While their reasons differ, scholars as varied as G. John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth have seen eye to eye on the reality of an extended period of peace among great powers, of which China and Japan are, to varying degrees. A not insignificant number of scholars of the Asian region endorse this perspective. Yet, to concur with this consensus requires one to make some brave assumptions about the troubled Sino-Japanese relationship. Contrary to claims in the literature, left to their own devices, a great power peace between Beijing and Tokyo is unlikely to emerge. A more accurate and compelling way to characterize this bilateral relationship is through the realist concept of a power transition, emphasizing different rates of economic growth and competing state interests. Here, China is an unambiguous rising great power, and Japan a declining one, whose future at once hinges on how China interacts with it, and on the existence of a robust U.S.-Japan alliance.

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Contrary to claims in the literature, left to their own devices, a great power peace between Beijing and Tokyo is unlikely to emerge. Chinese and Japanese analysts appreciate this reality.\(^3\)

A more accurate and compelling way to characterize this bilateral relationship is through the realist concept of a power transition, emphasizing different rates of economic growth and competing state interests.\(^4\) Here, China is an unambiguous rising great power, and Japan a declining one, whose future at once hinges on how China interacts with it, and on the existence of a robust U.S.-Japan alliance.

The argument is laid out in the following manner. In section one, we review four influential perspectives that point toward a great power peace emerging between China and Japan. These highlight the role played by the variables of trade, identity, socialization, and domestic politics. In section two, an alternative neo-realist understanding of Chinese policy toward Japan is presented. Here, differences in Chinese and Japanese capabilities and interests, in the context of a power transition, have been responsible for generating friction and accompanying spiral dynamics in bilateral relations. In section three, Chinese policy toward Japan from 2001-2007 is explored. Section four focuses on the 2008-14 period. Section five evaluates the case for a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations advanced in the existing literature. The conclusion sketches the outlines of a realist-based great power peace, and suggests possibilities for future research.

**Four Non-Realist Views of Peace in Sino-Japanese Relations:**
**Trade, Identity, Socialization, Domestic Politics**

The notion that a non-realist-based great power peace can exist in Sino-Japanese relations is consistent with a variety of influential interpretations in the Chinese foreign policy scholarship. These perspectives variously emphasize the role

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played by trade, identity, socialization, and domestic politics in Beijing’s international relations.

Advocates of what is best called the trading state viewpoint contend that trade has had a significant effect in promoting pacific tendencies in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, Ikenberry claims that while the international system benefits from China’s economic dynamism, “the existing trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so.” In this view, “Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system…that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in.” Giovanni Arrighi expands on this view by positing that the Chinese are part of a larger and “ongoing revival of the East Asian tradition of relying primarily on the economic sources of power.” China specialist David Shambaugh has identified expanded economic relations between China and its Asian neighbours as one of the four pillars of a more active and successful regional policy. He notes that “the most noteworthy dimension of China’s new engagement with the Asian region is in the economic domain.” A robust trend of “growing interdependence and cooperation among both states and non-state actors—with China increasingly at the center of this activity” is identified.

At face value, the case for viewing China as a trading state is a strong one. China’s trade has grown at an annual rate of 15–17 percent for almost 30 years. In 1979, exports and imports accounted for 14 percent of China’s GDP. By 2006, exports and imports accounted for 70 percent of its GDP. As a recent International

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7 Ibid.
Monetary Fund report noted:

Few countries have so obviously gained from integration into the open world trading system as China, its growth coinciding with its ascendancy as an exporter and manufacturer. China is now the first or second largest trading partner of 78 countries with 55 percent of global GDP (versus just 13 countries with 15 percent of global GDP in 2000).\(^{13}\)

Indeed, recent research on international perceptions of China’s role in world politics has found that its perceived influence has been strongest within the economic sphere.\(^{14}\) At face value, the applicability of the trading state perspective in analyzing Sino-Japanese relations has some resonance, since Japan is China’s second largest trading partner.\(^{15}\)

