory. This paper is co-authored; one of us thinks the answer is 'yes' and the other thinks the answer is 'no.' Our aim in the paper is to articulate the considerations on both sides and leave it to the reader to decide how they weigh up. To that end, we work through four considerations: group-level control, group-level unity, individual-level influence, and individual-level voluntariness. 55 minutes.

Michael LeBuffe (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Reason in Hobbes's De Cive
Stream: History of Philosophy
Hobbes's use of a central moral concept, right reason, in De Cive makes that work different from and worse than Hobbes's other political works. In De Cive alone Hobbes does not naturalize right reason. Instead he retains without argument a conception of right reason as a faculty by which human beings have knowledge of natural law. This feature of De Cive weakens the argument of the work in two ways. First, it has no basis in Hobbes's metaphysical commitments and therefore does not sit easily with his other psychological views. Its presence works to undermine Hobbes's claims in De Cive that his views about human nature are self-evident, and it confuses his presentation of those claims. Second, it compromises the account of sovereign authority in the commonwealth. Individuals who have right reason have no need of a single reasoner whose natural reason will stand for right reason. 55 minutes.

Bruce Long (University of Sydney)
The Mathematician's Black Box Encoder
Stream: Empirical Philosophy
I present an informationist alternative to Platonist, in re realist, and Nominalist appraisals of the nature of mathematical entities and structures and their explanatory power. Informational conceptions of the nature of mathematical entities are considered conceptually taxing due to problems with conceptions of information. I argue that, even given this difficulty, the causal informationist about mathematical entities can offer a story that is just as coherent as that given by
the Aristotelian in re realist about mathematical entities, is more plausible than soft Platonism, and that debunks the Platonist petitio-princii-cum-strawman charge that intractable nominalism is the only viable alternative. 55 minutes.

**David Lumsden and Joseph Ulatowski (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)**

**The Mystery Machine: How Narratives and Virtues Cause Action**

We wish to raise an issue about the causal role virtues and self-narratives play in the production of behaviour. When it comes to the explanatory power of reasons in folk-theoretic terms as *causes* of action, we’re led to consider their underlying physiological basis. For a reason to cause an action, it must exemplify a law of nature, something available only at the level of physical description. Alas, there’s no smooth shift from the folk-theoretic level of description to the scientific enterprise. Here, we’re confronted by the scientific *and* manifest images of human activity, whereby the causal processes underlying action will likely remain a mystery. Despite this, there’s still room to develop our understanding of the structure of causally efficacious virtues and, likewise, the nature and structure of self-narratives can still be usefully explored. In particular, their effect on action becomes more plausible if we consider a segmented narrative structure. 55 minutes.

**Cei Maslen (Victoria University of Wellington / Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko )**

**Time travel and collisions with past obstacles**

**Stream: Josh Parsons**

One recently discussed problem for time travellers to the past is the problem of potential collisions with past obstacles, including possible collisions with younger time slices of the time traveller herself. The problem seems to be more serious than simply that the time traveller cannot see where she is going in order to avoid the obstacles (as one of my student’s recently suggested). The problem has not been discussed nearly as much as other questions about time travel, such as whom the time traveller is able to kill once she arrives, though there are interesting discussion of it by Grey, Dowe, Le Poidevin and Bernstein. Some solutions that have been proposed are to be nowhere while she travels, only travel instantaneously, take a run-up, or simply to let the earth’s rotation take care of it. I actually disagree with most of what has been written about this problem, but I do think that an interesting puzzle about causation arises. 55 minutes.
John Matthewson (Massey University / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)
Grades of Proper Function
Stream: Empirical Philosophy
Whether a collection of entities can undergo natural selection is not a simple binary consideration. Rather, groups constitute paradigmatic Darwinian populations to a greater or lesser extent. This finding may have downstream effects for concepts that are standardly treated as categorical but depend on natural selection. One such idea is that of a proper function, where the proper function of a structure or behaviour is what caused that (type of) structure or behaviour to be selected for in the past. If a population can undergo natural selection in more or less paradigmatic fashion, and proper functions require natural selection, then perhaps we can also have more or less paradigmatic proper functions. I will explore the potential consequences of a graded view of functions on this basis, including what it might mean for related ideas such as dysfunction, disease, and teleosemantic content. 55 minutes.

Emma Maurice (University of Canterbury / Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha)
Colonial Intentions
Stream: Māori and Philosophy
If colonialism is the process that occurred in New Zealand from the 1800s until the present day then what does it mean to be colonised and what does it mean to be a colonist? Do colonial intentions hold true for both sides of this binary relationship? 25 minutes.

Alan McCulloch (AgResearch (NZ) Ltd.)
Should the new “Rutherford’s Den” display at the Christchurch Arts Centre really give such prominence to a philosopher (Popper)? : An Enquiry into the Ontology of Scientific Observation
In a 2008 essay “On Scientific Observation”, Lorraine Daston proposed an enquiry into the ontology of scientific observation, as part of a project to refocus philosophy of science away from epistemological concerns such as the testing of theory, assessment of evidence, metaphysical assumptions on the reality of scientific objects, and toward the ontologies of scientific objects created and sustained by expert scientific observation. In this essay I suggest a link between these ontologies and experimental and observational design, and characterise scientific observation as “Formulation and Refinement” in which experimental and observational design is ontologically and epistemologically fundamental, and also suggest that experimental and observational designs are systems of structure-preserving operators. I suggest a link between modern philosophy of science and declining public understanding and acceptance of science. 55 minutes.
Mike McLeod and Andrew Moore (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

Making Progress on Progress

Stream: Josh Parsons

These days it is all too common to hear criticisms of philosophy, from popular scientists such as Stephen Hawking, who has pronounced that "philosophy is dead", and Richard Feynman, who described philosophy as "paralysis of thought" as well as stating that "philosophy of science is as useful for scientists as ornithology is for birds". Meanwhile Neil deGrasse Tyson thinks that philosophers "pointlessly delay progress" by considering such quandaries as the "sound of one hand clapping". Whilst these views espoused by popular scientists might elicit such philosophical quandaries as wondering whether a strawman really burns if nobody is watching, more modest pessimisms about philosophical progress are maintained by philosophers as well. Many of these views propose that convergence is a sufficient condition for philosophical progress, with the assumptions that a) convergence is sufficient for progress in the sciences, and b) convergence is a suitable measure for philosophical progress. We argue that neither of these assumptions are plausible. Whilst we do not offer a fully developed positive account in place of the convergence models of progress that we take issue with, we note two often-overlooked factors that any attempted comparison between philosophy and the sciences should consider: (1) financial and (2) human resources. Whether such a comparison is a good idea, is a peripheral concern for this discussion. 55 minutes.

