Programme seminar series (2021): abstracts
October 13
TITLE: Wittgenstein, Blind Rule-Following, and the Possibility of Meaning
SPEAKER: Alex Miller (Otago)
ABSTRACT: In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes:
“All the steps are really already taken,” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space. -- But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help?
No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – I should say: This is how it strikes me.
When I follow the rule, I do not choose.
I follow the rule blindly.
(Wittgenstein 2009: §219)
What does Wittgenstein mean when he says, “I follow the rule blindly”? In this seminar, I will sketch an answer to this question: Wittgenstein is re-iterating the point he makes in Philosophical Investigations §201, that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. I’ll contrast this approach to the notion of “blindness” in rule-following to those adopted by Saul Kripke and Paul Boghossian, and I’ll use it to defuse some of the objections they make against non-reductionist conceptions of meaning and rule-following.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, October 13, in Richardson 7N10 (note: level 2 venue)
October 6
TITLE: In praise of ignorance
SPEAKER: Fabien Medvecky (Science Communication, Otago)
ABSTRACT: We are largely ignorant. At least, there are many more things we are ignorant of than knowledgeable of. Yet, the common perception of ignorance as a negative trait has left it rather unloved in debates around the knowledge and its place in decision making. This is markedly the case when it comes to science communication in its various guises. But ignorance is a complex and essential part of knowledge-making and of science; it performs a number of legitimate roles, and is performed in a range of legitimate ways. In this talk, I consider how ignorance has been presented and carved out. I make the case that we ought to value ignorance much like we value knowledge, and that this requires a finer grained understanding of (and rhetoric around) ignorance. I then consider the special case of science communication and make the claim that understanding when ignorance is a legitimately part of the scientific process and its communication, and when ignorance is misused or abused in science and its communication is a central to the public understanding science. I argue that fostering a greater public understanding of ignorance is a rarely acknowledged, yet essential, aspect of making science public; a challenge that those engaged in and committed to better public understanding of science should take very seriously.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, October 6, in Richardson 7N10 (note: level 2 venue)
September 15
TITLE: Reciprocity and Resources
SPEAKER: Elizabeth Fenton (Bioethics Centre, Otago)
ABSTRACT: Reciprocity has been deployed as the moral concept underpinning an obligation to ensure that health care workers (HCW) who work during a pandemic have access to essential goods, such as personal protective equipment (PPE), and as a principle for giving priority to HCW for scarce resources, such as intensive care beds or ventilators. In this paper I examine the concept of reciprocity, arguing that it is best understood as a form of fairness, or “fair return for services rendered.” This interpretation works well in explaining our obligation to provide HCW with PPE and other risk-mitigation resources, but I give reasons to suggest that it does not support an obligation to prioritize HCW for scarce medical interventions.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, September 15, in Richardson 7N10 (note: level 2 venue)
September 8
TITLE: What can’t AI do?
SPEAKER: James Maclaurin (Otago)
ABSTRACT: Alan Turing noted that laypeople often reason about AI in terms of things “we will never be able to make it do” such as thinking, creating, making moral judgements, experiencing the world etc. Turing called these “arguments from disability” and noted that they often rest on flimsy reasoning. More recent thinkers have suggested that such arguments cannot in principle be evaluated. But as AI has become more powerful and threatens to displace humans from many roles and occupations, reasoning about its capacities has become more important. In this paper I contend that such arguments can be made precise and they can, at least sometimes, be evaluated. This has important consequences, both practically and philosophically.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, September 8, via Zoom
August 25
TITLE: Neanderthals, Denisovans, Ghosts, and God
SPEAKER: Tiddy Smith (Massey)
ABSTRACT: Theistic evolutionism is sometimes considered Creationism-Lite©. According to theistic evolutionists: 1. God exists, 2. The evolutionary story told by scientists is true, and 3. Somehow, God is the director of that evolutionary story. God is, among other things, all-loving, all-knowing, all-powerful. Importantly, he is also anthropocentric. God has directed the evolutionary process so that it would lead to the existence of human beings—intelligent beings—with whom communion is possible.
Within the last 50,000 years, at least four archaic hominin species have gone extinct: the neanderthals, the denisovans, and two “ghost” hominin species, from whom part of the modern human genome is derived. Other relic hominid species also perished recently, within the last 20,000 years or so: Homo floresiensis and Homo luzonensis. I will argue that these extinction events are evidence against theistic evolutionism.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, August 25, via Zoom
August 04
TITLE: “There is a difference between justice (iustitia) and shame (verecundia) when reasoning about humans. The part of justice is not to harm (violare) a man, that of a sense of shame not to offend (offendere) him” (De officiis 1.99): Cicero and the moral importance of offense.