Another identifiable group of analysts whose views point in the direction of a non-realist-based great power peace between China and Japan see value in the concept of identity. Identity theorists credit positive changes in China’s identity with a shift to a more pragmatic and benign Chinese foreign policy.\(^{16}\) Arguably the most prominent articulation of this perspective is laid out by David Kang in China Rising and a variety of closely-related writings over the last decade.\(^{17}\) Kang contends that a region-wide understanding that China is resuming its traditional role as the “dominant state in in East Asia” has accompanied China’s rise. According to this analysis, fears over China’s rise are “empirically unfounded.”\(^{18}\) In this view, present-day Asian actors, including Japan, have reverted to pre-colonial era conduct that identified


\(^{17}\) Kang, *China Rising*.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 10.
Chinese regional hegemony with stability.\textsuperscript{19} For Kang, “it is interests and identity, not power that are the key variables in determining threat and stability in international relations.”\textsuperscript{20} Notwithstanding the reference to interests in the argument, it is the convergence of national identities in post-Cold War Asia that plays a particularly significant role in the analysis.\textsuperscript{21} On this basis, Kang generates optimistic insights on the region’s future international relations, including Sino-Japanese relations.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, he predicts a regional dynamic toward “accommodation” of China’s central position, rather than a posture of balancing against it.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, a shared regional understanding about “China’s preferences and limited aims short-circuits the security dilemma.”\textsuperscript{24}

A third view that is highly relevant to the notion of a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations is advocated by Alastair Johnston, who conceptualizes China as a social state. Johnston is particularly interested in behavioral change as a consequence of China’s participation in a variety of international institutions since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{25} The contention is that Chinese involvement in these institutions has been led to the activation of micro-processes of socialization, including mimicking, social influence, and persuasion.\textsuperscript{26} These alter the behavior of participants, resulting in a “convergence of preferences and beliefs, and conformist behavior.”\textsuperscript{27} In a related study, Johnston has evaluated China’s compliance with five major international normative regimes, specifically, sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self-determination, and human rights.\textsuperscript{28} China emerges in this analysis as a state that is quite comfortable in the U.S.-constructed international order, with little evidence found of Chinese activity designed to balance “very vigorously” against the United States.\textsuperscript{29} While Johnston has not written specifically on Sino-Japanese relations, the implications of his

\textsuperscript{20} Kang, \textit{China Rising}, 9.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 4, 9, 11, 20-21; Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong,” 66-70.
\textsuperscript{22} Kang, \textit{China Rising}, 63-66, 153-182.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., xxv.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 49.
analysis are clear. As China and Japan engage in greater institutional interaction, and particularly in various East Asian regional fora, the socializing mechanisms he identifies should ameliorate tensions between the two countries.

A fourth interpretation that is relevant to our discussion of a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations emphasizes the role played by domestic politics. In a recent book, James Reilly develops a cyclical public mobilization wave and ‘responsive authoritarian’ model, as a counter to previous studies which contend that public opinion does not influence the foreign policy of authoritarian states, and China in particular. In this view, when the Chinese leadership has been divided, public opinion, albeit of an illiberal variety, matters as a distinct variable in China’s foreign policy, and its Japan policy more specifically. When the leadership has been united, public opinion has had a much more muted impact. Ultimately, the Chinese state is viewed as a strategic actor, successfully exercising control over public opinion, and committed to stability in Sino-Japanese relations. If true, this would form the basis for a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations. What about nationalism? Reilly argues that rising Chinese nationalism is not correlated with military aggression, a pattern he expects to continue. Thus, it is contended that the prospects for the Sino-Japanese relationship are “far brighter than most analysts have assumed.”