Alex Miller (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

Rule-Following, Moral Realism and Non-Cognitivism Revisited

35 years ago, John McDowell and Simon Blackburn had a classic exchange (in a pair of papers in S. Holtzmann and C. Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (RKP 1981)) in which they debated the significance of the later Wittgenstein’s writings on following a rule for the debate in metaethics between moral realism and non-cognitivism. Building on previous work of mine (Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction (2nd edition Polity Press 2013), chapter 10) I revisit this exchange and develop an assessment of the true significance of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations for central issues in metaethics. 55 minutes.

Mehrnaz Monzavi (University of Canterbury / Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha)

How McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time can be transformed into an argument for modal realism

McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time is hugely influential, but also notoriously difficult to understand. In this talk, I begin by presenting a simple way of understanding his argument. I then
show that the argument, as so understood, applies not only to the temporal domain but also to the modal domain. The modal version of McTaggart’s argument provides powerful support for a variety of modal realism. 25 minutes.

Andrew Moore (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

**Being and Well-Being**

This paper argues that difference in one’s well-being requires difference in one’s being. It first puts this ‘being requirement’ to wide use, to analyse: several alleged experience, ‘body or mind’, and biographical requirements on well-being; several published or novel criticisms of various theories of well-being; replies to some of these criticisms; and rival views about whether or not posthumous difference in one’s well-being is possible. It argues that appeal to the being requirement is illuminating and fruitful in all these settings, and that consistency with the being requirement is desirable *pro tanto* in any theory of well-being. 55 minutes.

Alex Morgan (Rice University)

**Autonoetic Animals**

I argue that many non-human animals have a capacity for *autonoetic awareness*: a capacity to recall past events, or imagine possible future events. Psychologists have traditionally held that autonoetic awareness is a uniquely human capacity on grounds that it requires the subject to *conceptualize* herself as existing in the past or future. Drawing from recent neuroscientific evidence, I argue (1) that the neural mechanisms that mediate the egocentric, ‘perspectival’ aspects of autonoesis in humans also mediate egocentric perspective in perception, (2) that these perspectival aspects of experience are non-conceptual, and (3) that functionally homologous mechanisms are found in the brains of many mammals and birds. This undermines the central opposition to the view that animals possess genuine autonoetic awareness. I then argue that perspectival mechanisms in animal brains can be ‘decoupled’ from perception, providing positive support for the view that animals have genuine autonoetic awareness. 55 minutes.

Nick Munn (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)

**We should want lab grown meat**

Some defenders of animal rights oppose lab grown meat as morally problematic, even if it were to successfully be created with a suffering-free growth medium. In this paper I argue that they ought to embrace LGM. Opposition to LGM comes in a variety of forms: Some oppose LGM as it perpetuates a culture of meat eating and usage. Others claim that there is a moral issue with desiring
things that are of a kind with meat from animals, even if the thing desired is not itself animal-based. I claim that these concerns are untenable. 55 minutes.

Jerome Agboola Odebunmi (The University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)
John Dewey and the contemporary debate on knowledge as a natural kind term
Several epistemologists have shown keen interest in the argument that knowledge can be established as a natural kind. By this they mean that knowledge can be recognised as part of the fabric of the world in the same way oxygen, water, stones, and hills are and can be described in the same sort of spirit which science described acid or genes. However, some epistemologists have rejected this view by arguing either that knowledge involves context-sensitive dimensions or it is an evaluative term. In this paper, I concentrate on Kornblith’s account of knowledge as a natural kind. I explore how he identifies and articulates those characteristics of knowledge. I then compare the feasibility of Kornblith’s position with Dewey’s position on knowledge and articulate how Dewey’s position can better address some objections often raised against Kornblith’s position. I conclude by contending that the most important reason epistemologists such as Kornblith were interested in establishing knowledge as a natural kind is to establish a scientific epistemology. I argue that Dewey’s account of “knowledge as human transaction within nature” offers a more viable way of achieving this. 55 minutes.

Bessie Olsen (Victoria University of Wellington / Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko)
Validity as correct reasoning
The explanation that “Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning. When we reason about any matter, we produce arguments to support our conclusions. Our arguments include reasons that we think justify our beliefs” creates the idea that a logic is correct if and only if the logic validates a particular argument if and only if when the premises are true a reasoner is justified in believing the conclusion. So, validity is correctly described by a logic when it is an accurate representation of the circumstances under which we are justified in accepting a belief, but the biconditional nature of this principle means when the premises are true, and reasoner is justified in accepting a belief then, to be correct, a logic must validate that inference. So, to be correct a logic must validate inductive arguments something that the logic presented in the text does not and cannot do. 55 minutes.
Negar Partow (Massey University / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)

Reflections on Philosophy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Intelligence Augmentation (IA)

Stream: Empirical Philosophy

The tradition of philosophy rests upon its anthropocentric view on intelligence, existence and rights. It defines existence in a linear context shaped by the rules of causality. This presentation argues that the development of AI and IA pose existential questions to these foundations as it challenges the supremacy of human intelligence. These existential questions can be categorised into three topics. The first is breaking the hegemony of human intelligence in the world. All AI scientists argue that AI will become more intelligent than humans by the end of the twenty first century, even if they disagree about a particular time. No scientist can predict the level of intelligence that AI could attain in this process but it is evident that neither of the two previous revolutions in human history (Agricultural and industrial) posed this challenge to humans. The second is the linear process of development. Rather than the anthropocentric linear process based on which all philosophical notions have been shaped, the AI progresses in an expediential rate (Ray Kurzweil 2016). Therefore, humans can neither contain AI for long, nor can understand the ways through which it develops and becomes an indispensable part of life (smart phones). The third existential question for philosophers is the question of ethics. What would be the implication of AI on human’s approach towards ethics? What would constitute ethics or ethical behaviour in the age of AI and IA? This paper argues that to respond to these questions philosophers should engage with the scientific community and return to basis philosophical question of what being human means. 55 minutes.

