Corruption


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1. Introduction

Corruption is an umbrella term for activities that are deemed to be inappropriate or improper, not congruent with the expectations applicable to specific roles, contexts or relationships. In Africa, this includes high-level graft, that is, the looting of state coffers by “stationary bandits” (Olson 1993) such as Omar Bongo Ondimba, who ruled Gabon for 42 years, and is reported to have appropriated 25 per cent of oil rich Gabon’s GDP (Ghosh 2013). Corruption also includes cheating by public office bearers, ranging from the mundane everyday bribe in which the bribee is compensated for creatively interpreting or breaking a rule, to larger-scale buying and dispensing of political favours. Most discussions of corruption in Africa echo Joseph Nye’s widely-used definition of corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967: 419).

Agency does not lie exclusively with state officials and politicians, though, despite what the proponents of the current good governance programme want us to believe. Bayley’s (1966) definition of corruption concerns a larger group of agents. He defines corruption as “inducement by means of improper considerations to commit a violation of duty.” This
conception is echoed by Noonan (1984) in his comprehensive study of one specific form of corruption, the bribe, which he describes as “an inducement improperly influencing the performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised.” This includes gain-seeking behaviour by domestic and multi-national firms who exploit weakly developed governance practices on the continent to grease the wheels of business, avoid taxes, and maximise returns (Bracking 2015). Enterprise-induced corruption is a major contributor to the large and devastating net resource outflows from the continent amounting, according to a recent report, to 800 billion US$ over the period 1980 to 2012 (Global Financial Integrity 2015). Bayley and Noonan’s definitions also remind us of another set of agents who may have an interest in bribery: the numerous individuals who go about their daily lives and try to eke out a decent existence under conditions of scarcity, both of opportunities for advancement and of the provision of public goods such as infrastructure and the rule of law. Such scarcity is typical of modernising/transitional societies, and inducing corruption is often more an unavoidable means of survival than the result of a reflective choice. The fact that gift-giving and “showing your gratitude” is deeply embedded in the moral economy of many cultures in Africa, and that the distinction between private gain and civic responsibility is of recent origin and weakly observed, contribute to the normalisation of behaviour that outsiders find perplexing and morally suspect (Smith 2015; Ekeh 1975, Oliver de Sardan 1995). This broader appreciation of the social embeddedness of corruption act as a useful correction to the narrow public-choice approach that reduces the phenomenon to a matter of incentives and duplicating “right” institutions.

Building up to a discussion of the determinants of corruption (Section 4), I first discuss sources of cross-national data on corruption, those data that can be used in comparative studies and research aimed at generating substantiated general conclusions (Section 2). There
are also other very useful sources of information on corruption in Africa, such as country-specific anthropological and socio-political studies, both in English and in French (Blundo & Oliver de Sardan 2006, Smith 2007; Smith 2015; Ellis 2016; Reno 1995; Kempe & Chikulo 2000). Credit cannot be done to them in a short contribution like this. Torselo & Venard (2015) provide a very good overview of the anthropological literature, while Blundo’s Chapter 2 in Blundo & Oliver de Sardan (2006) is the most comprehensive review of this literature to date. Section 3 puts some of the sources discussed in Section 2 to work in reviewing what we know about the developmental consequences of corruption.

2. Sources

There are broadly four types of cross-national data sources on corruption in Africa. The first comprises of surveys among the public or business enterprises of the experiences with and perceptions of the extent of corruption. Indices in which expert assessments (local and foreign) are combined with other sources of information (including public surveys) to produce rank-order tables of composite scores for a large number of states, populate the second type. The third includes direct observations of corrupt behaviour, and the fourth the indirect statistical estimation of corruption. The latter two are relatively under-utilised in the study of Africa and I look at them very briefly, before focusing on the more prevalent types: surveys and composite indices.

A good example of the direct observation technique is the study by Sequeira and Dankov (2010) who employed researchers to shadow clearing agents who deal with customs and
cargo in the port of Maputo, Mozambique, and Durban, South Africa, both on the Indian Ocean. They recorded incidents of observed bribe payments to port and border officials in a random sample of 1,300 shipments, and found that bribes represent about 14 per cent of shipping costs for a standard container in Maputo, and four per cent in the case of Durban. A more indirect method to trace graft was used by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) to compare the amount of a special education block grant dispatched by the central government in Uganda in mid-1990s with the actual amount received by schools. They found that schools received only 13 per cent of what was earmarked for them, with most of the money appropriated by local officials and politicians. The leakage was not uniform, though, suggesting that some schools have more bargaining power than others. Three subsequent Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana produced similar results, the authors report in the same publication (Reinikka and Svensson 2004), although the leakage of public funds tended to be lower where the end-users were better informed about their entitlements.