The Realist Alternative: A Surprising Neglect

In the midst of this proliferation of perspectives on Chinese policy toward Japan, a standard perspective used to understand great power politics, neo-realist theory, has been strangely neglected. In the general literature on Chinese foreign policy,

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31 Reilly, Strong Society, 27.
32 Ibid., 2-6.
33 Ibid., 8-9.
34 First articulated by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, neo-realism (also known as structural realism) emphasizes the role of structure, defined in terms of the distribution of material capabilities, in determining relations between states. While initially developed to explain broad outcomes in international politics, notably great power balancing and security maximizing activity, it can also be used as a theory of foreign policy. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Waltz is associated with defensive realism. For the subsequent development of offensive realism, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, New York: 2001). For elaboration on neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, see Colin Elman, “Horses For Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, no.1 (1996): 7-53.

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[54] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
one can easily point to realists who are central figures, such as Robert Ross and Thomas Christensen.\textsuperscript{36} Neo-realists who analyze Japan’s China policy can also be identified.\textsuperscript{37} However, there is no contemporary analyst who explicitly adopts a neo-realist perspective in analyzing China’s Japan policy. Wan Ming comes close, but ultimately finds neorealism “indeterminate.”\textsuperscript{38} Richard Bush accepts the relevance of the security dilemma concept emphasized by neo-realists, but finds it “only moderately helpful.”\textsuperscript{39} He supplements his analysis with two factors: interactions and history.\textsuperscript{40}

The gap in neo-realist attention to China’s Japan policy needs to be filled. Utilizing neo-realism in its capacity as a theory of foreign policy, our narrative focuses on Chinese capabilities and interests in generating security dilemma dynamics.\textsuperscript{41} As China’s relative power capabilities have risen, it has naturally begun to assert its security-based interests in East Asia, its traditional sphere of influence. As Beijing has pressed its position, Tokyo has resisted.\textsuperscript{42} Here, a distinct pattern in Chinese policy toward Japan can be identified. Increasing Chinese capabilities and declining interests in minimizing conflict have generated spiral dynamics in the

\textsuperscript{37} Michael Green (Georgetown University) and Richard Samuels (MIT) come to mind.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 24-25.
\textsuperscript{41} Elman, “Horses For Courses”; The security dilemma is a central concept in the neorealist understanding of international politics. To appreciate its dynamics, we must start with the distinguishing difference between international and domestic politics, which is the concept of anarchy, or lack of an international sovereign in world politics. Given this structural condition, which heightens uncertainty, in a hypothetical two-state model, the self-defensive efforts by State A to increase its security by arming itself are viewed by State B as being offensive in nature. This generates fear in State B, compelling a response. An action-reaction spiral process occurs. The end result is that the security of both states is reduced below levels which existed prior to the start of interaction. Significantly, this process explains how heightened possibility of conflict occurs even when neither state intends it. That said, co-operation under the security dilemma is possible when offensive and defensive weapons can be differentiated, and when defense has the advantage over the offense. Under such circumstances, “security seeking” states can potentially, if not necessarily easily, differentiate themselves from non-security seeking and revisionist “power maximizing” states. While the security dilemma can be moderated through these variables, it cannot be eliminated. See Robert Jervis, “Co-operation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587-623; Waltz, Theory, 186-187.
form of an interactive process of conflict escalation.

Between 2001 and 2007, Chinese policy toward Japan reflected the workings of growing Chinese military capabilities underpinned by robust economic growth.43 As we shall see in the next section, during this time, Beijing began to challenge Japan for slights it previously minimized.44 This dynamic was nevertheless kept in check by Beijing’s understanding that its interests dictated some measure of restraint in pursuing conflict with Tokyo. A qualitative change in Chinese policy can be detected in the period beginning in 2008, when China began to behave more assertively, and bilateral relations deteriorated.45 What explains this change in the Chinese stance? Again, capabilities and interests are critical. This period has been marked by the distinct reality of rising Chinese economic power in the face of apparent dramatic (if overstated) U.S. decline, exemplified in the U.S.-centered great financial crisis of 2008-2009.46 Though not without its own financial weaknesses, at least in the short-run, China emerged relatively unscathed.47 At the same time, China’s interests in restraining conflict with Japan have weakened over time. As Beijing’s military strength has grown, it has perceived a Japanese intent to alter the status quo in the East China Sea.48 Thus, Beijing has begun to challenge Tokyo more forcefully, and for longer periods than in the 2001-2007 period. The alternative perspectives on China’s Japan policy summarized above are really only able to explain periods of relative peace and co-operation in Sino-Japanese relations, and have severe problems adequately explaining conflict. Only the neo-realist perspective is able to explain the full record of Chinese policy toward Japan.