Neil Pickering (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

The concept of disease – there’s very little to it

How disease should be conceptualised is a perennial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry. In this paper I consider the possibility that DISEASE is what psychologists would call a superordinate concept – a representation from which little can be inferred, and which doesn’t pick out any naturally distinct class or kind. To establish whether the concept is superordinate, I examine evidence amongst lay people and medical professionals. To establish what DISEASE being superordinate might mean for philosophical debates about DISEASE, I fall back on philosophical reasoning, to argue that it should be taken into account. 25 minutes.
One of the most cited sections in Hume’s *Treatise* is 2.3.3 ‘Of the Influencing Motives of the Will’. This is the locus for Hume’s famous claim ‘that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will’ or (more picturesquely) that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’. From this he draws the consequence that ‘since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition’, it is ‘incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion’ What does he mean by the claim that ‘reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition’? What are his arguments? What part does this thesis play in his overall polemic against moral rationalism? And what is its relevance to current concerns?

So Where Do They Go Wrong? Marx, Engels and the ‘German Ideologists’

Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged their relationships according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have got out of their hands. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let us revolt against the rule of thoughts … and -- existing reality will collapse’. These innocent and childlike fancies are the kernel of the modern Young-Hegelian philosophy, which not only is received by the German public with horror and awe, but is announced by our philosophic heroes with the solemn consciousness of its cataclysmic dangerousness and criminal ruthlessness. The present publication [*The German Ideology*] has the aim of uncloaking these sheep, who take themselves and are taken for wolves."

So say Marx and Engels in the Preface to the German Ideology in which they develop the theory of historical materialism by way of an extended critique of their erstwhile allies the Young Hegelians, especially Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner. But what exactly is the mistake that the German Ideologists are supposed to be making? M&E’s basic charge seems to be that philosophers in general and the Youth Hegelians in particular suffer from delusions of efficacy. Sometimes they seem to be arguing that the German Ideologists are impotent because ideologies are impotent, but that is not a thesis they can have consistently believed. Is there any way to make sense of Marx and
Engel’s polemic without attributing to them the obviously absurd thesis that ideologies have no influence on the course of history? 55 minutes.

**Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky and William Tuckwell (University of Melbourne)**

**There's no such thing as conceptual competence injustice: A response to Anderson and Cruz**

*Stream: Applied Philosophy*

Derek Egan Anderson has offered what he suggests is a novel form of epistemic injustice called *conceptual competence injustice*. This injustice occurs when “a marginalized epistemic agent make a conceptual claim and is illegitimately regarded as having failed to grasp one or more of the concepts expressed in her testimony” (2017, 210). In this paper, we provide reasons to doubt Anderson’s suggestion. We argue for this on three grounds. First, we suggest that there isn’t anything more to be learned by thinking about conceptual competence injustice that isn’t captured by testimonial injustice. Second, we show that the grounds on which Anderson attempts to distinguish conceptual competence injustice from hermeneutical injustice and contributory injustice are ultimately unsuccessful. Third, we query Manuel Padilla Cruz’s (2017) suggestion that conceptual competence injustice is useful in helping us to grasp how epistemic injustice manifests in the field of relevance theory and its application to linguistic pragmatics. 55 minutes.

**Aleksandar Radaković (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)**

**Hegel and the problem of poverty in a modern civil society**

*Stream: Applied Philosophy*

Poverty, its existence and ramifications, pose a distinct and perpetual challenge to democratic participation. Hegel addresses a few aspects of this phenomenon. Firstly, he highlights the problem of material destitution that relates to the lack of provision of basic human needs such as food, clothes and shelter. As a result, these disadvantages affect the poor people’s ability to develop their personal skills and get hold of resources needed for full participation in democratic political communities. Thus, without undermining the very real issues surrounding material destitution, Hegel focuses and gives more importance to other moral and civil disadvantages that result from poverty. By relying on Hegel’s insight that in poverty ‘freedom has no existence and the recognition of universal freedom disappears’, I will argue that the democratic state has a duty to more effectively address the existence of the poor because of their (in)ability to genuinely participate in civil society as equal members. 25 minutes.
Matteo Ravasio (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)

Two Kinds of Passional Doubt in Faith Ventures

The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I distinguish between two sorts of passional (non-evidential) doubt in the context of theistic faith: first-order and second-order passional doubt. I illustrate how second-order passional doubt is central to John Bishop’s (2007) account of permissible theistic doxastic ventures. On the other hand, I argue that the distinction could help solve a problem for Bishop’s account. Amber Griffioen (2015) has argued that Bishop’s view of permissible faith ventures is too restrictive, as it places the bar of permissibility too high. But this may not be the case once we modify Bishop’s account as to include first-order passional doubt. 55 minutes.

Adriane Rini (Massey University / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)

Three 7’s in π: Why Alice Ambrose and Wittgenstein Fell Out

In 1932, Alice Ambrose arrived at Cambridge, in Wittgenstein’s rooms, a copy of the *Tractatus* under her arm. She was fresh from a PhD at the University of Wisconsin, where she had written a dissertation about Weyl and Brouwer and Intuitionism. But Wittgenstein, noting her copy of the *Tractatus*, says that they’re not doing that – for the *Tractatus* was by then yesterday’s news. By the Lent Term of 1935, Wittgenstein’s lectures turned to problems of infinity in mathematics, mentioning Brouwer and the law of excluded middle. Ambrose quickly produced an article, ‘Finitism in Mathematics (I)’, *Mind* 1935. The article suggests bringing Wittgenstein’s views about ‘meaninglessness’ to bear on Brouwer’s rejection of LEM. Wittgenstein was furious. This paper tries to answer (i) to what extent was this falling out ‘business as usual’ for anyone working with Wittgenstein?, (ii) what was the relation between Ambrose’s article and work she had done before coming to Cambridge and before coming under Wittgenstein’s influence?, and (iii) to what extent was Wittgenstein justified in objecting to the article? 55 minutes.

Richard Rowland, David Killoren (Australian Catholic University), and Holly Lawford-Smith (University of Melbourne)

Moral Disagreement and Deliberation

We ran an empirical study in which two groups of 100 students discussed the trolley problem and the moral status of animals (respectively) in small groups for one day. The students were anonymously polled at the beginning and end of the day. 40% of participants had changed their views about the moral status of pushing the man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case and about the morality of eating meat by the end of the day. We argue that this result has three significant implications. Firstly, this result undermines social intuitionism in moral psychology.
Secondly, this result undermines the view that actual fundamental moral disagreement would persist in idealized conditions. Thirdly, this result undermines Joshua Greene’s view that we should accept (i) a dual process model of moral judgment and (ii) the view that system 2 of this dual process model yields consequentialist judgments about moral dilemmas. 55 minutes.