An indirect estimation approach can be found in the work of Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2007), who treat corruption as a latent (unobserved) variable that can be estimated by means of a structural equation model using variables that are causally associated with corruption and a set of indicators of the extent of corruption in a society. This MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) approach has been used successfully to estimate other unobservable economic variables, such as the size of the informal economy (Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro, 2011). Dreher and his colleagues estimate corruption scores for around 100 countries (30 from Africa) over the period 1976 to 1997. As two of the perception-based indices (WGI and CPI) start only in the mid 1990s, this provides an important complementary, publically accessible, and replicable early data source on corruption in Africa. Their figures
show that the better performers in Africa, such as Mauritius and Botswana, significantly improved their corruption scores over the twenty-year period covered, while the majority of states in the region gradually went from bad to worse. Algeria, the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Togo deteriorated significantly over this period, while scores for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia stayed very much the same throughout. Overall, Africa’s mean score and relative position in the world slipped over the twenty years between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s.

Surveys of the public and selected groups, such as firm managers, have become frequent since the 1990s and those conducted by the Afrobarometer project, the Global Corruption Monitor of Transparency International, and their combined efforts are increasingly being used. Their advantage is that they survey not only perceptions of corruption, but also ask questions about respondents’ direct experience with corruption. One recent (2014-2015) continent-wide combined survey (of representative samples in 28 Sub-Saharan states) reports that a majority of Africans regard corruption to be on the rise in their states, and they think that their governments are failing to deal with it effectively. Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana citizens were the most negative about the scale of corruption in their country (Transparency International & Afrobarometer 2015). On the basis of answers to the experience-based questions, the report calculates that some 75 million Africans had had at least one experience with corruption in the year preceding the survey, sometimes to escape punishment by police and the courts, but in many cases just to get access to basic services such as primary health care, water, sanitation, electricity, and education. A similar survey in North Africa and the Middle East (2014-2015) found that two thirds of respondents blame their governments for not putting a stop to the increasing corruption (both perceived and experienced) in their countries (Transparency International & Afrobarometer 2016). In Tunisia and Algeria a large
majority responded that corruption is getting worse, while in Egypt and Morocco only about a fourth of all respondents thought so. Studies that have used these and other experienced-based results in Afrobarometer surveys conclude that the poor are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in terms of bribery (Justesen & Bjornskov 2014), and that the prohibitive cost of alternative private sources of basic services (such as schooling, water and electricity) expose them to official whims more than citizens that can afford private alternatives (Peiffer and Rose, 2016).

Surveys of the experiences that firms operating in African states have with corruption add another important dimension to the experienced-based data. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES) conducted since the mid-2000s cover more than 10,000 firms in 33 African states, and reveal that a quarter of all firms in the region had at least one exposure to bribery involving officials. Just over 30 per cent reported that in their experience, getting a government contracts is predicated on “showing your gratitude” by means of a gift, and 38 per cent perceive corruption to be a major obstacle. Smaller firms seem to rely on bribes more than larger firms, and the more doubt there is about the fairness of the courts, the more inclined firms are to pay bribes. These surveys reveal quite a large variance across the region (see Table 1 below). According to the most recently available surveys, only four per cent of firms in Mauritius say that they had to face a bribe request, while the percentages for Liberia (the worst), Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are 70, 60, and 56 respectively. High as these percentages in individual cases might be, these business surveys show that Africa as a whole is on average not more corrupt (in terms of bribery) than South Asia or Central Asia.
The last of our four types of sources are composite indices. These combine a variety of sources, predominantly the subjective assessments of “experts” (such as commercial business information providers, non-governmental organisations, multilateral organizations and other public-sector bodies) to arrive at country-specific relative scores of perceived corruption. Two such indices have had considerable traction, namely the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the global non-governmental organisation Transparency International (Lamsbsdorff 2003), and the “Control of Corruption” index that form part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed under the auspices of the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007, 2010). The methodologies behind both are quite sophisticated and the care with which a large number of sources are explored and checked, do give them credibility (Meon and Weill 2010). However, concern has been expressed that they do not relate directly to the factors causally related to corruption, and suffer from subjective biases (Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 2007; Anderson and Heywood 2009; Olken 2009; Charron 2016; Aidt 2009). Subjective biases do not render composite indices totally useless, though. It is likely that biases and measurement errors are systematically distributed across these indices, which means that they can be used in cross-country and cross-regional comparisons. They also have the added bonus of covering Africa much better than any other corruption source.