**China’s Japan Policy, 2001-2007**

Between 2001 and 2007, China maintained a distinct trajectory of robust

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economic growth, which fueled an impressive military modernization. This set the background for the Chinese response to the policies of Japanese Premier Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006). Koizumi’s relationship with China started poorly. Beijing was appalled by his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 13 August 2001, which contains the remains of fourteen Class A Japanese war criminals. This was interpreted by the Chinese as a touchstone of the Japanese leader’s intentions and stance toward the Chinese, whose views on such visits are well-known. The Japanese Premier was to repeat these visits during every year of his tenure.

Even as he did so, a series of incidents over the 2004-2005 period reflected a particularly alarming deterioration in relations. Here, events surrounding the behavior of Chinese fans toward the Japanese national soccer team during the Asian Cup soccer finals held in China are noteworthy. The Japanese team was subjected to sustained abuse and vitriol as it played its preliminary group matches in various parts of China. The full-scale rioting by disgruntled Chinese soccer fans following the Japanese team’s victory over China in the final in August 2004 turned out to be a harbinger. In November 2004, a Chinese submarine was detected in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Later that month, Chinese drilling teams were dispatched to inspect for oil and gas deposits within the Japanese EEZ. In response, China was formally declared a security concern in Japan’s December 2004 National Defense Program Outline. In mid-February 2005, the U.S. and Japan met for their annual defense consultations. In an unprecedented move reflecting increasing Japanese concern at China’s foreign policy, Tokyo agreed to mention the Taiwan issue in the joint statement at the end of the consultations.

These events led to a spike of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. In late March 2005, a grass-roots campaign to protest Japan’s efforts to secure a permanent

50 For an examination of the period from 1949 to 1999, see Reilly, *Strong Society*, 55-97.
seat on the UN Security Council garnered an estimated 22 million signatures. Soon after, a wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations, which the Chinese government did little to stop, targeted Japanese businesses and government offices in Beijing, Shanghai and southern China. That said, Tokyo was not without its share of blame for the deterioration in relations. The 5 April 2005 publication of an official school textbook glossing over Japan’s World War II-era atrocities in China and Korea contributed to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment. Koizumi eventually delivered an apology for his country’s wartime behavior in Jakarta, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung conference.

In any case, Tokyo lodged a formal protest with China concerning the demonstrations, and requested an apology. The Chinese response was a counterproductive one. On 12 April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao added fuel to the fire by strongly implying that China was opposed to Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Tokyo then announced that it was starting to review applications to drill for gas in areas in the East China Sea that are in dispute between Japan and China. During a hastily arranged two-day visit to Beijing by Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing rejected any idea of a Chinese apology. Then, on 19 April, Beijing effectively halted the anti-Japanese protests. Commerce Minister Bo Xilai warned that a campaign to boycott Japanese goods would jeopardize China’s economic growth, and expressed confidence that Sino-Japanese economic relations would be unaffected by these events. The Chinese decision to halt the protests reflected a desire to ensure a modicum of stability in relations ahead of a meeting between Hu and Koizumi on 23 April.

67 Bush, Perils of Proximity, 209.
From mid-2005 to mid-2006, the Chinese began to challenge Japanese policy in the East China Sea. This included an emphasis on military measures, including the dispatch of air force fighters and naval vessels. However, just ahead of Koizumi’s departure from office in September 2006, the Chinese made a decision to lower tensions. Simply stated, the Chinese had made clear their opposition to Koizumi, and state interests in preventing further escalation pointed in favor of moderation. As diplomatic negotiations continued though 2006, the Chinese accepted a Japanese proposal to establish a mechanism to address incidents in the East China Sea. In July 2007, the Japanese Coast Guard and the Chinese State Oceanic Administration met, but negotiations stalled. The subsequent agreement reached in June 2008 satisfied neither side.