Andrew Rutherford (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

Swampman, copying and content similarity
Donald Davidson invented the concept of 'Swampman' in his 1987 paper 'Knowing. One's Own Mind', in order to advance a theory about what constitutes meaning, with meaning being necessarily created by virtue of a causal connection to its source. I use other examples of random coalescence to show that meaning can be created by content similarity, not just causal history. Whether a Swampman knows something or not just depends on whether it has justified true beliefs. It is the justified part that is in question, and this can be ensured by content similarity with normally formed beliefs. 25 minutes.

Vanessa Scholes (Open Polytechnic / Kuratini Tuwhera)

The importance of intersectionality in discrimination
Stream: Applied Philosophy
This paper argues for the importance of intersectionality in employment discrimination. Intersectionality is where people belong to more than one minority or stigmatised group; for example, being a Black lesbian woman. I draw on empirical research on stereotyping and employment discrimination from economics, sociology and psychology to show the force of stereotyping in discrimination, and the importance of intersectionality to this. I include a particular focus on the ‘Ban the box’ policy in the United States. This policy forced employers to remove a tick box on criminal conviction from their initial application forms, aiming to reduce discrimination against ex-offenders, and to improve employment opportunities for minority applicants in particular. I discuss the unexpected outcomes of this initiative, arguing they fit with the understanding of employment discrimination based on intersectional stereotyping presented in this paper. I draw on this understanding to suggest improvements to the policy. 25 minutes.

Vanessa Schouten (Massey University / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)
Age Groups, Birth Cohorts and the Prudential Lifespan Account
Norman Daniels’ Prudential Lifespan Account is an attempt to resolve the problem of justice between age groups by conceiving of the problem not as an interpersonal question of justice
between distinct groups but as a problem that can be solved by intrapersonal reasoning. Part of his argument is that when we distinguish age groups from birth cohorts, we see that the problem of justice between age groups is fundamentally different from distribution across genders or races because we all age. I explore some problems for the Prudential Lifespan Account that occur due to the assumption that age groups can be easily separated from birth cohorts, and the assumption that we all age. 55 minutes.

Ted Shear and John Quiggin (School of Economics, University of Queensland)

Modal logic for justification with confidence
L. A. Paul and John Quiggin have recently argued that the cognitive requirements implicit in rational choice models cannot be satisfied when the decisions involve transformative experience or bounded awareness. They argue that agents, nonetheless, ought to attempt to make ‘reasonable’ choices in which they are confident. In this paper, we operationalise the notion of confidence essential to the claim using a novel extension of justification logic. Justification logics aim to model the justificatory relationships undergirding agents' beliefs. By contrast, the modals in our extension additionally express how much confidence (appropriately understood) the agent derives from the justification. The modals in our logic take the form ‘[t]s X’ and are read ‘the agent has s confidence in X on the basis of t’. The result is a modal logic with application for reasoning about justification and confidence that is flexible enough to avoid the pitfalls of the traditional approaches. 55 minutes.

Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)

What is Naturalism in Metaethics?
Many metaethical theorists describe themselves as “naturalists” or “non-naturalists”. What does naturalism in metaethics amount to? I suggest understanding metaethical naturalism as the conjunction of empiricism and concretism. Empiricism is an epistemological commitment to believing whatever provides the best explanation of experience – perhaps, the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data. Concretism is the metaphysical view that real things are concrete – that they’re spatiotemporally located and exist contingently. Naturalistic realists believe that goodness is concrete and that belief in it is justified on empiricist grounds. Non-naturalistic realists believe that goodness exists in some other way. Anti-realists deny that goodness exists, often because they don’t think its existence is consistent with naturalism. While naturalism and non-naturalism are often defined differently outside metaethics, this way of dividing the territory makes sense of metaethical debates. 55 minutes.
Tiddy Smith (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
What the Common Consent Argument Actually Supports
Theistic philosophers of religion, stretching back to the time of Cicero, have argued that despite the existence of widespread religious diversity, there is a general consensus between religions that supports the conclusion that God exists. I will argue that, given some reasonable account of the way in which agreement provides evidential support, the common consent argument in fact provides stronger evidence for the claim that some form of animism is true. I charge, then, that theistic (and specifically Christian) philosophers of religion entertain the common consent argument at their own peril. 25 minutes.

Shawn Standefer (University of Melbourne)
Non-classical justification logic
Justification logic, developed by Artemov, Fitting, and others, is a logical formalism for reasoning about justification and evidence. We point out some features of general justification models that are in tension with the philosophical motivations of justification logic. We then motivate a particular class of models that better fit with the philosophical motivations. This class is defined using some techniques from the study of non-classical logics. 55 minutes.

Kim Sterelny (Australian National University)
Norms: Cooperation, Scale and Complexity
Stream: Empirical Philosophy
Just about everyone who works on the evolution of social or moral norms connects the evolution of norms to the distinctive character of human cooperation. More specifically, important recent work has connected the evolution of norms to the scale of human cooperative life: this idea is developed in somewhat different ways in Michael Tomasello’s *Natural History of Human Morality*; Robert Boyd’s *A Difference Kind of Animal*; Philip Kitcher’s *The Ethical Project* and Joseph Henrich’s *The Secret of Our Success*. I accept the broadest outlines of this picture: I agree that the emergence of norms is linked to both cooperation and complexity. But I shall argue that they key driver is economic complexity; the changing nature of the returns on cooperation, rather than social scale. Scale is indeed challenging; but in my view, that challenge came later, around the Pleistocene/Holocene transition. So I think norms and normative cognition emerged later and for different reasons that Tomasello, Boyd, Henrich or Kitcher. 55 minutes.
John Thrasher (Monash University)
When Good Norms Go Bad: Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms
Stream: Empirical Philosophy
Social norms are important in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. However, we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive social norms as well. In a variation of a public goods game, in which the return to investment is negative for both group and individual, we find that the opportunity to punish led to higher levels of contribution, thereby harming collective payoffs. A second experiment confirmed that, independently of whether punishment is available, a majority of subjects regard the efficient behaviour of non-contribution as socially inappropriate. 55 minutes.