SPEAKER: Sean McConnell (Classics, Otago)
ABSTRACT: In this talk I explore Cicero’s attempt in De officiis to develop a systematic argument that grounds a concern about the moral importance of offense firmly in nature rather than in convention and arbitrary cultural norms. I first outline the Cynics’ argument (shared by some Stoics) that there is in fact nothing by nature offensive and that, therefore, concerns about causing offense, bound up with verecundia, are morally irrelevant. Cicero’s treatment of the fourth virtue, decorum, is largely defined against the Cynics’ challenge, and in the second part I examine his argument that verecundia, in which the essence of decorum is said to be seen most clearly, is in fact grounded in nature. In the final part I address further the problem that cultural relativism raises for Cicero’s argument—why do different cultures have different norms and standards concerning offense if nature is our universal guide? I suggest that the personae theory of decorum allows Cicero to account for such differences in a fashion that should appeal to contemporary thinkers grappling with the social and political implications of offense in liberal multi-cultural societies.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, August 4, Richardson GS2
July 28
TITLE: Reconciling relativity with a privileged present
SPEAKER: Patrick Dawson (University of Sydney)
ABSTRACT: It seems intuitive to think that there is an absolute, objective present time, distinct from the past and future. A variety of philosophical worldviews – the A-theories of time – propose that there exists such a present. But these views seem to be at odds with our best physics, and in particular the theories of relativity, which describe a four-dimensional spacetime containing no objective present, and no objective simultaneity. In this talk I discuss how relativity, the A-theories, and our common sense might be reconciled. I argue that the A-theorist can and should interpret relativistic spacetime as describing the observable past, rather than describing reality more broadly. So what our best physics tells us, in this case, is that there are no facts-of-the-matter about which past things were absolutely simultaneous with which. I argue that, contrary to first impressions, this does not contradict the notion that there is an absolute present, so long as we understand in detail what an absolute present is, and how it relates to notions like copresentness, or simultaneity.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, July 28, Richardson GS2
July 21
TITLE: The ABC of action: a neuro-philosophical analysis
SPEAKER: Grant Gillett (Bioethics Centre, Otago)
ABSTRACT: Reality comprises particles called atoms; but reality comprises waves of energy with a wavelength and frequency. The two conceptions must not be objectively, exclusively and literally true. Science forces us to use to apparently disparate types of mathematical modelling to begin to understand and analyse what is happening, A human being acts as a result of propositional attitudes; a human being resonates in accordance with the rhythms of life and so interacts with the world. Again we have disparate apparently inconsistent formulations. Sophisticated mathematical modelling allows us to understand this dynamic process. A similar structure to each of these inconsistent seeming pairs is found in the case of human action. Neurophilosophy may allow us a reconciliation in that a human being and some (or all) higher animals seem to act in a way which requires a holistic top-down coordination of sensori-motor function. Intentional action invites an ABC analysis where A is the act; B the brain state and C the consciousness/cognition involved. Philosophical questions about the act, the mental state preceding it, the appropriate moral judgment, and so on can turn on various of these points, each of which must be considered to characterise the event in terms of philosophical psychology, cognitive competencies, and the philosophy of action. The, analysis has a neuro-philosophical resonance for a human agent related to language and mental ascription and to the practiced rhythms of life which are difficult to render in abstract and formalised terms; they have a kind of “vibe” which provides a naturalistic account contrasting with propositional attitude based theories of mind.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, July 21, Richardson GS2
July 14
TITLE: Explaining Temporal Experience in a B-theoretic World
SPEAKER: Heather Dyke (Otago)
ABSTRACT: In the debate over the nature of time between the A-theory and the B-theory, the A-theory is prima facie a better fit with ordinary commonsense thinking about time, while the B-theory is prima facie a better fit with scientific thinking about time. Each theory thus faces a task of reconciliation: the A-theory must reconcile itself with science, while the B-theory must reconcile itself with commonsense thinking about time. I argue that the task facing the A-theory is, at best, deeply problematic, and I explore available strategies for the B-theory. I argue that the best strategy is an approach I call deflationism about our experiences as of objective presentness and temporal passage.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, July 14, Richardson GS2
June 2nd
TITLE: A New Value Pluralism for Sexual Ethics