China’s Japan Policy, 2008–Present

Even as U.S. economic growth and prestige took a direct hit from the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy experienced only a relatively modest dip. Certainly, its military spending remained impressive. The continued rise in Chinese military capabilities occurred in the context of a series of perceived Japanese challenges. Critically, Chinese interests in restraining conflict with Japan weakened during this period. Here, the Japanese were viewed by the Chinese as seeking to revise a previously stable (if far from satisfactory) status quo in the East China Sea. Accordingly, Beijing began to challenge Japan more forcefully and in a more sustained fashion than in the 2001-2007 period.

On 8 September 2010, a collision between a Chinese trawler and a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea led to the imprisonment of the trawler’s Chinese fishermen for 20 days. Beijing subsequently cancelled scheduled talks on the joint exploration of a gas field in the East China Sea, summoned the Japanese ambassador on repeated occasions, and demanded an apology. As tensions flared, China reportedly blocked the shipment

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69 Ibid., 79.
70 Ibid., 79-80.
71 Drezner, “Global Economic Governance.”
to Japan of rare earths, which are critical components in the production of high technology products. On this issue, the Japanese sense of vulnerability is particularly acute since China controls approximately 95 percent of the global supply of rare earths.\(^74\)

As events unfolded, interventions by Chinese and Japanese government officials exacerbated tensions. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara accused China of “extremely hysterical” counter-measures.\(^75\) Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu then claimed that Maehara’s comments were “absurd,” and that “China is not to be blamed.”\(^76\) A short ten-minute meeting between the Chinese and Japanese Prime Ministers at the East Asian Summit in Hanoi at the end of October failed to stabilize bilateral tensions.\(^77\) Protests by Japanese right-wing groups extended to throwing flares into the compounds of the Chinese consulates in Fukuoka and Nagasaki. On the Chinese side, anti-Japanese protests persisted both on the Internet and on the ground, even after the Chinese authorities attempted to quell them. At one point, an estimated 30,000 took part in protests in Chengdu in Southwest China.

During August-September 2012, developments centering on Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands represented an important watershed and the beginning of a second phase of conflict. The catalyst for rising tensions came in the form of then Tokyo mayor and right-wing nationalist Shintaro Ishihara’s attempt to purchase three of the islands from a Japanese family. Seeking to forestall this development, which would have severely de-stabilized relations, the Japanese government instead nationalized the islands in question. However, the move backfired. Beijing interpreted the move as a calculated insult, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded that the Japanese government “stop actions that violate Chinese sovereignty.”\(^78\)

These developments fueled anti-Japanese resentment across China. Throughout September, Japanese-themed shops, restaurants and consulates were vandalized. As with earlier demonstrations in 2005, the Chinese authorities

\(^{74}\) “Tokyo Urges Beijing to Resume Rare Earth Exports,” October 25, 2010.
\(^{76}\) Ibid.
eventually suppressed the protests. Nevertheless, at the same time, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a speech asserting that China “will never budge, even half an inch, over the sovereignty and territorial issue.”79 Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng reinforced the message, observing that China was “watching closely…and reserve[d] the right to take reciprocal measures.”80 Commenting on the situation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta deemed the situation sufficiently troubling to express official concern that the accidental use of force could occur.81

**Continued Escalation**

A third phase in the escalation process was to occur, highlighting the seemingly intractable state of bilateral relations. In December 2012, eight Japanese F-15 fighters scrambled to intercept a Chinese marine surveillance aircraft from the State Oceanic Administration, which was flying over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. This happened again on 11 January 2013, when the Japan Air Self-Defense Force responded to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force J-100 fighters operating near the islands. On 19 and 30 January 2013, the Japanese Defense Ministry claimed that a Chinese PLA Navy vessel had activated its missile guidance system and “painted” a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel. Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera claimed that Japan had “irrefutable data” on this incident and considered that Chinese actions amounted to threatening the use of force.82