Giuliano Torrengeo (University of Milan)
Tenses in Action
We experience a present that is constantly shifting towards the future and away from the past. This aspect of our experience seems to be connected to the fact that we use tenses and other representational elements to locate objects and events in time. In this talk, I will focus on the interconnection between: the dynamic aspect of our experience, the “tensedness” of our mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires, and the role of both in motivating action. I will argue that our experience of the passage of time has a central role in explaining both the formation of beliefs with tensed contents and their motivational role with respect to action. 55 minutes.

Martin Vacek (Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences)
Believing vs. Make-Believing in Modality
A part of the overall reason to prefer modal fictionalism to modal realism is our epistemic access to fictions, in contrast to our inability to access casually isolated spatiotemporal systems. I claim that the objection is yet another kind of a so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance. First, I present the ‘how can we know?’ objection against modal realism. Second, I introduce the puzzle of imaginative resistance regarding morality, and extend it to cases in modality. Finally, I propose a solution to the puzzle(s) based on a distinction between believing and make-believing. 55 minutes.

Chloe Wall and Kourken Michaelian (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Collective Confabulation
In recent years, popular fora have seen lively discussion of the “Mandela effect”. The Mandela
effect—so called in reference to the paradigm case of a widely shared memory of Nelson Mandela dying in prison in the 1980s—occurs when individuals who have never met each other in person develop highly similar memories of events that never occurred. Popular explanations of this phenomenon (e.g., that the apparently false memories in question are in fact accurate memories of events that occurred in parallel universes) are fanciful, and the scientific literature so far contains no discussion of the effect or the mechanisms giving rise to it. The purposes of this talk are, first, to make a case for the existence of the Mandela effect as a novel memory error worthy of scientific attention and, second, to sketch a general account of a mechanism that might give rise to it. Our hypothesis is that the Mandela effect is an instance of collective confabulation. We argue that, given either the causal account of mnemonic confabulation defended by Robins (2016) and Bernecker (2017) or the reliability account defended by Michaelian (2016), the effect amounts to confabulation on the collective level. It does not, however, reduce to individual confabulation. Instead, the effect occurs when ordinary misremembering goes online. In typical offline environments, a subject who incorrectly remembers that Mandela died in prison would be corrected by his peers. In the novel environment of the internet, in contrast, such a subject may instead be exposed to confirmatory testimony that reinforces the memory. The Mandela effect thus amounts to a novel, genuinely collective form of confabulation. 55 minutes.

Zach Weber (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)
Atheism and Dialetheism; or, ‘Why I am not a (paraconsistent) Christian’
In some recent papers, Beall and Cotnoir float the idea that dialetheism (that there are true contradictions) can help with some puzzles about omnipotence in theology. In this talk, after briefly reviewing their work, I want to delineate the prospects for this project by showing that dialetheism cannot help with one big puzzle about another classic ‘omni’ property, omnibenevolence—the famous problem of evil. For someone (including a dialetheist (like me)) who thinks that the existence of evil is a knock-down argument against traditional theism, it is a knock-down argument against dialetheic theism too. 55 minutes.

Dan Weijers (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)
Has the deceived businessman been deceiving philosophers? The freebie problem and intuitions about discovered and undiscovered deceptions
In the deceived businessman thought experiment, we are asked to imagine the lives of two businessmen, equal in net pleasant experiences, but unequal in the amount of deception. Both lives are experienced as equally happy from the inside, but one is deceived about many important things, while the other isn’t. When comparing these two lives, people usually report that the non-deceived
life is preferable to the deceived life. Philosophers working on wellbeing have used this result to discredit experiential accounts of wellbeing, especially prudential hedonism. I argue that two structural problems with the thought experiment preclude it from being a reliable source of evidence for drawing conclusions about wellbeing, including discrediting prudential hedonism. If I’m right that these structural problems mean the deceived businessman thought experiment should not be used when arguing about wellbeing, then several other influential thought experiments with the same structural problem might also be under threat. 55 minutes.

Hayden Wilkinson (Australian National University)

Does consequentialism work in our universe?
The problem of infinite moral value has received some attention to date, particularly in the social welfare literature, but largely just as a theoretical problem. To date, there has been little discussion of whether, in our universe, the leading forms of consequentialism actually imply that no action is impermissible. This paper seeks to correct this. Our universe is very likely infinite, with infinite amounts of anything which plausibly holds moral value – various physical theories predict that our universe will persist forever (or span infinite space) and contain infinitely many beings who experience any given level of happiness, pleasure, etc. Its total moral value will be infinite, regardless of our present actions. No physically possible action produces less value than any other. Therefore, for standard total-maximising consequentialists, no action is impermissible. This paper will also discuss the empirical basis for this argument and determine just how far-reaching the problem is. 55 minutes.

Martin Wilkinson (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)

Reducing Obesity and Promoting Welfare
Stream: Applied Philosophy

Some policies, e.g. sugar taxes, aim to reduce obesity by raising costs. Would these policies promote the welfare of consumers? For people shifted from being fatter to thinner, answering this question requires figuring out a conception of welfare that is both defensible and useable in policy, and this has not yet been done. Writers in public health tend to think that if anti-obesity policies make people healthier they must be better off. Mainstream economists, by contrast, believe that limiting choice could not make people better off. Both answers are inadequate. To come up with a better way of thinking about consumer welfare, this paper enquires about how far consumer decisions are rational and informed and, most importantly, produces a practical and defensible test of welfare. Using this test, the evidence is that anti-obesity policies would make most adults worst off. 55 minutes.
Daniel Wilson (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)

Wehi and the Sublime

Stream: Māori and Philosophy

The sublime is one of the most influential concepts in Western aesthetics. The Māori term wehi may be used in an aesthetic sense in a way comparable to the sublime. I examine wehi in its aesthetic sense and argue for the value of cultivating this emotion. I argue that Immanuel Kant’s theory of the sublime has shortcomings due to the kinds of actions the sublime emotion might motivate. On the one hand, we might be motivated to harmonise with that which is great or, on the other hand, we might be motivated to dominate or overcome that thing. I will show the important respects in which wehi may be differentiated from the sublime—particularly in response to the natural environment—and how it might have a positive impact on human flourishing. 55 minutes.