The most recent addition to expert-based perception indices of corruption is constructed by the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) team, overseen by fifty social scientists on six continents, and drawing on the expertise of 2,500 country experts. Although this dataset has been used only sparingly in studies of corruption in Africa (see the Vdem website: https://www.v-dem.net/en/), it holds much promise and is included in Table 1. The project covers 173 states and data assessments back to 1900. One big advantage of the VDem data is that the academic experts involved distinguish between different types of corruption: judicial,
executive, legislative, and corruption in the public sector, thus capturing both graft and cheating, grand and petty corruption. Indices for all four are constructed from various indicators, and all four are combined in a super-index called “political corruption” that runs from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating more corruption.

Table 1 summarises information on Africa from three composite indices, and from the WBES in which firms are asked about their experiences with corruption. Means for the decade of 2000s are contrasted with means for the 2010s to identify trends. Overall, levels of perceived and reported corruption have stayed high in Africa, but with improvements around the margins. Note that there is a high degree of correlation between the three composite indices ($r$ of between 0.87 and 0.97), while the survey results in the last two columns have a correlation of between 0.54 and 0.61 with the composite indices (all pairwise selection).

<Table 1 here> **Table 1: Corruption in Africa, 2000s and 2010s**

As a whole, Africa fares poorly when compared to the rest of the developing world and the transition economies, as can be seen from the distribution graphs in Figure 1. The measure of (the perception) of corruption used in Figure 1a is the standardised version of the WGI’s measure of “Control of Corruption” but here reversed so that a higher score equals perception of more corruption. The mean for the period 2011 to 2015 is used. On the left is the distribution for “rest of the world”, that is, all states for which data exists excluding Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Africa. In comparison, Africa is perceived to be considerably more corrupt than this larger sample of developing and transition nations. The distribution for Africa also has a relatively short tail to the left, indicating that there are comparatively fewer African states with low levels of perceived corruption (notably
Botswana, Mauritius, and Tunisia) than the rest of the sample. Twelve of the twenty states with the worst WGI scores in 2015 are in Africa, namely Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan. Africa emerges somewhat better from the comparison in Figure 1b, which shows the distribution of bribe incidence (percentage of firms required to pay at least one bribe, mean over the period 2011-2015). Africa’s distribution is more similar to the rest of the sample compared to 1a, but with a larger density in the middle (20-30%), and a thin density to the left compared to the rest. Very few firms operating in Africa report that no bribes were required, while a large number do so in the rest of the sample.

<Figure 1 here> **Figure 1: Corruption in Africa compared**

The different sources of corruption reviewed here do not map onto each other one-to-one, but do provide a rich vein of information that can be exploited systematically. It would be wrong to assume that we will ever have a complete and error-free picture of a murky subject such as corruption, and it is therefore important that we report measurement errors and confidence intervals. The overall picture that emerges from all the sources cited here is not flattering for the continent, although the two mostly used perception-based indices both register a marginal lowering of the average score for Africa since the 2000s. There are pockets of relative little corruption, such as in Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tunisia, but many of the worst are also to be found on the continent.
3. Consequences

