Commentary: With recent scandals highlighting the risks of lobbying done behind closed doors, NZ’s secret lobbying culture is fast becoming an election issue, Dr Sean Whittaker and Jack Evans, of the Faculty of Law argue.
Politicians in New Zealand have long resisted regulating lobbyists and their activities.
This resistance is in large part due to the broad accessibility of our politicians, the informal nature of political relationships and the government’s reliance on lobbying for information and expertise in complex policy areas.
Nevertheless, the Government’s decision to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 in response to lobbying by Z Energy and Fonterra Co-operative Group has highlighted the risk of well-resourced individuals or groups influencing the development of government policy for their own benefit, often at the expense of the public good.
Such influence is deemed acceptable when lobbying is done in a transparent manner, as it allows the public to scrutinise the actions of both lobbyists and those within the public sector who respond to lobbying activity.
However, lobbying in New Zealand is obfuscated by the lack of legal obligations to disclose when lobbying has taken place. Unlike many other countries, this country does not legally require lobbyists, ministers, MPs or public sector employees to publicly disclose their lobbying activities or engagement with lobbyists.
The consequence of this lack of regulation is that lobbying here is primarily done in secret, making it difficult for the public to identify when government policies have been influenced or undercut to benefit private interests – such as in response to lobbying by Z Energy and Fonterra.
Additionally, this lack of transparency can lead to perceptions of ministers, MPs and public sector employees agreeing to amend government policy in the hopes of securing future employment with those lobbying them – the so-called ‘revolving door‘ between the public and the private sectors.
These negative outcomes of lobbying heighten the public’s distrust of the government and undermines our reputation as a country free from corruption. This, in turn, has raised the issue of our lack of lobbying regulation to one of electoral significance.
At the time of writing, various political parties have included the regulation of lobbying in their manifestos. The Green Party, for example, has introduced a member’s bill to regulate lobbying in New Zealand. Meanwhile, the Labour Party has called for a mandatory lobbying register, and the Opportunity Party has made the regulation of lobbying a bottom line for coalition negotiations.
For Kiwis looking to reach an informed opinion on political parties’ views on lobbying and lobbying regulation, there are several factors they should consider when assessing the efficacy of any proposal to regulate it in New Zealand.
The first important point is that any proposed regulatory regime needs to ensure that lobbying is done in a transparent manner. Publicly accessible lobbying registers provide a baseline level of transparency; both in terms of what is discussed during lobbying meetings and the number of meetings that take place between lobbyists and ministers, MPs and public sector employees.
Yet such registers are only effective where the recording of lobbying activities is mandatory, and where the reporting period is sufficiently short to ensure there is no major lag between the lobbying activity and its reporting. New Zealanders should keep a close eye on such elements in any party’s manifesto when determining whether any proposed regulation of lobbying will be effective.
The second point we should keep in mind is the existence of any stand-down periods. By prohibiting former ministers, MPs and public sector employees from being employed as a lobbyist during the stand-down period, it is less likely that lobbyists will be able to influence the development of government policy through promises of employment.
Introducing such a stand-down period would bring New Zealand in line with other countries and increase public trust in government. To align with international norms, any stand-down period should run for at least one year to prevent ministers, MPs and public sector employees from immediately trading their recent connections or knowledge of confidential matters for private benefit.
The final point worth considering is how political parties define who qualifies as a lobbyist. Too wide a definition risks unintentionally capturing ordinary communications between constituents and MPs, whereas too narrow a definition risks excluding those who seek to influence the exercise of public power from regulation.
One approach adopted by Ireland is to define lobbyists based on whether they engage in lobbying activities rather than defining them by their job or position in society. This approach has the advantage of allowing any regulation to apply flexibly across society while allowing for important exclusions such as communications between constituents and their MPs. This approach is viewed as the more successful approach to defining lobbyists within lobbying regulation.
New Zealand’s reliance on general transparency and integrity mechanisms as a means of regulating lobbying are proving insufficient. Sir Geoffrey Palmer previously argued that “the naivety and innocence of the traditional Aotearoa approach has caused us to fall behind other reputable democratic countries”.
This claim rings true in light of Z Energy and Fonterra’s lobbying activities. It is now up to us, as voters, to respond and ensure our rules for lobbyists reflect our expectations of a respected democracy.
Dr Sean Whittaker is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Otago, specialising in public law, governance and anti-corruption and Jack Evans is a final-year student in the Bachelor of Laws (Honours) programme at the University of Otago, researching lobbying regulation.
This article first appeared on Newsroom 14 October 2026.