On 16 April 2013, Beijing released a white paper which identified Japan as “making trouble over the Diaoyu islands issue.”83 The next day, a PLA Type-052 Lanzhou missile destroyer and Type-054A Hengshui missile frigate entered waters near the contested islands. This occasioned an escalating process of action and reaction. On 21 April members of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s cabinet visited the

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80 Ibid.
Yasukuni shrine. On 23 April, 170 members of the Japanese Diet and a small flotilla carrying 80 Japanese nationalists visited waters off the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Reacting to this provocation, on 26 April, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman allegedly asserted that “the Diaoyu islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it’s China’s core interest.”

Watching from the sidelines with increasing concern, the United States finally acted, though with less effect than intended. At a two-day informal meeting in California, President Barack Obama urged his counterpart President Xi Jinping to “deescalate” the conflict with Japan. The United States also communicated assurances to Japan that the United States would honor its alliance commitments. However, neither China nor Japan has demonstrated an interest in following U.S. counsel. The Japanese Defense Ministry’s annual White Paper, released in July, proposed an increasingly hardline stance towards China. This was coupled with expressions of serious concern that the United States might not be able to match the rhetoric of its policy of rebalancing to Asia with appropriate funding. Commenting on this Japanese activism, the Chinese Defense Ministry contended that Japan was compromising regional stability.

**China’s ADIZ Declaration**

China’s 23 November 2013 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea represented a fourth phase in the escalation process. There is a 50 percent overlap between China’s and Japan’s ADIZs. Under the terms of the Chinese ADIZ declaration, China requires aircraft to “identify themselves and maintain contact with the Chinese authorities when flying through it. Aircraft must report flight plans and follow instructions; failure to do so,” the Chinese warned, could elicit “emergency defensive measures.” The United States immediately challenged

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this declaration by flying two B-52 bombers through the ADIZ without notifying Beijing. Seoul and Tokyo followed suit with their own sorties through China's ADIZ. Beijing’s announcement came just days before a trip by Vice-President Joseph R. Biden Jr. to the region. While in Tokyo, Biden stated that the United States was “deeply concerned by the attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea.” Yet, critically, while the Vice President stated that the United States “did not recognize the zone,” he did not ask President Xi to rescind the ADIZ declaration. On 6 December, the lower house of the Japanese Diet passed a resolution urging China to abolish the ADIZ. During a Japan-ASEAN summit in mid-December, Prime Minister Abe criticized the ADIZ, “demanding China rescind all measures like this that unjustly violate the general rule [regarding freedom of navigation].” Predictably, Beijing slammed this idea, characterizing it as “malicious slander.” Just a day later, Secretary of State John Kerry, in a visit to Hanoi, advised Beijing that “the zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea.”

Escalating Sino-Japanese Tensions and U.S. Drift

In any case, Prime Minister Abe has not showed much restraint in his actions, even going against U.S. advice to de-escalate tensions with China and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on 26 December 2013. Indeed, speaking off the record, in an exasperated tone, one American official observed that Abe’s Yasukuni visit made Biden’s China diplomacy “useless.” The shrine visit led a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman to take the unusual step of directly criticizing Abe for honoring “fascists” and the “Nazis of Asia.” Concerns about Abe’s revisionist interpretations of history are such that on 4 March 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pointedly warned that

92 Ibid.
China would not allow any country “to reverse the course of history.” Significantly, on 9 March, the Abe government had to issue a statement affirming that it had no intention to revise its apology for women forced to work in Japanese military-controlled brothels during World War Two. This welcome statement was repudiated by claims from some Japanese politicians that these widely-acknowledged historical facts were “a total lie.”