There is a long-standing debate on whether corruption greases the gears of commerce and economic development or whether it acts as sand that grinds and slows down these same gears. On the side of the “greasers”, Leff suggests that corruption should be seen as “an extra-legal institution used by individuals and groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy” (1964: 8). It provides political access to the politically weak and allows them to invest, produce, barter, and trade, under conditions of bureaucratic incompetence and/or policy failures. Leff (1964) and Khan (1996) both warn against using idealised benchmarks of economic efficiency against which to compare the presumed inefficiencies induced by corruption. Under certain circumstances, corruption – by getting things done – may compensate for official failings, and this is not only true of developing countries today, but was also true in 19th century USA and 18th century England. The bribe breaks the stranglehold of economic monopolies, cuts red tape (that is, undermines unproductive involvement of the state in micro-managing the economy), facilitates new investment and capital formation, encourages innovation, and assists in national integration (Leff 1964: 10; Nye, 1968: 419-420). Harvey (1966) adds that corruption can be “a supplemental allocation mechanism” conducive to economic development by allocating resources away from consumption to investment and the accumulation of capital goods. In a recent statistical study (covering developing and developed countries), Meon and Weill (2010) find that corruption indeed greases the wheels of aggregate economic efficiency when the overall quality of public institutions is sub-optimal. In a second best institutional world, corruption keeps the wheels of commerce spinning by compensating for policy and institutional weaknesses (see also Greenstone 1966; Choi and Thum 2005; Hunt & Laszlo 2012).
Those who believe that corruption acts more like sand in the gears retort that it might be true that corruption corrects for institutional failings, but it is still only a second-best alternative and it might well contribute to the further weakening of institutions such as the rule of law and public accountability. Overall, corruption creates more inefficiency than it corrects (Aidt 2009). It encourages the creation of “extra” levels of regulation that create additional opportunities for rent-seeking (opportunities to maximise monopoly profits), and thus reduces overall productivity. Harvey – who we saw had some sympathy for the grease argument – also points out that corruption acts as a form of double taxation (Harvey 1966). This reduces the total amount available for public purposes because the first tax is avoided by paying the second tax (bribe) that ends up in private hands. In addition, public spending priorities might be skewed by ethnic/group favouritism that is encouraged by corruption. By using perception-based measures of corruption, Mauro (1995) reports evidence that corruption undermines growth.

The literature on Africa tends to support the view of the “sanders” (Mbaku 2000; Gyimah-Brempong & Munoz de Camacho 2006). In a study that relies on the CPI for data on corruption, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds evidence of a significant and sizeable negative effect on economic growth, attributable directly to its lowering of productive effort and the misuse of resources, and indirectly, through reductions in investment in both physical and human capital as well as degradation of institutions (2002). d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni (2016) add a further consideration. They show that corruption encourages public spending in state procurement projects that, by its very nature, allows for graft at the highest levels. The secrecy and the size of the contracts involved in military procurement, for instance, create
ideal environments for bribers and bribees alike and encourage investment in the defence sector that is sub-optimal from an economic growth point of view. The natural resource sector in Africa is also notorious for its rent-creation potential, that is, the creation of opportunities to generate monopoly profits. Arezki and Gylfason (2013) find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption, especially in less democratic states in Africa. They also note that these very states experience fewer internal conflicts, suggesting that the spoils of corruption might well be distributed sufficiently widely to subdue those with the potential of challenging the regime. The resource curse operates to undermine economic efficiency and sustainable development (Taylor 2016), but does not necessarily endanger political stability in more authoritarian regimes.

Perceptions of and experiences with corruption may also have a negative effect on investment decisions by foreign and domestic investors, and consequently on economic growth. The evidence is mixed, though. Quazi, Vemuri and Solimam (2014) find support for the greasing-of-the-gears argument in that corruption (measured by the CPI) appears to facilitate foreign direct investment more than it discourages it. This effect is conditional on the overall institutional quality of the recipient states, which is exactly what the “greasers” argue. Abotsi and Iyavarakul report evidence of a degree of “corruption tolerance” on the part of foreign investors in Africa, but the “tolerable level of corruption for investment” is low (2015). International instruments such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials and the UN Convention Against Corruption, may well be lowering it even further.

As we all know, development involves more than just economic growth. Whether corruption favours or harms sustainable development has not been adequately tested on the African continent. As Aidt (2009) argues, it is only when we look at indicators of sustainable
development that we can settle the argument about the developmental effects of corruption conclusively. Using data from enterprise surveys, perception indices, and a measure of sustainable development Aidt concludes that while the net effect of actual and perceived corruption on economic growth is close to zero, both are significantly negatively related to the growth rate of “genuine wealth”, also known as “net national savings” (Dasgupta 2001, Chapter 9). There are relatively few African states in his sample, though. To see if his general conclusion holds for a larger collection of African states, Figure 2 traces the relationship between corruption, measured in two different ways, and an indicator of sustainable development. The latter is the 100-point Natural Resource Management Index (NRMI), a composite index derived from the average of four proximity-to-target indicators for eco-region protection (weighted average percentage of biomes under protected status), access to improved sanitation, access to improved water and child mortality. The NRMI covers the period 2006-2011, and 53 African states. A higher score records better sustainable management of the human and non-human resources (SEDAC 2011). The two measures of corruption are the WGI used above, and the WBES measure of the bribe incidence (percentage of firms required to pay at least one bribe). Figure 2 show a significant net negative effect of both perceived corruption (2a) and experience of bribery (2b) on predicted values of the NRMI, our measure of sustainable development. These negative effects are net of two other determinants of sustainable development, namely GDP per capita (from the World Bank’s Development Indicators - 2015) and the quality of economic institutions (as measured by Kuncic, 2014). Figure 2 implies that a one per cent increase in corruption in Africa on average reduces sustainable development by 0.4 per cent. Read in conjunction with Aidt’s findings, Figure 2 tells a very cautionary tale. Note, however, that these findings do not necessarily imply that the reduction of corruption is sufficient to promote development. It might also well be that the reduction of corruption itself depends on the achievement of a
certain standard of development.