SPEAKER: Vanessa Schouten (presenter); Mark Henrickson, Catherine Cook, Sandra McDonald and Nilo Atefi (co-authors)
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we argue for a form of value pluralism in sexual ethics – specifically, that pleasure and desire have been neglected in favour of consent, and that re-focusing on pleasure and desire can help resolve issues that consent standards pose for those who may not be capable of giving morally valid consent, such as people with diminished cognitive capacities. We believe that it is crucial that ethical theory pays attention to the practical insights of those making the kinds of decisions philosophers theorize about, and as such part of this paper presents and analyses data gathered from a large cross-sectional study on Residential Aged Care Facilities in Aotearoa New Zealand. The staff and residents of such facilities grapple with ethical decisions about sexual intimacy involving people with diminished cognitive capacity as a regular part of their working lives, and information about how they make those decisions and what they think matters can usefully inform theory.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, June 2, Richardson GS2
May 26th
TITLE: Decolonizing Philosophy: Differing Forms of Knowledge
SPEAKER: Greg Dawes (Otago)
ABSTRACT: A demand commonly made by advocates of 'decolonization' is that we should be prepared to embrace differing forms of knowledge: mātauranga Māori, for instance, alongside (Western) science. But what does it mean to embrace differing forms of knowledge? This paper sets out three possibilities before exploring some ways in which we might defend a radical cognitive pluralism: one that allows for even apparently incompatible ways of representing reality.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, May 26, Richardson GS2
May 19th
TITLE: The Identity of Indiscernibles and Human Nature in Spinoza's Ethics
SPEAKER: Michael LeBuffe (Otago)
ABSTRACT: Spinoza maintains that any two distinct things are discernible. The way that he applies this principle at Ethics 1p5 and 2p10s shows that, on his view, human beings share a nature but that we nevertheless differ essentially from one another. Spinoza's arguments on this subject move from a Cartesian to a Leibnizian account of created substance.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, May 19, Richardson GS2
May 12th
TITLE: Harmful choices and health-care decision-making competence
SPEAKER: Neil Pickering (Bioethics, Otago)
ABSTRACT: When people are assessed to see if they are health-care decision-making competent (or not), should the harm of their choice be taken into account? The internalists – as they are called – say ‘no’. The externalists say ‘yes’. In this talk I consider support externalists have offered for their account – only to find they’ve fixed the answer – and further analysis is needed.
At least some of my analysis will focus on a well-known analogy, devised by the externalists.
Imagine a person who is a very average tightrope walker. Is this person competent to walk the tightrope? The externalist argues yes if the tightrope is only a few inches off the ground, but no if the tightrope is suspended high and there’s no safety net. Mutatis mutandis, the externalist concludes that a person may be competent to choose beneficial health-care options, but simultaneously not competent to choose harmful health-care options.
How persuasive is this purported analogy? (Not very.) Can externalists do better? (Let’s give it a go.)
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, May 12, Richardson GS2
May 5th
TITLE: The Scope of Practical Deliberation
SPEAKER: Caitlin Fitchett (Otago, Harvard)
ABSTRACT: Paradigmatically, agents form intentions through processes of practical deliberation. An intention terminates a process of practical deliberation by settling the question that inspired that instance of practical deliberation. A number of philosophers, including Michael Bratman, Nicholas Southwood, and David Velleman draw a tight circle between what an agent can rationally intend to do and what that agent can rationally deliberate about: If an agent cannot φ, that agent cannot rationally intend to φ, and therefore should not ask practical questions that are answered only by an intention to φ. I argue against this view. Agents, I claim, can take outcomes that they may not be able to personally cause as their ends without thereby being irrational. If successful, my argument has serious implications for debates concerning the nature of intentional actions performed by groups and the moral responsibility of individuals as members of our shared world. I conclude with a brief discussion of these implications.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, May 5, Richardson GS2
April 28th
TITLE: How to Canberra-plan disagreement
SPEAKER: Jeremy Wyatt (Waikato)
ABSTRACT: What is disagreement, and how can we come to know what disagreement is? Philosophers from nearly every corner of the discipline have investigated disagreement, so answers to the first question aren't in short supply. Answers to the second question, though, are harder to come by. In this talk, I'll outline an approach to the study of disagreement that is modelled on the Canberra Plan. I'll also demonstrate how this approach can be applied by using it to sketch an account of one of the most controversial kinds of disagreement, disagreement about taste.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, April 28, Richardson GS2