Thomas A. Yates (University of Auckland / Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau)

"Better Safe than Sorry": Responsibility for Acceptance

The main argument for the concept of “blameworthy believing” is that we need this concept to explain some cases of blameworthy acting. Clifford’s shipowner is to blame for his decision to send families out to sea—and ultimately to their deaths—precisely because he is to blame for his unjustified belief that the ship was seaworthy. In this talk, I want to challenge this line of thought by defending a somewhat neglected alternative: The shipowner is not to blame for his decision on account of his poorly-formed belief that the ship was seaworthy, but on account of a voluntary acceptance of its seaworthiness when deliberating about what to do. Cases in which there is a great deal at stake in being wrong in one’s belief are cases in which the reflective agent normally has the ability to withhold accepting (or “taking”) her belief to be true in her practical reasoning. 55 minutes.

Marsden Information Panel

Chair: Justine Kingsbury (University of Waikato / Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato)

For many New Zealand philosophers, Marsden grants are the main potential source of external research funding, and they are notoriously difficult to get. A panel of experts will provide philosophy-specific advice on the application process. Panelists will include Robert Hannah (convenor of the Marsden Humanities panel), Ben Jeffares (former Research Assessor for the Royal Society), Adriane Rini (former member of the Humanities panel and multiple Marsden grant recipient), Krushil Watene and Tim Dare (Marsden grant recipients). Possible topics include: what panel to submit to; the new “super-panel” which is being trialled in 2018; whether and how to
include Associate Investigators in your project; whether and how to put in an interdisciplinary proposal. Most of the time will be taken up with questions from the floor, and we hope attendees will bring along potential Marsden project ideas for discussion and feedback. 55 minutes.

Diversity Panel
Chair: Adriane Rini (Massey University, Palmerston North / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa)
Panelists: Krushil Watene (Massey University, Albany / Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa) [TBC], Cheryl Cottine (Oberlin College), Mike LeBuffe (University of Otago / Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo)

This panel aims to explore and to express diversity in philosophy, including with reference to the context in Aotearoa New Zealand. The session will open with brief reflections (roughly 5 minutes each) from the panelists and the Chair, followed by open interactive discussion in which all in the room are invited to participate. The following are among the questions to which all participants are invited to respond:

- which diversities matter for philosophy? (e.g. in who does it, how it's done, and on what topics)
- how well are we doing in these respects?
- how well would we ideally do in the future?

55 minutes.
Transport and Navigation

Getting to and from the airport
The distance between the Dunedin airport to the University of Otago campus is roughly 30kms.

Taxi: To get a taxi one way costs approximately $80-$100. This is a more expensive option but might be useful if there are a group of people coming in/going out to the airport together. There are a number of taxi companies:
- Blue Bubble Taxis Dunedin: (03) 477 7777
- Green Cabs Dunedin: 0800 46 4736
- Southern Taxis: (03) 476 6300 or Freephone 0800 829428
- City United Taxis Dunedin: (03) 477 1771 or Freephone 0800 771 771

Airport shuttle: The airport shuttles do a door to door service. There are a few different companies that run an airport shuttle.
- Kiwi Shuttle is $20 one way. http://www.kiwishuttles.co.nz
- Dunedin Airport Shuttle is also $20 one way. https://www.airportshuttlesdunedin.co.nz/book-online

Some of these shuttle companies also do a group rate. The more of you on the same booking leaving and going to the same location, the cheaper it is per person.

Getting to Conference Dinner at Etrusco
Taxi: As per airport listings above
Walking (fig. 1, below):
The insider's guide to Dunedin

Some of our favourite spots for coffee and food (see fig. 2, p36)

1 - Cafe Albany (1 minute). Food and coffee & tea. Open 8am - 4pm. In ‘The Link’ building, right across from the main entrance to the Castle Lecture theatres.

2 - Frankly Sandwiches (1 minute). True to name. Open 10am - 2pm. In ‘The Link’ building just beyond Cafe Albany.

3 - Dispensary (2 minutes). Coffee, cake and salads. Open 8.30am - 3.30pm Albany Street, part of the OUSA building and across the road from the 5 - floor Burns/Art Building.

4 - Poppa’s Pizza (2 minutes). True to name. Open 11.00am - 10.00pm. Across from University of Otago Central Library on Albany Street.

5 - Gilbert’s on Albany (2 minutes) Food, coffee & tea. Wide assortment of gluten free food. Open 7.30am - 3.30pm. Across from University of Otago Central Library on Albany Street.

6 - Otago Museum Cafe (2 - 3 minutes). Food, coffee & tea. 9.00am - 5.00pm. Next to big trees in the Museum Reserve. Go through The Link and cross Cumberland Street. Otago Museum is well worth a look too.

7 - Formosa Delight (3 minutes). Food - the neighbourhood’s foremost delight for vegetarians and vegans especially. Open 11.00am - 8.30 pm. Albany Street, to the left as you head from Castle Theatres to Albany Street.

8 - Eureka (3 minutes). Cafe and bar. Philosophy Department claims to have found it; so does everyone else. Open 11.00am - 10.00pm. Albany Street, left as you head from Castle Theatres to Albany Street.

9 - Sushi Great King Street (3 - 4 minutes). True to name. Open 8.00am - 5pm. Albany / Great King Street corner. Through the link, diagonally cross the Museum Reserve. Cross at Great King Street traffic lights. Sushi is close to UBS (University Bookshop).

10 - ReBurger (3 - 4 minutes). True to name. Gluten free and vegetarian options available. Open 11.30am - 9.00pm. Albany / Great King Street corner, in The Cook.

11 - The Good Earth Cafe (5 minutes). Food, coffee & tea. Light and elegant space. Open 7.00am - 5.00pm. Cumberland / St David Street Corner opposite North Ground and St David Lecture theatres. Go through the link, then go right up Cumberland Street for 1.5 blocks.

12 - Aika & Co (7 minutes). Coffee. Open 7.30am - 5.00pm. George Street. Just along from the 5 way intersection and The Bog pub. Go through the Link. Cross the Museum Lawn. Cross Great King Street and continue along Albany Street until you reach the stairs at the end of Albany Street. Turn left and you are on George Street.

13 - Let Them Eat Vegan (10 minutes). Vegan food. Open Wednesday and Thursday 11.00am - 5.00pm. On Albion Lane between Centre City New World on Great King Street and George Street.
14 - Dog With Two Tails (15-20 minutes). Food, coffee, tea and craft beer. Open 8.00am - 12.00am. Moray Place. Follow George street to the Octagon. Walk one block past the Octagon to Moray Place. Turn right onto Moray Place and Dog With Two Tails is on the left hand side of the road.