4. Determinants

In Section 1 we noted that the majority of Africans (in the 28 states surveyed by TI and Afrobarometer in 2014-2015) identified corruption as major problem in their states. African leaders appear to agree. In 2003, representatives of 48 member states agreed to the African Union’s *Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption*. Africa is clearly “no longer at ease” (as the title of Chinua Achebe’s novel on bribery would have it). What can be done to address corruption depends on what one considers to be its main determinants.

There are few works that try to systematically identify determinants of corruption in the region, despite the fact that the general literature has identified a number of candidates in global cross-national studies (Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 2007; Aidt 2003; Treisman 2000, 2007). The exceptions limit the analysis to tracing the effect of a single or a narrow bound of factors (Willets 2009; Collier 2000) or focus more on the characteristics of firms and what makes some more inclined to bribe their way to contracts and favours than do others (Pelizzo *et al.* 2016). Nevertheless, some useful conclusions can be drawn from the general literature. These conclusions warn that there are no quick fixes, though.
The extent of corruption is determined by long-term trends, in particular the legal tradition of a state, level of economic development, and long exposure to democracy (Treisman 2000). The degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation also serves to encourage and perpetuate corruption as rulers favour their own clans/tribes (Treisman 2007). As we saw in Section 1, bribers favour corruption when it is assumed to compensate for the institutional shortcomings and weak general capacity of the state. All of these factors change only very slowly.

Legal institutions based on the common-law tradition are associated with lower levels of corruption than alternative legal traditions, and Africa is no exception. Bribe incidence is on average five per cent and perceived corruption three per cent lower in African states with a common-law tradition. This tradition entails law-making by judges, based on precedents, rather than on civil codes developed by scholars and passed by governments (Treisman 2000). In Africa, ex-British colonies inherited this tradition, but not all low corruption states share this tradition, viz. Mauritius.

Cross-national studies find that states with higher per capita income levels register lower levels of perceived and reported corruption. This effect is also noticeable in Africa, although the association is somewhat weaker. In a panel-data random-effects regression of a sample of 50 developing and transition states and covering the period 1996 to 2014 (excluding Africa), and controlling for the two other long-term factors discussed here (legal tradition and duration of democracy), a one per cent increase in per capita income reduces the incidence of bribery by 0.7 per cent, and significantly so. The corresponding reduction in a sample of 42 African states for which we have data is 0.25 per cent, but also highly significant. A higher level of GDP per capita accords with larger state capacity, including the ability to tax effectively,
securing a larger revenue pool to provide public goods and maintain institutions that can monitor and combat corruption. The distinction between private gain and public resources tend to be stronger developed in richer states, where there are also higher levels of urbanisation and more diffused educational opportunities. Urbanised, well-educated individuals are less tolerant of corruption. The history of corruption and its eventual decline in the USA, the UK, and Western Europe underlines that the reduction of corruption is a function of economic and political development, not the other way around (Noonan 1984; Ryan 2013). Peck emphasises that the patterns of corruption in early modern England paralleled those in contemporary developing nations and that these patterns had distinct benefits for the centralisation of state power in tumultuous political times in England (Peck 1993; see also Huntington 1968).

In Africa, as in the rest of the developing world, it is the uninterrupted duration of democracy, rather than the mere event of democratisation – the introduction of competitive elections where none existed before— that makes all the difference. Net of the effects of the other two long-term factors (legal tradition and per capita income level), every additional year of uninterrupted democracy in an African state subsequently reduces the incidence of bribery by two per cent. Maturity of democracy brings accountability, more critical media, and restrictions on the terms of office holders – hence, less corruption. It is also accompanied by the development of modern political parties that institutionalise the aggregation of broader societal interests than those of the clan or the family (Huntington 1968).