More broadly, new features in Japan’s defense-related policy are emerging under the Abe government, raising Beijing’s ire. In late February 2014, the Abe government announced a reversal of its predecessor’s 2012 “escape from nuclear” energy policy commitment. On 13 March, an end to a longstanding ban imposed in 1967 on Japanese military exports was declared. On 19 April, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera announced that construction work would begin on a military radar station on the Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost island, just 150 kilometers from the Senkaku island group, and 108 kilometers from Taiwan. According to Onodera, the purpose of this facility is to “defend islands that are part of Japan’s territory.”

For their part, the Chinese appear to be taking steps to revise previous agreements reached with Japan. This is suggested by the Shanghai Maritime Court’s April 2014 decision to seize a Japanese cargo ship in response to alleged unpaid compensation for Chinese ships used by the Japanese in 1936. The issue of wartime reparations was previously believed to have been settled in a 1972 agreement. The foregoing has occurred against the backdrop of a United States that is refocusing its attention on the Asia-Pacific region, even as it remains distracted by events in the Ukraine and the Middle East. Thus, President Obama’s late April 2014 trip to Asia, when he explicitly stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are covered by the U.S-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, was a welcome, if belated, move to contain Sino-Japanese tensions.

However, U.S. actions continue to be challenged. On 5 February 2014, while

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testifying to Congress, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel rejected China’s ADIZ claims. Yet, China continues to operate with impunity in the zone. As recently as late May, in an apparent escalation, a pair of Chinese Su-27 fighters flew within one hundred and fifty feet of a Japanese YS-11 reconnaissance plane in an area of overlap between the two sides’ ADIZs. The increasing tensions came to a head at the annual IISS Shangri-La meeting in Singapore in late May 2014. At the meeting, Prime Minister Abe stated Japan’s intention to play “an even greater and proactive role” in sustaining peace in Asia.101 In an obvious insertion of Japan into the increasingly conflictual Sino-ASEAN disputes over territories in the South China Sea, Abe offered Japan’s “utmost support for ASEAN member countries to ensure the security of seas and skies and rigorously maintain freedom of navigation and overflight.”102 Rightly or wrongly, this stance signifies a Japanese intention to expand its conflict with China. Meanwhile, one can only hope that Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s strong stance at the Singapore meeting on Chinese policy toward the territorial disputes in the South China Sea represents a positive turning point in U.S. Asia policy.103 It bears noting that Abe and Koizumi’s views were strongly contested by the Chinese representative at the forum, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, the deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army. General Wang conveyed a Chinese perception that the United States and Japan were co-operating to target China at the meeting.104 Beijing’s anti-Japanese stance has continued. In a visit to South Korea in early July, President and Communist Party leader Xi Jinping underlined China’s role in repelling a Japanese invasion of Korea in the 1590s.105 Meanwhile, during German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Beijing, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang directly criticized Japan for its wartime aggression against China.106 As such, it comes as little surprise that the Japanese Defense Ministry specifically identified China as a security concern in separate reports in 2014.107

102 Ibid.
Evaluating the Sino-Japanese Great Power Peace

The critical conclusion to draw from the narrative above is that Chinese policy toward Japan has not conformed to the expectations of either trading state, social state, identity state, or public opinion theorists. This finding has serious consequences for the notion that a great power peace will characterize Sino-Japanese relations on the bases prescribed by these perspectives.

China’s relationship with Japan is the most striking example of a trend that contrasts starkly with the trading state perspective. In short, China’s major trading partners are also the states that view it as their major source of strategic concern. Japan is at once one of China’s major economic partners and the central focus of Chinese nationalism. Over the course of the 1992-2013 period, Japan was consistently either China’s number one or two trading partner. Yet, this has done little to prevent the episodes of intense anti-Japanese outbursts which we explored above. Ultimately, economic factors in China’s foreign policy are subordinate to wider political dynamics. This crucial point is obscured in the trading state perspective.

Moreover, there appears to be little if any evidence for China functioning as a social state. Rather than being socialized into more benign and regularized patterns of behavior, China has confronted Japan and the U.S. at the East Asian Summit and various ASEAN-related meetings, in full view of the other participating states. More broadly, the institutionalist literature, be it of a constructivist or a neo-liberal variety, obscures conflict within institutions. This is a promising area for future research in realist theory.