15 - Beam Me Up Bagels (15 - 20 minutes). True to name. You can make a nice little trip of it from campus by walking through the Dunedin Botanic Gardens. Open 9.00am - 2.30pm. Turn right out of the Castle Theatre main entrance. Follow this pedestrian area and continue up Castle Street. Cross through the Dunedin Botanic Gardens which begin at the end of Castle Street. Beam Me Up is diagonally across from the New World on North Road.

**Supermarkets** (see fig. 2, p36)

A - New World Centre City (7 minutes). Head across the Museum Reserve. Turn left down Cumberland Street. Walk two blocks. New World City Centre is on the right side of the road on the 3rd block.

B - Countdown (10 minutes). One block further down Cumberland Street from Centre City New World.

C - New World Gardens (15 minutes). You can make a nice little trip of it from campus by walking through the Dunedin Botanic Gardens. Open 9.00am - 2.30pm. Turn right out of the Castle Theatre main entrance. Follow this pedestrian area and continue up Castle Street. Cross through the Dunedin Botanic Gardens which begin at the end of Castle Street. At the Botanic Garden exit you will be opposite Gardens New World.

**Favourite night-establishments in the Octagon region** (see fig. 3, below)

1 – Albar. Traditional style UK bar with good selection of craft beers and whisky
2 – Carousel. Up-market cocktail bar, with vast selection of craft beers and wines.
3 – Pequeno. Alleyway cocktail bar, with comfortable lounge environment.
Local attractions within walking distance from Castle Lecture Theatres (see fig. 4, p38)

1. Otago Museum (2 minutes). Most exhibitions are free. There are some special exhibitions that you need to pay and get tickets for such as the Butterfly Garden and the Planetarium. Open 10.00am - 5.00pm.

2. Dunedin Botanic Gardens (10 minutes). New Zealand’s first botanic garden. It has a wide variety of horticultural and botanical collections. It is very easy to spend several hours walking up and down various paths and there are lots of nice places to sit and enjoy the ‘greenery’. Open from dawn until dusk. From the Castle Lecture Theatres. Turn right and walk along the main path through campus. Continue along Castle Street. At the end of Castle Street there is an entrance to the garden.

3. Olveston Historic Home (15 minutes)
Olveston is a historic house museum which depicts the life of a wealthy merchant family in the early twentieth century. Guided tours are $20.50 each. There are 5 tours a day. [http://www.olveston.co.nz](http://www.olveston.co.nz). This is about 15 minutes uphill from the Otago University University Campus

4. Dunedin Railway Station (15 minutes). The architecture of the Dunedin Railway Station is pretty spectacular. Well worth a visit. Walk through ‘The Link’. Turn left onto Cumberland Street. Follow this road for 4 and a bit blocks. The railway station will be on the left.

5. Harbour Walkway and cycle path (15 minutes). If you enjoy a morning or afternoon walk the Harbour walkway is very pleasant on a sunny day.

6. Dunedin Public Art Gallery (15- 20 minutes)
This gallery houses most of the public art collection of Dunedin. Admission is free. Located on the far side of the Octagon on the uphill side.

7. Dunedin Chinese Gardens (25 minutes)
Opened in 2008 the Dunedin Chinese Garden is an authentic Chinese garden. Entry costs are $9.00 per adult and $6.00 per student. Walk through ‘The Link’. Turn left onto Cumberland Street. Follow this road for 4 and a bit blocks. You will see the Dunedin Railway Station on your left. Continue for another half block and you will reach the Toitu Otago Settlers Museum. The Chinese Gardens are just after the Settlers Museum on the same side of the road.

8. Toitu Settlers Museum (25 minutes)
A museum about the people of Dunedin - from early settlers, through to those that have recently arrived. Open 10.00am - 5.00pm. Walk through ‘The Link’. Turn left onto Cumberland Street. Follow this road for 4 and a bit blocks. You will see the Dunedin Railway Station on your left. Continue for another half block and you will reach the Toitu Otago Settlers Museum.

9. Baldwin Street (30 minutes). Baldwin Street is the World’s Steepest Residential Street. Located up North East Valley it is a nice stroll through the Botanic Gardens and up North Road.
Other attractions that are further afield if you have extra time in Dunedin

Tairoa Head and Albatross Colony
A headland at the end of the Otago Peninsula. Closeby are Yellow Eyed Penguin breeding grounds. There is also the Royal Albatross Centre - [http://www.albatross.org.nz](http://www.albatross.org.nz). On a windy day sometime the Albatross are flying around the carpark.

Orokonui Ecosanctuary
A predator free area for native New Zealand plants and animals.
Unguided: $19.00
Guided: $35.00- $50.00

Tunnel Beach
A 7.5km drive south of Dunedin, Tunnel Beach is a favourite. Walk down a steep path to sandstone cliffs with a tunnel down to the beach.
just a perfect day … in Dunedin

ajm@3Dec2017

The street art on central Dunedin’s south side (map available) would be my first pleasure as I strolled down the hill to arrive about 8am at Mazagran (8-6 M-F, 8-2 Sat.). This tiny Moray Place café and roaster does excellent coffee for its many and varied communities, a fine selection of current magazines, and a frequently changing blackboard of chalk art.

Next stop OCHO café, 22 Vogel St (8-4 M-F). At this home of NZ’s best chocolate, a recent public share float has made Otago Chocolate Company products so popular that in-store stock is temporarily limited. If you prefer your chocolate chocolate-flavoured, bite into any 65-88% bar; my own favourite is PNG 88%. If alt-flavoured chocolate is your style, try the horopito and kawakawa.

I would then stroll the emerging Vogel St precinct, to keep briefed on this vibrant development and to take in more street art. This would include a drop-in to elegant and well-hosted Wine Freedom (9-6 M-F, 9-5 Sat.), 49 Water St at Water / Vogel corner. Here I’d select a drop of everyday or fine wine for the evening.

A contemplative stroll would follow, through the nearby Chinese Garden (10-5 daily) at Rattray / Cumberland corner. This garden has beautiful, traditional, and deeply Chinese design and build.

On a good enough day, I’d cross the bridge over the railway line to 20 Fryatt St, for a harbour boat trip to Taiaroa Head with Monarch Wildlife Cruises and Tours (10-5 M-F, 10-3 S-S). The wildlife varies seasonally, and trip by trip.