Specific policy decisions by state leaders can reduce or exacerbate corruption. The introduction after independence of what Collier calls “sweeping economic control regimes
which gave officials astonishingly wide powers over private activity” (2000, 194), set the scene for the flourishing of corruption (see also Mbaku 2000; Riley 1998). The first generation of post-independence leaders appointed large numbers of civil servants to oversee these regulations, and expanded public procurement to unprecedented levels. These leaders favoured light surveillance arrangements. For Collier and Mbaku, this means that corruption was “made” in Africa, and that it can therefore be “unmade” once these opportunities for rent-seeking are reduced and better scrutiny of government behaviour is put in place. Collier and Mbaku’s prescriptions resonate well with the public-choice understanding of corruption, in which corruption is primarily a function of the incentives faced by perpetrators and victims (see Mbaku 2000, and for a critique, Olken & Pande 2012). Reduce the incentives – by curtailing state procurement and its size, and streamlining tax and reducing regulatory regimes – and corruption will be tamed. The current “good governance” consensus driven by donors, international institutions, and prominent academic institutions, is largely build around this narrow approach. Proponents of this approach single out foreign aid as an additional and unnecessary incentive for corruption, but the evidence is ambiguous. Some authors suggest that aid flows increase corruption (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). However, Menarda and Weill (2016) find no causal effect in a cross section of developing counties, including African states. As noted in Section 1, other transnational factors such as the availability of means for individuals and firms to drain capital from Africa to tax havens have a much worse effect than official development assistance could ever have.

There is no easy recipe to tackle corruption, and initiatives launched in Africa have so far met with little success. Better surveillance of national and continent-wide bodies can help, as would measures to curb the illegal drain of resources from the continent. In addition, streamlined state regulation and taxation regimes can also limit opportunities for cheating.
Ultimately, though, the reduction of corruption follows from the building of state capacity and economic-political modernization, and it seems unrealistic to try and bypass these processes. To the extent that the current fashionable good-governance agenda ignores or undermines the prerequisites of state developmental capacity (Khan 2012), it is likely to be counter-productive (Uberti 2016).

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Table 1: Corruption in Africa, 2000s and 2010s

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Notes:  
WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators measure of “Control of Corruption” reversed. Higher score indicate more (perceived) corruption. This measure is standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. A negative score thus means that a state is doing better than the mean for all the states covered by this measure. See [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)  
CPI = Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, score reversed and standardised with mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Higher score equals more (perceived) corruption. A negative score thus means that a state is doing better than the mean for the all the states covered by this measure. CPI methodology changed in 2012 and only data up to 2011 therefore used. See [https://transparency.org](https://transparency.org)  
VDem is the Political Corruption index of the Varieties of Democracy project. The index runs from 0 to 1, with higher score equalling more (perceived) corruption. See [https://www.v-dem.net/en/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/)  
Bribe is the incidence of bribery, expressed as the percentage of firms who experienced at least one bribery payment request. Source is the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. See [http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/](http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/)
Figure 1: Corruption in Africa compared

Fig. 1a

Note: “Rest of the sample” refers to 105 (1a) and 88 (1b) states respectively, excluding Africa, Western Europe, North America, and Australia and New Zealand.

Sources: 1a is based on the “Control of Corruption” measure of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, reversed so that a higher score indicates less control (= more perceived corruption). Available at: http://www.govindicators.org/

1b Uses the bribe incidence measure from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
Figure 2: Corruption and sustainable development in Africa, 2006-2011

Fig 2a:

![Graph showing the relationship between perceived corruption (WGI, lagged) and predicted values of NRMI (log).]

Note: Values of Natural Resource Management Index (NRMI) predicted in panel-clustered, random-effects regression, with GDP per capita and quality of economic institutions as regressors. See text and Figure 1 for sources.

Fig 2b:

![Graph showing the relationship between bribe incidence (log, lagged) and predicted values of NRMI (log).]

Note: Values of Natural Resource Management Index (NRMI) predicted in panel-clustered, random-effects regression, with GDP per capita and quality of economic institutions as regressors. See text and Figure 1 for sources.