April 21th
TITLE: Pluralism and Paraconsistent Arithmetic
SPEAKER: Zach Weber (Otago)
ABSTRACT: Mathematical pluralism says there are many different but equally legitimate mathematical practices. Logical pluralism says there are many different but equally legitimate logics—for example, paraconsistent logic. Pluralisms give us a friendly way to understand, say, “paraconsistent arithmetic” as just one kind of theory among many. But I will argue that pluralism does not help us make sense of actual examples, such as R. K. Meyer’s claim circa 1975 to have “overturned” Gödel’s incompleteness theorem using paraconsistent arithmetic. Did he? Does his claim even make sense? We will investigate. The answers we come to will turn on whether logic is descriptive or normative.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, April 21, Richardson GS2
April 14th
TITLE: New challenges for rule consequentialism
SPEAKER: Andrew Moore (Otago)
ABSTRACT: Through Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialism, this ethical theory has credibly addressed several key challenges from critics. This talk offers a quick overview of these things. It then presents some new challenges, and it develops and appraises various responses on behalf of rule consequentialism. Its overall conclusion is that rule consequentialism remains a serious contender in ethical theory.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, April 14, Richardson GS2
March 31st
TITLE: Just Interaction in a Non-Ideal World: Why We Should Tax International Aviation
SPEAKER: Elisabeth Ellis (Otago)
ABSTRACT: The social contract tradition’s promise of facilitating just interaction among large groups of strangers remains as salient as ever in today’s globalised economy. In response to the challenge of coordinating the welter of anonymous interactions that modern economic life consists in, contract thought offers the social conventions of money and law. However imperfectly these conventions operate in practice, however ephemeral the illusion of just economic interaction seems in the age of palm oil plantations, fast fashion, and Walmart, still, people rely on social conventions like money to orient themselves in the world. Carbon taxes have been touted by economists for decades as the most efficient way to send appropriate signals to people about their emissions behavior. The widely underappreciated fact that most fuel for international air travel remains untaxed — and is thus effectively subsidized relative to the rest of the economy — provides an especially vivid illustration of the necessity for appropriate social conventions to provide the conditions under which economic activity can be undertaken justly (or, at least, with reduced externalized harm). Taxing international aviation fuel would help people answer the question of how much of the remaining global carbon budget they can fairly spend on flying.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, March 31, Richardson GS2
March 17th
TITLE: Memory and Epistemic Circularity
SPEAKER: Tiddy Smith (Indonesia/Otago) Heather Dyke (Otago)
ABSTRACT: A great crowd of philosophers says that it is impossible to justify the reliability of memory without using memory. That's the ugly circle or the “epistemic circularity” of memory. In this talk, we want to push back against that crowd. We argue that advances in cognitive science should radically upheave the traditional, folk-psychological conception of memory which epistemologists subject to analysis. There are diverse cognitive systems that typically fall under the umbrella term “memory”. Once those systems are put to analysis, it can be shown that there is no epistemic circularity of memory.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, March 17, Richardson GS2
March 10th (from original March 3rd)
TITLE: Updating My Solution to Prior's Dilemma
SPEAKER: Charles Pigden (Otago)
ABSTRACT: Tea-Drinker 1: A. Tea–drinking is common in England. Therefore: B. Either tea–drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot.
Tea-Drinker 2 A’. Tea–drinking is NOT common in England. B. Either tea–drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. C. All New Zealanders ought to be shot.
According to Prior, sentence B is either moral or not moral. If it is moral then Tea-Drinker 1 is a valid Is/Ought inference. If it is not then Tea-Drinker 2 is a valid Is/Ought inference. Either way No-Ought-From-Is is false.
Thirty-eight years ago I developed a solution. B in Tea-drinker 1 is not substantively moral since its moral component suffers from inference-relative vacuity. So Tea-Drinker 1 is not an inference from non-moral premises to a substantively moral conclusion. Indeed no such inferences are possible.
But Prior might reply as follows: If B is not substantively moral when it appears as a conclusion in Tea-Drinker 1 that doesn’t mean that it is not substantively moral when it appears as a premise in Tea-Drinker 2? In which case Tea-Drinker 2 is an inference from substantively non-moral premises to a substantively moral conclusion! I update my original solution to deal with this response.
TIME AND LOCATION: 11am–12.30pm, Wednesday, March 3, Richardson GS2