Recent research has also contradicted Kang’s sweeping and premature claims that China’s rise has not generated fear, balancing, and security dilemma dynamics in the East Asian region. This article complements and extends this research,
making it abundantly clear that the Chinese view Japan as a threat to their security, and vice versa. China correctly understands that Japan will challenge a potential Chinese bid for a regional sphere of influence. Presently, Tokyo is bolstering its military capabilities and adjusting its diplomacy to obviate this outcome. The foregoing therefore raises serious doubts about Kang’s explanation of China’s regional policy and Sino-Japanese relations, which focuses heavily on a transformed Chinese identity.113

In respect to Reilly’s emphasis on the role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy, that perspective is also at variance with the recent history of Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, the claim that rising Chinese nationalism is not correlated with military aggression requires interrogation.114 Moreover, Reilly’s characterization of the Chinese leadership as pragmatic, nuanced, sophisticated, and committed to stability in Sino-Japanese relations is highly questionable.115 Contrary to Reilly’s assessment, the overwhelming evidence suggests that China’s leadership, particularly during the current Xi Jinping regime, has been united, but that this has been associated with an increase in Sino-Japanese conflict.116

The contention of this article is that Chinese policy is more persuasively explained by the neo-realist alternative laid out above. In positing both China and Japan as security maximizers, and focusing on the twin variables of capabilities and interests, we have outlined an explanation for Chinese policy toward Japan. Since 2001, an identifiable pattern of rising Chinese capabilities and diverging interests with Japan has been evident. Security dilemma dynamics, in the form of an interactive process of conflict escalation, have intensified. Looking to the future, a continuation of China’s rise will have predictable consequences. Rising Chinese capabilities will dovetail with compelling interests in favor of establishing a Chinese sphere of influence in East Asia. Accordingly, relations with Japan will be associated with varying degrees of friction and even intense conflict. From a neo-realist perspective, the only surprise is that analysts are surprised with such developments, which were foreseen even before the current spike in tensions.117

113 Kang, China Rising, 64.
114 Reilly, Strong Society, 8-9.
115 Ibid., 2, 7, 21, 159.
Conclusion

As we move forward, what are the implications of Chinese foreign policy for the great power peace in Asia? Whatever we may call it, the Sino-Japanese relationship is not an example of a great power peace. The optimistic view offered in various strands of the literature—be it of the trading state, identity state, social state, or domestic politics variety—that China's self-styled peaceful rise will invariably stabilize the region because of variables they emphasize is misplaced. Indeed, if not correctly managed, China's rise presents the distinct prospect that a great power peace will not occur in Asia in the twenty-first century. That said, few would deny the merits and desirability of a great power peace in Asia. How can we possibly achieve this outcome? This is an area of potentially fruitful future research, and a few preliminary ideas can be briefly sketched here. For a great power peace to emerge and be consolidated, it has to be based on regional power realities. Growing Chinese power needs to be balanced by a robust American-led alliance network. In such a regional order, the United States must emphasize its strengths as a maritime power, even as China's sphere of influence covers mainland Asia. In this emerging bipolar system, American and Chinese alliance policies will require management to ensure that entrapment does not occur, triggering alliance security dilemma dynamics.

Further research needs to address these issues. A few questions suggest themselves. What are the sources of stability (and instability) in a system in which a rising power is a continental power and the hegemon is a maritime power? What is the role of technology (including missile defense systems) in affecting the security dilemma in such a structural setting? What is the role of alliance management in the nascent bipolar system that is emerging between the United States and China? While rare, a great power peace predicated on realist premises is not without precedent. It operated in nineteenth century Europe, which experienced an extended


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period of relative great power peace in an era of dramatic change.\textsuperscript{121} Whatever the case, such an arrangement is a surer basis for regional peace and stability than the alternatives reviewed here.

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