I’d make my way to Dunedin Public Art Gallery (DPAG) (10-5 daily), in The Octagon, for its superb current Gordon Walters exhibition. The Japanese woodblock prints by Hokusai and others are my favourites from the permanent collections, but aren’t on show just now. Some fine dealer galleries are just south of The Octagon too.

While coursing through the above, I would’ve stopped for lunch. Perhaps for sushi and miso at Hikari (9-9 M-S, 9-6 Sun), 363 George St between St Andrew and Hanover. Or maybe I’d enjoy vegan fare at Watson’s Eatery (8.30-6 M-F, 9.30-5 S&S), in Wall Street Mall on this same block of George Street.

As the summer day’s heat and light ease, I would take a Ross Creek run or walk. I’d start at the Philosophy Department, heading up the Water of Leith / Owheo, through the Botanic gardens, through Woodhaugh Garden, and across Malvern St in the Leith Valley. Then take the riverside track up Ross Creek, the Leith tributary that flows down from the beautiful Ross Creek Reservoir. Enter the Ross Creek from the bottom end of Woodhaugh St, or instead from further upstream near the bottom of Rockside Rd. Some way up the wide Ross Creek track, where a few ‘worms’ also gently glow at night, a temporary fence presently blocks your path. This is due to maintenance work on the Reservoir. Turn back here if you’d like. Or instead carry on up, by stepping carefully across the creek and on up the now-narrow track beside it. You’ll confirm you’re on the right track when you pass a lovely 15m waterfall / cascade. Carry on upstream, carefully crossing the generally quiet Burma Rd and carrying on upstream beyond it, until you reach a minor clearing with little foot bridge over the creek. It’s simplest then just to retrace your steps. The return time for the full route above is 45–60 minutes to run. Or take an excellent shorter walk or run simply by turning back sooner. You’ll have fellow walkers and runners on this route, so if you’re unsure, do ask one of them for a steer.

If seeking inexpensive dinner, I would head to Izakaya Yuki in Bath St, for its small plates of
Japanese pub-style food, and its opportunity to catch up with the sumo on screen. If drifting a little higher up-market, I cross lower Stuart St to enjoy the urbane ambience, Hallertau beer, and Malaysian hawker-style food at Madam Woo. If instead I wanted Dunedin’s best, I would have made sure a day ahead to book at Bracken on Filleul St (Tu. – Sat.).

If the day were longer, hard choices would have been made, involving at least the following three contenders. First, some excuse would be needed to hang out at Café St Clair, next to the Saltwater Pool at the beach. I reckon this café has a view unmatched by any other in NZ. This is at almost sea level, and runs along the sweeping waveline to Lawyer’s Head and Lion’s Head Rock and Otago Peninsula, out across to White Island’s perfect triangle of rock, and the other way beyond Dunedin to Mt Cargill. Get there on the bus, from any stop on George St, on Dunedin’s busiest bus route (Normanby / St Clair). Second, a trip with Taieri Gorge Railway, from Dunedin’s coastal volcanic landscape, deep into Central Otago’s schist landforms. Third, a trip to Orokonui Ecosanuary, to stand near the feeding stations in quiet delight as the indigenous NZ native birds that I’ve loved since childhood swing by for some kai. You might need a hired car or local help to get to this spot.

My last treat on this perfect day, as on most others, would be the sound of frogs from the gardens around 20 – 26 Pitt St, as I stroll home back up the hill.
Philosopher's Cryptic
Cruciverbalist: Tiddy Smith

Across
1  Help his poor, confused folk writing footnotes to Plato (11)
6  Unfinished laptop broken for Academy teacher (5)
7  A scalp, removed and re-arranged, makes quite a wager (6)
8  Network a bunch of squares (4)
11  Closely observe one of the same rank (4)
14  Hock ham has tip removed, often with razor (6)
16  Headless equine talks about sliced rabbits (5)
17  Logical positivist from Hitler's third followed by baroque pianist, with England caught in the middle (11)

Down
1  Little dog beheaded yuppy under protestant leader (5)
2  Siri returns flower (4)
3  Penis found in De Morgan's laws (5)
4  Spit humour (6)
5  Follow disorderly in teal (6)
9  Debunk Popper's method (6)
10  Sarcastic Alanis Morisette song (6)
12  "Cor!" in an oak nut (5)
13  Done to avocados and the state (5)
15  Initially howls Aotearoa's killer act (4)
Appendix. 1 – Wifi Access on Campus

University of Otago Visitor Network Access

Welcome to the University of Otago! You can access the network/internet here using the following services:

**UO_Guest**

If you are visiting the University of Otago and only require Internet access you can use our **UO_Guest** network.

To log in or create a **UO_Guest** account:

1. Connect to the **UO_Guest** wireless network (SSID) on your device.
2. If the **UO_Guest** portal does not appear, open a web browser and browse to an Internet website. You will be re-directed to the **UO_Guest** portal page.
3. If you already have a **UO_Guest** account, you can log into it here. Otherwise click on the 'Don't have an account?' link.
4. Fill out the details with your Username (you can create your own), First name, Last name, plus a valid email address, then click 'Register'.
5. Your login details will be displayed on screen. Please write these down or take a snapshot for your later reference. An email with your login details is also sent to the email address you have supplied.
6. Click 'Sign on' and agree to the Acceptable Use Policy to complete your login process.

A **UO_Guest** account provides access to the Internet for up to:

- two weeks (14 days)
- 500MB per day
- two devices at a time

Your **UO_Guest** account expires after either the two weeks from creation or seven consecutive days of no activity. You can then create a new one if needed.

**Note:** If your device has logged in to another University network using a University username (staff, student or external), you will not be able to access the **UO_Guest** network on that device.

**eduroam**

If you are a visitor to the University of Otago from another eduroam-participating institution, you are able to use the **eduroam** service for secure wireless network access using your authentication credentials from your home institution. **eduroam** should appear as a wireless network option (SSID) on your mobile device or laptop.

The security settings you use to access **eduroam** at the University of Otago are shown below. More detailed information will be provided by your home institution – please contact your own IT support first for assistance.

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Do you have a question or need assistance? Please contact the ITS Service Desk:

- Tel 64 3 479 8888 or 0800 479 888
- Email its.servicedesk@otago.ac.nz
Appendix. 2 – University of Otago campus map